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Abstract
The first essay (Chapter 2) examines how investors behave in parallel markets that trade
the same asset but have different degrees of transparency level. Using data from the
Taiwan Security Borrowing and Lending market, we find that short sellers with private
information prefer to trade in the opaque market, with momentum and risk-bearing
trading strategies prefer to trade in the semi-transparent market, and with urgent
liquidity needs (such as short-squeezed short sellers) prefer to trade in the transparent
market. We show that transactions in both transparent and opaque markets contain
information and provide liquidity. Our results indicate that parallel markets complement
each other by serving different types of investors.
The second essay (Chapter 3) shows that the presence of security lending supply
before an initial public offering (IPO) reduces the initial stock return following IPO and
improves the subsequent long-run performance. We use a sample of British firms that
went public via a two-stage IPO procedure where a firm becomes publicly traded on the
London Stock Exchange in the first stage, and offers new shares to the public in the
second stage. Stocks are lendable before the new equity issuance which relaxes the short
sale constraints that investors typically face in a conventional IPO. We find that two-
stage offerings with higher security lending supply before offering are associated with
lower IPO underpricing and better long-run performance. Our results are consistent with
the conjecture that short selling improves the pricing efficiency of the IPO market.
The third essay (Chapter 4) examines the effect of short sellers as arbitrageurs on
market liquidity in cases of toxic and non-toxic arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage
opportunities can be toxic when the prices of an asset-pair adjust to information at
different speeds. In this case, market makers increase spread to avoid being picked off
by informed arbitrageurs. Using price-parity deviations of Canadian stocks cross-listed
in the U.S. market as arbitrage opportunities identifiers, we document that short
arbitrageurs provide liquidity to the market in general, but impair liquidity in cases of
toxic relative to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities. We also show that the liquidity
impairment effect of short arbitrageurs is stronger when limits to arbitrage are high.
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1Chapter 1
General introduction
A short sale is defined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as “the sale
of a stock that an investor does not own or a sale which is consummated by the delivery
of a stock borrowed by, or for the account of, the investor.”.1 Short sellers borrow
securities for delivery at settlement. Later, they purchase securities back on the open
market and return to the lender to close out their short position. They earn profit if the
security price decreases between the opening and closing out of the short position.
Academics generally believe that short selling is beneficial to the market. Miller
(1977) predicts that in the existence of divergent opinions, short sales improve market
efficiency by allowing investors with opposite opinions to short stocks, so as to reduce
potential overvaluation. In addition, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that short
sales enhance the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information. Empirically,
Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), and
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short sellers are informed traders who
contribute to pricing efficiency. Moreover, Kaplan, Moskowitz and Sensoy (2013)
document that stock lending as the source of short sales has no adverse effects on stock
returns, volatility, skewness, or bid- ask spreads. Further, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010)
document that stocks with low lending supply have lower pricing efficiency.
However, short selling is also perceived as a cause for the 2007-2009 financial crisis
and the European sovereign debt crisis. More specifically, short sellers are blamed for
generating excessive volatility with large price reversals through aggressive and
1 http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm
2manipulative shorting behaviour (e.g., Goldstein and Guembel, 2008). With a model of
predatory short selling, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) predict that aggressive short
sales in stocks owned by financial institutions could lead to short-term creditor-imposed
leverage constraints in these financial institutions. This leverage constraint could force
financial institutions (i.e., stock owners) to liquidate their long-term asset holdings at a
fire sale price. Empirically, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2012) show that intraday
predatory short sales could consume liquidity and cause excessive downward price
pressure.
Recent literature that investigates short selling bans (mainly target at financial stocks)
during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis find that banning short sales may not be a
successful means of market intervention. For example, by examining over 12,600 stocks
from 26 markets, Beber and Pagano (2013) find that short selling bans impair liquidity
and reduce price correction speed. Similarly, by studying the short selling ban in the U.S.
market, Harris, Namvar and Phillips (2013) and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013)
document that the prices of financial stocks are inefficiently inflated during the ban. In
addition, by studying the short selling ban in the U.K., Marsh and Payne (2012) show
that both liquidity and market efficiency decrease for financial stocks during the ban.
The above literature indicates that a thorough understanding of short sales and related
markets is crucial to academics, regulators and investors. This thesis contains three
empirical essays that examine the role of short selling in the financial market from
different settings. Specifically, Chapter 2 investigates short sales in parallel markets
with different levels of transparency, based on the data from Taiwanese security
borrowing and lending (SBL) market. In the Taiwan SBL market, the following three
markets run in parallel: (i) a transparent market, which facilitates both pre-trade and
3post-trade transparency, (ii) a semi-transparent market, which provides post-trade
transparency, and (iii) an opaque market that does not provide any quote or trade level
information.
Academics have undertaken several studies, but both the theoretical and empirical
literature remain inconclusive about the effect of transparency on market quality (e.g.,
Pagano and Röell 1996, Rindi, 2008, Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver 2005; and
Boehmer, Sarr and Yu, 2005). The results in Chapter 2 show that markets that trade the
same asset but have heterogeneous levels of transparency complement each other by
catering for investors with different trading needs. In addition, Chapter 2 documents that
short interests (lending fees) in the opaque (transparent) market have strong predictive
power regarding future stock returns, while short sales in the semi-transparent market
have no predictive power. Further, Chapter 2 shows that short sales in both transparent
and opaque markets provide liquidity to the stock market, while short sales in the semi-
transparent market have no significant impact on stock liquidity.
Chapter 3 analyses the effect of relaxing short sale constraints on the performance of
initial public offerings (IPOs) based on a sample from the London Stock Exchange
(LSE). On the LSE, firms could go public via a two-stage IPO strategy (i.e., introduction)
which has the same regulatory requirements as a conventional one-stage IPO, but allows
issuers to separate the listing (i.e., the first-stage introduction) and equity issuance (i.e.,
the second-stage offering) into two stages. In the first-stage introduction, firms are listed
on the LSE without raising new capital, while in the second-stage offering, listed firms
raise capital by issuing new shares. Importantly, existing shares could be borrowed and
sold short immediately after the first-stage introduction. When there exists a stock
lending supply after the first-state introduction, the second-stage equity issuance
4becomes short sale unconstrained. Short sellers would short existing shares before the
second-stage offering day if they believe stocks are overpriced, which in turn would
reduce the upward price pressure on the second-stage offering day. Consequently,
among two-stage IPO firms, short sale unconstrained firms are expected to have less
price run-up on the second-stage, offering day and better performance in the long-run.
The results in Chapter 3 show that the presence of short sellers before an IPO
reduces the first-day IPO return and improves the long-run stock performance.
Theoretical studies predict that short sale constraints and opinion dispersion on the IPO
offering day could be associated with initial price run-up and subsequent long-run
underperformance (e.g., Miller, 1977). However, in conventional IPOs, short sale supply
is unobservable since data on stock lending supply are only available for publicly listed
stocks. Using a novel sample with pre-IPO short sale supply data, Chapter 3 directly
tests this prediction and find supporting evidence.
Chapter 4 studies the effect of short sellers as arbitrageurs on market liquidity in
heterogeneous arbitrage opportunities. The previous literature examines the effects of
arbitrage on market liquidity, and has mixed predictions: Holden (1995) and Gromb and
Vayanos (2002, 2010) predict that arbitrageurs provide liquidity to the market when
they correct the mispricing based on transient buying pressure. Foucault, Röell, and
Sandås, (2003) conjecture that when arbitrageurs trade with asymmetric information, 
they impair market liquidity as dealers increase spread to avoid being picked off at stale
quotes. In addition, Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015) posit that arbitrageurs have
different effects on market liquidity depending on the source of arbitrage opportunities.
Chapter 4 provides evidence on the heterogeneous effects of short sales on market
liquidity based on arbitrage opportunities among Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in
5the U.S. market. A cross-listing arbitrage opportunity arises when prices in the U.S. and
Canadian markets deviate from each other. Arbitrageurs simultaneously take a short
position in the relatively overpriced market and a long position in the relatively
underpriced market. The findings in Chapter 4 indicate that short arbitrageurs provide
liquidity to the cross-listed stocks in general. However, they may impair liquidity in
cases of toxic (i.e. arbitrage opportunities that arise because of asynchronous
adjustments to news) relative to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities (i.e. arbitrage
opportunities that arise because of liquidity shocks), and this liquidity impairment effect
is stronger among firms with higher arbitrage costs.
6Chapter 2
Short selling in parallel markets with different transparency
2.1. Introduction
Market transparency is regarded as central to the financial market. Different
transparency levels result in heterogeneous rent distributions among market participants.
Undesirable transparency level could even drive certain types of investor out of the
market (Foucault, Pagano, and Röell, 2013). In addition, the transparency level is also
crucial to the competitiveness of exchanges. For example, in order to compete with dark
pools for market share, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) launched a pilot
program in October 2008 which allows investors to hide all of their order sizes.
Academics have undertaken several studies, but both the theoretical and empirical
literature remain inconclusive about the effect of transparency on market quality (e.g.,
Pagano and Röell 1996, Rindi, 2008, Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver 2005; and
Boehmer, Sarr and Yu, 2005).
In this paper, we examine the Taiwanese security borrowing and lending (SBL)
market, in which the following three markets run in parallel: (i) a transparent market,
which facilitates both pre-trade and post-trade transparency, (ii) a semi-transparent
market, which provides post-trade transparency, and (iii) an opaque market that does not
provide any quote or trade level information. Based on this novel setting, we examine
the trading behaviours of investors with heterogeneous trading motivations. We
document that parallel markets with different transparencies complement each other and
serve investors with different trading needs.
7With the aforesaid parallel markets being heterogeneous in transparency, an informed
investor with private information may prefer to trade in the opaque market to hide his
information. However, if the broker in the opaque market also has information, he will
increase trading costs or stop trading with informed investors. As private information is
usually time-sensitive, the informed trader will then need to shift to the transparent
market for the fastest execution to avoid closing his position. In addition, uninformed
investors such as momentum and opportunistic risk-bearing traders would prefer to trade
in the semi-transparent market, in which they could better evaluate the equity based on
past trading information, while bearing search costs to avoid paying a higher price for
immediacy.
In this paper, we focus on the behaviour of security borrowers in the Taiwanese SBL
market. Security borrowers are mainly short sellers who are perceived as sophisticated
traders (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012;
and Boehmer and Wu, 2013) that trade with different strategies (Diether, Lee, and
Werner 2009). 2 Their trading behaviours could provide insights into how investors
optimize their trading needs by choosing among markets with different levels of
transparency.
The Taiwan SBL markets offer a suitable economic setting in which to investigate
the relation between market transparency and investor behaviour. First, the Taiwan
Stock Exchange (TWSE) is an important market in emerging economies, with its total
market capitalization ranked 21st in the world. Second, Taiwan is one of the few
countries (e.g., Singapore, Brazil and Japan) with parallel SBL systems, and it offers
investors three different levels of market transparency. Third, Taiwan is the only market
2 There could be other purpose of security borrowing except for short selling, for example, borrowing
shares for voting. However, these trades are not prevalent and only emerge around particular event days.
8that provides trade-level SBL information in the transparent and semi-transparent
markets. This unique data enables us to examine the informativeness of lending fees
paid by short sellers with different trading motivations.
We raise several important findings. First, we provide real market evidence of trading
protocols in parallel markets with different transparencies. We show that during our
sample period, the opaque market neither overrides (e.g., Madhavan, 1995) nor gets
crowded out by more transparent markets (e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda 1991). Our results
support the experimental findings by Bloomfield and O'Hara (2000) which show that
parallel markets with different levels of transparency could arrive at equilibrium. We
further demonstrate that different transparent levels attract investors with different
trading motivations.
Second, we document different degrees of informativeness from short sales in the
three markets. We show that lending volume (lending fees) in the opaque (transparent)
market have strong predictive power regarding future stock returns, while short sales in
the semi-transparent market have no predictive power. Finally, we document that short
sales in both transparent and opaque markets provide liquidity to the stock market, while
short sales in the semi-transparent market have no significant impact on stock liquidity.
Our paper contributes to the growing finance literature that examines market
transparency and multi-market trading (e.g., Biais, 1993; Lyons, 1996; Porter and
Weaver, 1996; and Bloomfield and O'Hara, 1999). Previous literature mainly focuses on
the trading patterns of dealers and informed traders (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Biais,
1993; Porter and Weaver, 1996; and Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan, 1998) and relies
on experimental asset markets (Bloomfield and O’Hara, 1999, 2000; Bloomfield,
O’Hara, and Saar, 2015; and Gozluklu, 2014). We extend this literature by identifying
9various types of investor with different trading motivations in the Taiwanese SBL
market, and analyze how they trade in parallel markets with heterogeneous
transparencies. We also document that when markets with different transparencies
coexist, each market affects stock returns and liquidity differently. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that uses real market data to examine investors’ trading
behaviour in three parallel markets with heterogeneous market transparencies.
In addition, this is also the first paper to investigate a parallel SBL market system.
Unlike conventional short selling literature that focuses on a single over-the-counter
(OTC) market (e.g., Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock, 2013, Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010,
and Prado 2015), we use a novel sample in the Taiwanese SBL market to directly track
lending fees for the same asset in parallel markets. In contrast to the previous literature
which predicts that increasing transparency could reduce the search cost and thus result
in lower lending fees (Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen, 2002; Yin, 2005), we document a
higher average lending fee in the transparent market (2.97% p.a.) compared to that in the
semi-transparent market (1.24% p.a.). We conjecture that when investors can choose
among markets in different transparency regimes, the higher lending fee in the
transparent market is likely to represent the cost of immediacy.
Moreover, we fill in an important gap in the short selling literature by revealing the
heterogeneous preferences of different short sellers for market transparencies. The
previous literature with a single OTC market setting could only examine the general
influence of market transparency on short sellers based on changes in disclosure
requirements (Jones, Reed, and Waller, 2014; Duong, Huszár and Yamada, 2015). We
provide direct evidence from the parallel Taiwanese SBL markets, and show that
different transparencies benefit short sellers with different trading needs.
10
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional
features of the Taiwan SBL market. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes
our sample and summary statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2.2. Institutional features
2.2.1. Taiwan SBL market
In Taiwan, naked short selling is prohibited. Investors short sell either within the
credit line of a margin account, or by borrowing sufficient stocks from the SBL market.
The Taiwanese SBL market operates a three tiers system, where a transparent market (a
market for “competitive bid transactions” as defined by the TWSE), a semi-transparent
market (a market for “negotiated transactions” as defined by the TWSE), and an opaque
market (a market for “brokerage transactions” as defined by the TWSE) run in parallel.
Both the transparent and semi-transparent markets were established by the TWSE in
June 2003. The transparent market uses a deal-matching principle with the lending fee
determined by bids and offers through the SBL system. The trading process of
transactions in the transparent market is illustrated in Figure 2.1. When a deal is
matched, TWSE requests Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation (TWDCC) to
transfer the loaned securities from the borrower to the lender. Specifically, both the
borrower and lender appoint a security firm to report their bids and offers to the TWSE.
TWSE acts as a central counterparty and handles collaterals. The initial collateral
margin is fixed at 140% of the stock value, measured by its market opening price. In the
event of default, TWSE uses the provided collateral to buy back loaned securities.
Moreover, trading in the transparent market will incur the following trading costs:
11
lending fee (as determined in the transaction), TWSE service fee (which accounts for
1.6% of the determined lending fee), and the security firms’ commissions (which
accounts for 0.4% of the determined lending fee). All fees are calculated on a trade-by-
trade basis.
The trading process of transactions in the semi-transparent market is illustrated in
Figure 2.2. In particular, borrowers and lenders negotiate through their appointed
security firms and agree on a negotiated borrowing contract. The contract needs to be
confirmed by TWSE. After confirmation, TWSE then requests that TWDCC transfer the
loaned securities. In addition, both initial collateral margin and maintenance margin are
negotiated between the borrower and lender. The delivery of collateral is also arranged
between the SBL counterparties. Therefore, the default risk of the borrower is borne by
the lender. Trading costs in the semi-transparent market include lending fees (which is
negotiated between the borrower and lender), the TWSE transaction fee (which accounts
for 0.02% per annum of the total lending value) and security firms’ commissions (which
is negotiated between the SBL participants and security firms).
The opaque market started in January 2007. Transactions under this scheme are
completed outside the TWSE SBL system. The opaque market follows an OTC setting,
in which participants are not required to disclose any information to the public.
Moreover, no intermediary exists in the opaque market, borrowers and qualified brokers
(security firms and security finance companies who hold a lending pool) search for each
other and negotiate on lending volume, lending fee and commission for each SBL
transaction (as illustrated in Figure 2.3). Collaterals are arranged between the borrower
and the broker, while the initial collateral margin is fixed at 140% of the stock value
measured by its market opening price. The default risk of the borrower is borne by the
12
broker. Trading costs in the opaque market include lending fees and commissions (both
are negotiated between the borrowers and brokers).
2.2.2. Transparency in parallel SBL markets
In this section, we describe the types of information that each market discloses. The
transparent market provides both pre-trade and post-trade transparencies. In terms of
pre-trade transparency, live competitive bids and offers in the transparent market are
updated on the TWSE website during trading hours. Moreover, the identity of each
order submitter is disclosed to the public. This pre-trade information could limit
investors’ execution risk and reduce the search cost. In terms of post-trade transparency,
lending volume and lending fees are reported on the TWSE website immediately after
the completion of each transaction. This post-trade information could help market
participants evaluate the value of securities.
The semi-transparent market provides post-trade transparency. Borrowers need to
appoint a security firm to search for and bargain with potential lenders. Therefore, they
bear the search cost. During the searching and negotiation process, no information on
quotes is disclosed to the public. After a trade in the semi-transparent market is settled,
TWSE immediately reports the associated lending volume and lending fee on its website.
However, the identity of traders is not disclosed.
The opaque market is the least transparent market. No quote or trade-level
information is available to the public. Borrowers and brokers need to search for each
other and bargain on the lending fees. TWSE collects information from each broker on a
daily basis, and then estimates a total daily lending volume in all the three SBL markets
for each stock. This estimation would be published on the TWSE website the following
13
day, from which investors could infer the historical lending volume in the opaque
market.
2.2.3. Security lending volume versus short interest
In this section, we describe the distinction between security lending volume and short
interest. A conventional proxy for short selling activity is short interest. It measures the
total open short positions at the end of each trading day. Although short interest captures
the flow of a completed loan, it masks the sources and costs associated with the loan. In
comparison, security lending volume measures total shares on loan at the end of each
trading day. It captures the flow of a new loan position and identifies the market in
which it is borrowed from. Since there are three parallel markets for stock borrowing in
Taiwan, a new loan position in one market could either represents a new opening of a
short position or a shift of an existing short position from another market. Therefore,
security lending volume provides a more comprehensive understanding of trading
strategies of short sellers.
2.3. Hypothesis development
Our main research question focuses on the trading behaviour of heterogeneous short
sellers in the presence of parallel SBL markets with different transparencies. The
previous literature shows that short sellers could have different trading strategies
(Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009). In this section we discuss various types of short
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selling motivation on which we focus and make predictions on the possible preferences
of corresponding short sellers on market transparency.3
The first motivation for short selling is short sellers’ possession of asymmetric
information. Informed short sellers could have private information about either the
contemporaneous or future stock fundamental values. Short sellers would short sell
stocks that are either temporarily overpriced (Miller, 1977) or have not incorporated
asymmetric information about future fundamental values into current prices (Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1987). In addition, according to Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg
(2012), market capitalisation could proxy for information asymmetry. Since news
coverage and investor attention decrease with firm size, information asymmetry would
be severer among small stocks (Vega, 2006; Engelberg, 2008). Therefore, to identify
information based short sales, we examine whether lending volume is higher in small
stocks, and have predictive power on future stock returns.
The literature on market transparency predicts that informed investors would prefer
to trade in the opaque market. In particular, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) predict that
informed traders prefer trading in a less transparent market to dissimulate their private
information. Likewise, Pagano and Röell (1996) argue that informed dealers prefer
trading in opaque market to better extract rents from less informed investors in opaque
market. Further, Madhavan (2000) claims that traders with private information prefer
trading in an anonymous system to avoid being identified as informed and charged with
3 One should note that as short sellers are not all alike, there could be other short selling motivations
beside the ones we investigate here. For example, short arbitrage based on corporate events, short
arbitrage based on convertible bonds and indexes, and short sale to hedge a long position in the same
stock. These short sale motivations are beyond the scope of this paper, however, they would be worth
studying in the future research.
15
wider spread. We conjecture that these predictions can be extrapolated to the setting
with parallel SBL markets. Formally we posit:
H1: Lending volume in the opaque market have predictive power on future stock
returns.
The second motivation for short selling is to resolve a “short-squeeze” problem. A
short-squeeze occurs when a security lender wants to sell the loaned stock and recalls it
from the short seller. Consequently, the short seller needs to find an alternative lender.
In the worst case, he has to repurchase the stock from the open market and close his
short position.
When a security lender recalls a stock, the short seller has to deliver the stock in a
limited time (usually within three days) and in turn, has to pay a high lending fee to
another lender for immediacy (D’Avolio, 2002). As the starting day of the short-squeeze
based short sale transaction does not represent the real opening date of the short seller’s
position, the lending volume of the new transaction may still represent short seller’s past
information (information short seller possessed on the real opening date of this short
position).Rather, the high lending fee in a short-squeeze based transaction could contain
the lender’s private information on the stock’s future performance, as it represents a
decrease in the lending supply. Huszár, Tan, and Zhang (2015) show that lenders are
large institutional owners (insiders) that have better information about the stock but are
prohibited from selling. They document that lenders raise lending fees and recall stocks
before negative earnings announcement to deter upcoming short sales. If the short-
squeeze based short sale reveals lender’s private information, then the lending fee would
have prediction power for future stock return even after controlling for the short sale
demand (i.e., short interest). Therefore, to identify a short-squeeze based trading, we
16
examine whether lending volume has limited predictive power on future stock returns,
and whether lending fees associated with these trades have strong predictive power for
future stock performances.
In addition, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) show that traders with immediate
liquidity needs cannot conceal their needs and will be charged higher price by market
makers in a transparent market. Since short-squeezed short sellers need to deliver stocks
back to the original lender in limited time, they need to trade in the transparent market
which has no search cost but high borrowing cost. Formally, we posit:
H2: Lending fees in the transparent market have predictive power on future stock
returns.
The third motivation for short selling is to facilitate momentum trading. The previous
literature documents that investors earn profit by buying stocks with good past
performance and selling stocks with poor past performance (Jegadeesh and Titman,
1993, 2011; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996). In addition, Konukoglu (2010)
shows that momentum traders are uninformed and trade based on the past profitability
of momentum factors. Therefore, to identify momentum based trading, we expect that
lending volume increases as the stock past performance decreases, and are more likely
to crowd in past losers (i.e. stocks with the poorest past performance).
The forth motivation for short selling is to facilitate opportunistic risk-bearing trading.
As predicted by Miller (1977), uncertainty and risk lead to opinion dispersion. In the
presence of opinion dispersion, pessimistic investors would bear the risk and short the
stock. Empirically, opinion dispersion could be captured by stock intraday volatility
(Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009). Therefore, to identify opportunistic risk-bearing short
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selling, we expect that lending volume increases following the increase in stock intraday
volatility.
For short sellers with momentum and opportunistic risk-bearing trading strategies,
the literature shows that they are likely to be uninformed (e.g., Miller, 1977; Konukoglu,
2010). Therefore, instead of focusing on one particular stock that they have information
on, they are more likely to first select several potential targets and then search and
bargain to pick up ones with the lowest lending fees. In the semi-transparent market,
they could easily evaluate the lending fees and availabilities of a set of stocks. Therefore,
we conjecture that momentum and risk-bearing traders prefer to trade in the semi-
transparent market. Formally, we posit:
H3: lending volume and lending fees in the semi-transparent market have no
predictive power on future stock returns.
2.4. Sample and descriptive statistics
In this section, we describe our data sets and present the characteristics of the three
SBL markets. We use data from multiple sources. We hand collect transaction-level
security lending volumes and SBL fees from the TWSE web site for the transparent and
semi-transparent markets during our sample period (January 2010 to December 2013).
To infer the daily lending volume of each stock in the opaque market, we obtain daily
total lending volume of each stock from TWSE. Since SBL transactions can only be
conducted in these three markets, the stock-level daily lending volume in the opaque
market is estimated as the difference between the daily total lending volume and the
combined daily lending volume in the transparent and semi-transparent markets. In
addition, we obtain bid, ask, and closing prices, trading volume, total outstanding shares,
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year-end book value of equity and deferred taxes from Compustat Global and
Datastream. We obtain institutional ownership data from the Taiwan Economic Journal.
We exclude firms without SBL transactions.
Our sample contains 1,045 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai
during the January 2010 to December 2013 period. Among these 1,054 firms, 342 firms
are traded in the transparent market, 692 firms are traded in the semi-transparent market,
and 1,049 firms are traded in the opaque market. In addition, the majority of firms
traded in the transparent market are also traded in the other two markets. Likewise, most
firms traded in the semi-transparent market are simultaneously traded in the opaque
market. Overall, the total number of stocks that are traded in all three markets is 323.
Table 2.1 reports the distribution of SBL transactions in each market during our
sample period. The number of trades in both the transparent and semi-transparent
markets increases from 2010 to 2013. However, the total lending volume in the
transparent market decreases continuously during our sample period. This finding
indicates that traders in the transparent market prefer more frequent and small trades to
infrequent large trades.
Panel A of Figure 2.4 illustrates the percentage market share of each SBL market
measured by total lending volume. We find that the transparent market experienced a
9% drop in market share in 2011. This decrease occurred right after the financial crisis.
During recessions, investors are more aware of default risk. Therefore, with TWSE
acting as a central counterparty (i.e., investors have minimum default risk), the
transparent market was favored by investors at the beginning of our sample. However,
with the recovery of stock market after the financial crisis, the benefits of having a
central counterparty become less attractive for investors.
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To the contrary, semi-transparent market experienced a steady increase in market
share, from 48.35% in 2010 to 65.41% in 2013, as measured by total lending volume.
The opaque market has a relatively stable market share, between 18.6% and 24.11%
during our sample period. This evidence suggests that short sellers who leave the
transparent market generally flow into the semi-transparent market. If the quote
information is ineffective in influencing market behaviour (Bloomfield and O’Hara,
1999), then the trade flow from the transparent market to semi-transparent market
represents a decline in investors’ utility on default risk guarantee after the financial
crisis. For robustness, we use total lending value as an alternative measure of market
share and find similar patterns, as plotted in Panel B of Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.5 presents the average lending fee in transparent and semi-transparent
markets. During our sample period, the average lending fee in the transparent market is
more than twice as high as that in the semi-transparent market. This finding contradicts
the previous literature which predicts that higher transparency could reduce search costs
(Yin, 2005) and thus result in lower lending fees (Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen,
2002). However, the high lending fee in the transparent market could be anticipated with
parallel markets. When short sellers can choose from markets with different
transparencies, traders opting for the most transparent market are likely to be in urgent
needs and cannot afford time to search in the semi-transparent or opaque market.
Therefore, borrowers may not have bargaining power on lending fees.
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of stocks traded in each SBL market.
Specifically, we report the raw lending volume (SHVOL), normalized lending volume
(SHRAT), institutional ownership (IO), market capitalization, turnover, intraday
volatility, return volatility, Amihud illiquidity, and book-to-market ratio (B/M). For
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comparison, we also report the summary statistics for the full sample. SHVOL is the
total lending volume measured in thousands. SHRAT is calculated as the ratio of daily
lending volume to daily trading volume, measured in percentage.4 As suggested by
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), this normalization ensures the cross sectional
comparability of lending volume. Amihud illiquidity is our main proxy for stock
liquidity, which is measured as the ratio of absolute daily percentage return to daily
dollar trading volume (Amihud, 2002). B/M is measured as the book value of equity
divided by the market value of equity. IO is the percentage of shares outstanding owned
by institutional investors. Capitalization is the price per share times the shares
outstanding. Turnover is the total trading volume divided by shares outstanding,
measured in percentage. Intraday volatility is the difference between daily high and low
price, divided by the daily high price and measured in percentage. Return volatility is the
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous month.
We find that the semi-transparent market has the highest average daily lending
volume by using both lending volume measures. In addition, the transparent and opaque
markets have similar SHVOL (13.47 vs. 13.02), while the SHRAT is slightly higher in
the opaque market. The relatively lower SHRAT in the transparent market may be
explained by the larger average capitalization and higher turnover in this market. Stocks
traded in the transparent market also have the highest level of institutional ownership.
Moreover, the transparent market has the lowest Amihud illiquidity (0.09%) while the
opaque market has the highest (0.41%). This evidence indicates that stocks traded in the
transparent market are liquid stocks, while stocks traded in the opaque market are
illiquid stocks. This evidence is also consistent with D’Avolio (2002), who documents
4 All our results remain similar if we normalize short sale volume with total shares outstanding.
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that the holdings by security lenders are more biased towards large, liquid stocks than
the average holdings by institution investors in general. Therefore, we conjecture that
security lenders in the Taiwanese market are mainly passive indexers, similar to those in
the U.S. market.
2.5. Empirical analysis
2.5.1. Determinants of short sales in parallel markets
Evidence of different short sale motivations could be inferred from determinants of
short sales in the three parallel markets. To avoid sample selection bias, we focus on the
323 stocks that have been traded in all the three markets. We run a weekly panel
regression with firm fixed effect to test the determinants of short sales in each market.
The dependent variable SHRAT is converted from daily into weekly by taking the
Wednesday to Wednesday average. The same conversion method applies to other
variables. Independent variables include: lagged return (R), which is estimated by
aggregating Wednesday to Wednesday percentage daily returns; winner (loser), which is
a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock return is ranked in the top (bottom)
decile in that week, and zero otherwise; intraday volatility, turnover, IO and
capitalization. In addition, since lending volume has autocorrelation, we include lagged
SHRAT in the three markets as independent variables.
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results. Column (1) and (2) report the determinants
of lending volume in the transparent market. Specifically, lagged winner is positively
associated with SHRAT in Column (2), which indicates that short sellers in the
transparent market are either contrarian traders or have emergent needs for stocks (i.e.,
short-squeezed). If the transparent market is dominated by contrarian traders, both
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lending volume and lending fees should have (no) predictive power on future stock
return when contrarian short sellers are informed (uninformed). In contrast, if the
transparent market is dominated by short-squeezed short sellers with emergent trading
needs, only lending fees could have predictive power on future stock returns. Therefore,
to further identify the dominant trading motivation in the transparent market, we need to
explore the predictive power of lending volume and lending fees on future stock returns.
Further, SHRAT is negatively correlated with Amihud illiquidity in the previous week in
both regressions, which indicates that liquid stocks are more likely to be sold short in
this market. This is consistent with our finding in Table 2.2 that stocks available in the
transparent market are liquid stocks.
Column (3) and (4) of Table 2.3 report the determinants of lending volume in the
semi-transparent market. We identify strong risk-bearing and momentum trading
motivations in this market. Economically, in Column (3), a one standard deviation (i.e.,
4.71%) increase in past return is associated with a 0.14% decrease in SHRAT. Similarly,
the coefficient of lagged loser is significantly negative in Column (4). These findings
show that momentum short sellers prefer to trade in the semi-transparent market, which
supports H3.
In addition, the coefficients of lagged intraday volatility are positive in both Columns
(3) and (4). Economically, a one standard deviation (i.e., 1.27%) increase in intraday
volatility in the previous week would lead to a 0.10% and 0.13% increase in SHRAT in
Columns (3) and (4), respectively. This result indicates that the lending volume in the
semi-transparent market increases with the level of uncertainty. This evidence shows
that opportunistic risk-bearing short sellers prefer to trade in the semi-transparent
market, which supports H3.
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Columns (5) and (6) present the estimation results of short sale determinants in the
opaque market. The positive coefficient of lagged return in Column (5) and the negative
coefficient of lagged winner in Column (6) indicate that short sellers avoid past winners.
However, they do not concentrate on past losers, which indicate that short sellers in the
opaque market may not be simply momentum traders. In addition, the coefficients of
capitalization are negative in both Columns (5) and (6), which indicates that short
sellers in the opaque market prefer small stocks (i.e., stocks with high information
asymmetry).
2.5.2. Information and return predictability in parallel markets
To test which market has more informed short sellers, we form portfolios based on
lending volume and examine the performance difference between the least shorted
stocks (portfolio 1) and the most shorted stocks (portfolio 5). According to Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang (2008), the portfolio approach is easy to interpret, as it replicates the
return to a real trading strategy. Moreover, portfolio sorting approach could reduce the
impact of outliers when compared to the regression approach. We expect portfolio 5 to
underperform portfolio 1 if the market has informed investors. In addition, we also
consider an overall sorting based on daily aggregated lending volume from all the three
markets. This provides an assessment of the average informative level of transactions in
the Taiwanese SBL market. To better replicate the real portfolio trading strategy, we
start by sorting all stocks that are traded in each market. In the robustness test, we also
provide sorting results in each market based on the 323 stocks that have been traded in
all three markets.
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Following Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), each day we sort stocks within each
parallel market into quintiles based on the SHVOL and SHRAT in previous five days.
We then skip for one day and hold the portfolio for (i) one week (i.e., five trading days)
to replicate a short-term holding strategy, and (ii) one month (i.e., twenty trading days)
to replicate a long-term holding strategy. We repeat the sorting and holding procedure
for each day, which indicates that the holding portfolio is rebalanced by 1/5 or 1/20 on
each holding day. Finally, we calculate the average daily returns for the two holding
strategies following a calendar-time approach and report the results by multiplying five
(twenty) to illustrate the real profit of the portfolio strategy. The short-term and long-
term holding strategies help us to capture the time effectiveness of information, if exists,
processed.
Table 2.4 reports the sorting results. The portfolio performance is measured by both
equally-weighted daily raw return (EWRT) and equally-weighted risk-adjusted daily
abnormal return (EWAR), measured in basis points (bps). 5 The risk-adjusted daily
abnormal return (i.e., risk-adjusted AR) is measured as the difference between stock
return and the return of a corresponding Fama-French (Fama and French, 1993) 25
size/book-to-market portfolio.
Panel A reports the sorting results based on aggregated lending volume in the
Taiwanese market. We find that when portfolios are sorted by SHVOL, EWRT decreases
monotonically from portfolio 1 to portfolio 5, regardless of holding periods. The results
remain similar when we use SHRAT as the sorting variable and hold each portfolio for 5
5 Our results remain similar if we use value-weighted return measures.
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days. However, the return difference between portfolios 1 and 5 becomes insignificant
when we increase the holding period to 20 days.6
Collectively, short sellers in general are informed in the Taiwanese SBL market,
which is similar to the informativeness of short sellers in the U.S. market (e.g., Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang, 2008; 2013; and Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009). However, the
information content diffuses in a longer holding period.
Next, we examine the informativeness of short sales in the three parallel markets.
Panel B of Table 2.4 reports portfolio sorting results for the transparent market. We find
that the performance difference between portfolios 1 and 5 is not significantly different,
regardless holding periods and sorting criteria. This evidence suggests that short sales in
the transparent market are not likely to be information-driven, which rules out the
informed contrarian trading explanation for trading motivation in the transparent market.
Panel C reports portfolio sorting results for the semi-transparent market. Similar to
the results in Panel B, we find that portfolios 1 and 5 do not have significantly different
performance, regardless of holding periods and sorting criteria. This finding supports
H3, namely that lending volume in the semi-transparent market has no predictive power
on future stock returns. Uninformed investors such as momentum and opportunistic risk-
bearing short sellers prefer to trade in the semi-transparent market.
Panel D reports the portfolio sorting results for the opaque market. In contrast to the
transparent and semi-transparent markets, portfolio 5 significantly underperforms
portfolio 1 under all performance measures, sorting criteria, and holding periods. These
findings suggest that traders in the opaque market are highly informed, which is
6 The t-statistics of portfolio return differences are estimated using Newey-West (1987) adjusted standard
errors with 5 lags for the short-term holding strategy and 20 lags for the long-term holding strategy.
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consistent with H1, namely that lending volume in the opaque market has predictive
power on future stock returns.
In the next test, we perform Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions to control for
other characteristics. The depended variables are R and risk-adjusted AR over the next
one, two and four weeks. Independent variables include SHRAT in the three parallel
markets; three markets which is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock has
positive trading in all the three markets during that week, and zero otherwise; lending
fee in the transparent and semi-transparent markets, which is calculated by estimating
the Wednesday to Wednesday value-weighted average of the lending fee in each trade
within that market. Other control variables include winner, loser, Amihud illiquidity,
B/M, capitalization and turnover. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation by
using the method in Newey and West (1987). We use 6 lags as suggested by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) test.
Regression results are reported in Table 2.5. Panel A reports the estimation results
when raw return is used as the dependent variable. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show that,
economically, a one standard deviation increase (i.e., 0.01%) in SHRAT in the opaque
market is associated with a 0.07, 0.13, and 0.19 basis points decrease in raw return over
the following one, two, and four weeks. Results are similar after including control
variables, as reported in Columns (2), (4) and (6). In addition, the estimation results are
quantitatively similar when risk-adjusted AR is used as the dependent variable as
reported in Panel B. Overall, these findings suggest that the opaque market is
dominated by informed short sellers, which supports H1.
Moreover, we find that in the transparent market, SHRAT has the predictive power on
stocks returns in the following two and four weeks (as shown in Columns (4) to (6) in
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Panel A). However, the predictive power becomes weak when we use risk-adjusted AR
as performance measure (as shown in Panel B). In addition, we find that the lending fee
in the transparent market has predictive power on stocks returns. For example, a one
standard deviation (1.71% p.a.) increase in transparent market’s lending fee would lead
to a 6.41 bps, 16.76 bps and 33.82 bps decrease in return over the following one, two
and four weeks. Results are virtually unchanged when risk-adjusted AR is used as
performance measure (as shown in Panel B).
This strong return predictive power of transparent market’s lending fee together with
the weak return predictive power of lending volume in the transparent market suggest
that the information in the transparent market transactions is more likely to originate
from security lenders. This finding rules out the uninformed contrarian trading
explanation for the trading motivation in the transparent market, and further supports H2
by showing that short-squeezed short sellers prefer the transparent market.
The coefficients of both SHRAT and lending fee in the semi-transparent market are
insignificant in Table 2.5. This result suggests that short sellers in the semi-transparent
market are not likely to be informed. Consistent with H3, we document that neither
lending volume nor lending fees in the semi-transparent market have predictive power
on future stock returns.
2.5.3. Liquidity provision by short sales in parallel markets
In this section we examine the liquidity provision by short sellers in parallel markets.
One strand of literature shows that short sellers provide liquidity (e.g., Chakrabarty,
Moulton, and Shkilko, 2012; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013). In contrast, Comerton-
Forde, Jones and Putniņš (2015) predict that short sellers could consume liquidity. We 
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run a panel regression with firm fixed effect to examine the relation between short sales
in parallel markets and future stock liquidity.
Table 2.6 reports our estimation results. We find no significant liquidity impairment
effect in any of the parallel market during our sample period. In Columns (1), (2), (5),
and (6), we find that SHRAT in the transparent and opaque markets have negative
influences on Amihud illiquidity over the next week. This finding indicates that short
sales in the transparent and opaque markets provide liquidity to the stock market. The
liquidity provision effect in both marks remains significant in Columns (7) and (8) when
we simultaneously include SHRAT in all the three parallel markets as independent
variables. Meanwhile, we find that short sales in the semi-transparent market have no
significant influence on stock liquidity.
Recall that in Table 2.3 we find short sellers in the opaque market tend to trade on
smaller stocks, the liquidity provision effect of short sales in the opaque may imply that
informed short sellers facilitates liquidity in small stocks. In addition, the liquidity
provision effect of short sales in the transparent market might represent the original
lender’s selling behaviour. This further supports H2 by showing that when lenders recall
stocks for sell, short-squeezed short sellers prefer to trade in the transparent market.
Based on the findings above, we conclude that short sellers with different trading
motivations have different liquidity provision abilities. Informed short sellers in the
opaque market and short-squeezed short sellers in the transparent market provide
liquidity to the stock market. In addition, short sales based on momentum and risk-
bearing trading strategies in the semi-transparent market have no significant influence
on stock liquidity. Our finding further suggests that parallel markets with different
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transparencies are likely to complement each other and serve investors with different
trading needs.
2.5.4. Robustness tests
In this section we report the robustness test for our portfolio sorting results. Table 2.7
reports the return differences of short sale portfolios for the 323 stocks that have been
traded in all the three markets. Results remain similar to those reported in Table 2.4. In
the opaque market (Panel D of Table 2.7), when EWAR is used as the performance
measure, portfolio 5 significantly underperform portfolio 1 with a 20-day holding
strategy (-123.80 bps and -100.60 bps based on SHVOL and SHART sorting,
respectively). The magnitude of portfolio return difference is greater than that reported
in Panel D of Table 2.4 (-86.00 bps and -43.40 bps). This finding indicates that when
short sellers are not restricted by specific stock characteristics and have the discretion to
choose from markets in different transparency regimes, the informativeness of lending
volume in the opaque market is stronger. This finding further supports H1 and shows
that informed short sellers prefer to trade in the opaque market.
2.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study how short sellers with different trading motivations behave
when they could choose from parallel markets in different transparency regimes. We
identify different short selling motivations, and show that short sellers with asymmetric
information prefer the opaque market, short sellers with immediacy needs such as short-
squeezed short sellers prefer the transparent market, and uninformed short sellers such
as momentum and risk-bearing traders prefer the semi-transparent market.
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We find that parallel markets complement each other in information revelation and
liquidity provision. Our results provide the first real market evidence of investors’
trading behaviour in parallel markets with different transparencies. Our findings also
shed new light on the market design by illustrating that parallel markets in different
transparency regimes can cater to investors’ different trading needs. In future works, it
would be interesting to examine the trading behaviour in the three parallel markets
around corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions, stock splits, seasoned equity
offerings and earnings announcements. It is also worth examining the intraday trading
patterns in the three parallel markets.
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Table 2.1 : Year and market distributions of short sales
This table presents the year and market distribution for stocks that are short sold in the Taiwanese SBL market for the full sample as well as each parallel market.
We report the statistics of stocks traded in each parallel market, and report the market share of each parallel market as a percentage of overall Taiwan SBL
market based on that statistic. Our sample includes 1,045 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai between January 2010 and December 2013.
Number of firms is the total number of firms traded in each market each year. Number of trades is the total number of trades in each market each year, measured
in thousands. Lending fee is the value-weighted lending fee of firms traded in each market each year, measured in percentage. Total short volume is the total
number of shares traded in each market each year, measured in billions. Total short value is the total value of stocks traded in each market each year, measured in
NT$ billions. Number of trades and lending fee are only available for transparent and semi-transparent markets.
Full sample Transparent market Semi-transparent market Opaque market
Year Number Mkt share Number Mkt share Number Mkt share
Number of firms
2010 836 173 336 820
2011 935 198 557 904
2012 858 221 546 844
2013 855 243 627 819
Number of trades (thousands)
2010 6.99 10.73
2011 9.72 15.68
2012 13.12 18.47
2013 15.57 19.70
Lending fee (%)
2010 3.00 0.92
2011 3.06 1.17
2012 3.42 1.42
2013 2.45 1.31
Total short volume (billions)
2010 17.08 5.02 29.38% 8.26 48.35% 3.80 22.27%
2011 20.23 4.13 20.39% 11.23 55.50% 4.88 24.11%
2012 18.27 3.31 18.14% 10.74 58.79% 4.22 23.07%
2013 22.74 3.64 15.99% 14.87 65.41% 4.23 18.60%
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Table 2.1 (Cont’d)
Full sample Transparent market Semi-transparent market Opaque market
Year Number Mkt share Number Mkt share Number Mkt share
Total short value (NT$ billions)
2010 1,041.74 361.85 34.74% 506.19 48.59% 173.70 16.67%
2011 1,146.65 287.55 25.08% 626.20 54.61% 232.90 20.31%
2012 1,009.20 283.48 28.09% 531.64 52.68% 194.08 19.23%
2013 1,107.03 266.78 24.10% 685.87 61.96% 154.38 13.95%
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Table 2.2 : Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample as well as each parallel market. Our sample
includes 1,045 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai between January 2010 and
December 2013. SHVOL is the total lending volume measured in thousands. SHRAT is calculated as the
ratio of daily lending volume to daily trading volume, measured in percentage. Lending fee is the
annualized value-weighted lending fee of each trade, measured in percentage. Amihud illiquidity is
measured as the ratio of absolute daily percentage return to daily dollar trading volume (Amihud, 2002).
B/M is measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. IO is the percentage of
the shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Capitalization is the price per share times shares
outstanding. Turnover is the total trading volume divided by shares outstanding, measured in percentage.
Intraday volatility is the difference between daily high and low price, divided by the daily high price and
measured in percentage. Return volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous
month. .
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Full sample Transparent
market
Semi-
transparent
market
Opaque market
SHVOL (thousands)
Mean 63.72 13.47 41.41 13.02
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 555.32 237.85 593.78 147.38
SHRAT (%)
Mean 1.29 0.19 0.70 0.41
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 9.09 3.64 6.98 4.04
Lending fee (%)
Mean 2.97 1.24
Median 2.50 0.01
Std. Dev. 2.36 2.36
IO (%)
Mean 37.42 43.35 37.73 37.23
Median 35.41 43.70 35.88 35.36
Std. Dev. 21.41 21.65 21.30 21.27
Capitalization (NT$ billions)
Mean 13.73 34.94 20.19 13.72
Median 3.86 13.83 6.93 3.82
Std. Dev. 35.52 56.90 42.67 35.69
Turnover (%)
Mean 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.66
Median 0.28 0.36 0.31 0.28
Std. Dev. 1.03 0.98 0.99 1.03
Intraday volatility (%)
Mean 2.49 2.48 2.42 2.49
Median 2.13 2.15 2.07 2.13
Std. Dev. 1.68 2.15 1.60 1.68
Return volatility (%)
Mean 2.00 2.01 1.94 2.00
Median 1.91 1.92 1.85 1.91
Std. Dev. 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.88
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Table 2.2 (Cont’d)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Full sample Transparent
market
Semi-
transparent
market
Opaque market
Amihud illiquidity (%)
Mean 0.41 0.09 0.14 0.41
Median 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06
Std. Dev. 1.19 0.43 0.51 1.19
B/M
Mean 0.88 0.79 0.82 0.88
Median 0.80 0.70 0.75 0.80
Std. Dev. 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.46
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Table 2.3 : Stock lending in parallel markets
This table presents fixed-effect panel regression results for determinants of lending volume in the
transparent, semi-transparent and opaque markets. The dependent variable is weekly SHRAT (measured in
basis point) in the transparent market for Columns (1) and (2), semi-transparent market for Columns (3)
and (4), opaque market for Columns (5) and (6). Independent variables include return, winner, loser,
intraday volatility, Amihud illiquidity, turnover, SHRAT in the transparent, semi-transparent and opaque
markets in the previous week, and contemporaneous capitalization and IO. Variables are as defined in
previous tables. Our sample contains 323 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai and have
been traded in all three SBL markets from January 2010 to December 2013. All columns in this table
include year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm. ***, ** and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Transparent
market
SHRAT
Transparent
market
SHRAT
Semi-
Transparent
market
SHRAT
Semi-
Transparent
market
SHRAT
Opaque
market
SHRAT
Opaque
market
SHRAT
Rt-1 0.18 -3.00*** -1.14***
(0.33) (0.63) (0.24)
Winnert-1 10.30* 5.60 -6.27*
(6.01) (6.95) (3.54)
Losert-1 7.37 26.26** 4.44
(5.92) (11.19) (4.44)
Intraday volitilityt-1 -2.57 -2.86 8.10** 9.77*** -0.66 0.06
(2.34) (2.37) (3.72) (3.67) (1.75) (1.78)
Amihud illiquidityt-1 -0.06** -0.06** -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
Turnovert-1 -7.42** -7.54** -22.08*** -29.23*** -16.30*** -18.62***
(3.37) (3.30) (4.51) (4.34) (3.96) (3.90)
Capitalization -0.56 -0.56 0.00 -0.03 -0.55*** -0.56***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.53) (0.53) (0.15) (0.15)
IO -0.92* -0.95* -0.88 -0.86 -0.61 -0.58
(0.54) (0.55) (0.71) (0.71) (0.42) (0.42)
Transparent market SHRATt-1 19.51*** 19.52*** 8.16*** 8.16*** 1.50** 1.50**
(2.73) (2.73) (2.10) (2.10) (0.64) (0.64)
Semi-transparent market
SHRATt-1
2.69*** 2.70*** 15.89*** 15.97*** 1.08*** 1.10***
(0.79) (0.79) (1.35) (1.36) (0.31) (0.31)
Opaque market SHRATt-1 5.55*** 5.57*** 11.60*** 11.89*** 19.68*** 19.76***
(1.81) (1.81) (1.95) (1.97) (1.28) (1.27)
Constant 144.08*** 143.67*** 244.01*** 240.49*** 142.00*** 141.23***
(28.64) (28.56) (36.13) (35.91) (19.99) (19.90)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205
R2 (adjusted) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
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Table 2.4 : Portfolios based on recent lending
This table reports the performance of portfolios sorted based on lending volume. Our sample contains
1,045 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai between January 2010 and December 2013.
Measures for lending volume include SHVOL and SHRAT. Performance measures include equally
weighted raw return (EWRT) and equally-weighted abnormal return (EWAR). We report the portfolio
performance with both a 5-day holding period and 20-day holding period. Panel A reports the full sample
results. Panels B, C, and D reports sorting results of stocks traded in the transparent, semi-transparent, and
opaque markets, respectively. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are estimated using Newey-West
(1987) adjusted standard errors with 5 or 20 lags for a 5-day or 20-day holding period.
Panel A: Full sample
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pt5-pf1
(bps)
Portfolios sorted by SHVOL
1 (least) -1.79 -0.98 -0.49 -18.26
2 -1.85 -4.18 -0.70 -25.41
3 -5.54 -9.89 -0.42 -31.46
4 -14.48 -15.20 -18.05 -21.15 -0.94 -13.38 -43.68 -42.40
5 (most) -17.19 (-2.05) -22.07 (-3.32) -1.26 (-0.51) -57.95 (-2.02)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
1 (least) -2.77 -4.48 -54.88 -39.18
2 -7.03 -9.36 -52.88 -34.57
3 -6.95 -9.95 -55.28 -40.37
4 -10.21 -12.20 -12.85 -14.30 -38.94 -9.16 -27.79 -14.06
5 (most) -14.94 (-1.78) -18.80 (-2.19) -64.04 (-0.40) -53.24 (-0.65)
Panel B: Transparent market
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
Portfolios sorted by SHVOL
1 (least) -9.35 -13.55 -36.57 -32.68
2 -17.22 -21.13 -29.00 -28.14
3 -21.70 -24.99 -67.26 -66.18
4 -24.03 -5.20 -27.68 -5.65 -80.23 -42.20 -77.26 -45.20
5 (most) -14.53 (-0.36) -19.18 (-0.40) -78.76 (-0.96) -77.84 (-1.05)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
1 (least) -11.91 -19.19 -27.52 -34.41
2 -6.76 -10.53 -35.13 -35.28
3 -26.14 -28.64 -87.78 -82.99
4 -29.34 -0.22 -32.73 4.15 -72.16 -41.60 -69.44 -26.00
5 (most) -12.13 (-0.02) -15.05 (0.30) -69.03 (-1.22) -60.49 (-0.76)
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Table 2.4 (Cont’d)
Panel C: Semi-transparent market
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
Portfolios sorted by SHVOL
1 (least) -7.49 -9.61 -36.92 -25.60
2 -6.38 -7.90 -44.12 -32.64
3 -12.47 -16.28 -39.75 -36.39
4 -8.04 -2.68 -11.96 -5.70 -22.86 -16.74 -20.13 -32.00
5 (most) -10.17 (-0.28) -15.33 (-0.62) -53.66 (-0.56) -57.58 (-1.15)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
1 (least) -5.68 -10.20 -35.17 -33.74
2 -12.07 -16.13 -44.98 -40.38
3 -9.51 -12.22 -49.04 -42.22
4 -4.60 -7.10 -7.54 -4.99 -27.65 -3.86 -23.51 2.54
5 (most) -12.76 (-0.70) -15.19 (-0.51) -39.03 (-0.14) -31.21 (0.09)
Panel D: Opaque market
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWRT
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
EWAR
(bps)
pf5-pf1
(bps)
Portfolios sorted by SHVOL
1 (least) -1.29 2.47 -15.53 -0.32
2 -7.51 -5.16 -26.64 -0.88
3 -11.14 -11.92 -47.82 -2.26
4 -14.12 -27.65 -15.96 -33.70 -34.53 -62.40 -1.92 -86.00
5 (most) -30.71 (-3.28) -32.40 (-4.31) -84.48 (-1.98) -4.76 (-3.07)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
1 (least) -3.88 -6.91 -46.74 -35.25
2 0.33 -0.65 -38.65 -20.89
3 -10.00 -12.71 -56.02 -38.10
4 -15.34 -13.00 -17.61 -14.05 -76.52 -46.40 -58.23 -43.40
5 (most) -16.89 (-1.68) -20.94 (-1.95) -93.15 (-1.80) -78.67 (-1.84)
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Table 2.5 : Return predictive power by stock lending in three markets
This table presents weekly Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results of stock returns. The dependent
variable is return in the Panel A and risk-adjusted AR, which is measured as the difference between stock
return and the return of a corresponding Fama-French 25 size/book-to-market portfolio in Panel B.
Independent variables include SHRAT (measured in percentage) in the transparent, semi-transparent and
opaque markets, three markets which is a dummy variable that equals one if the stock has positive lending
volume in all three markets during the week, and zero otherwise, lending fee in the transparent and semi-
transparent markets, winner, loser, Return volatility, Amihud illiquidity, turnover, capitalization and B/M.
Variables are as defined in Table 2. Our sample contains 323 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE
or Gre Tai and have been traded in all three SBL markets from January 2010 to December 2013. All
columns in this table include year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted
for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method with 6 lags. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample consist 323 stocks that are traded in
three SBL markets from January 2010 to December 2013.
Panel A: Dependent variable is raw return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Rt+1 Rt+1 Rt+2 Rt+2 Rt+4 Rt+4
Transparent market SHRAT -0.90 -0.91 -1.82 -2.15* -3.23* -3.88**
(0.77) (0.72) (1.28) (1.28) (1.79) (1.67)
Semi-transparent market SHRAT -0.37 0.72 -0.66 0.59 -0.98 0.39
(0.41) (0.65) (0.86) (1.07) (1.29) (1.48)
Opaque market SHRAT -6.74*** -5.30*** -12.63*** -7.21*** -18.87*** -7.45*
(1.48) (1.56) (2.42) (2.29) (4.16) (3.84)
Three markets -4.48 34.32 -23.13
(21.92) (37.95) (51.61)
Transparent market lending fee -3.75* -9.80*** -19.78***
(1.90) (3.63) (7.14)
Semi-transparent market lending fee -0.79 1.36 1.38
(1.47) (2.70) (4.34)
Winner -9.76 -0.58 12.42
(13.30) (18.90) (22.61)
Loser 27.10*** 28.55* 41.41**
(9.51) (15.47) (18.92)
Return volatility -2.14 -4.04 -7.23
(4.93) (9.25) (17.13)
Amihud illiquidity 1.87 6.91 12.47
(3.62) (6.47) (9.65)
B/M -51.27*** -100.95*** -207.68***
(11.78) (23.59) (45.81)
Capitalization -0.07 -0.13 -0.29
(0.06) (0.11) (0.20)
Turnover -2.13 -1.35 -13.56
(7.94) (13.76) (23.95)
Constant 12.27 61.48** 24.39 120.70** 49.59 259.15***
(18.54) (24.26) (35.49) (46.65) (66.38) (89.43)
Number of observations 44,619 25,194 44,835 25,194 44,835 25,194
R2 (average) 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.19
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Table 2.5 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Dependent variable is risk-adjusted abnormal return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Risk-adjusted
ARt+1
Risk-
adjusted
ARt+1
Risk-
adjusted
ARt+2
Risk-
adjusted
ARt+2
Risk-
adjusted
ARt+4
Risk-
adjusted
ARt+4
Transparent market SHRAT -0.63 -0.66 -2.12 -1.82 -3.26* -3.14
(0.68) (0.71) (1.49) (1.77) (1.94) (2.12)
Semi-transparent market SHRAT -0.12 0.80 -1.56 -0.61 -1.82 -0.70
(0.40) (0.61) (1.15) (1.21) (1.52) (1.65)
Opaque market SHRAT -6.51*** -4.88*** -21.19*** -17.80*** -27.19*** -17.91***
(1.37) (1.46) (2.74) (2.94) (4.21) (4.21)
Three channels -7.64 -17.41 -72.61
(22.11) (55.37) (63.48)
Transparent market lending fee -3.40* -15.51*** -24.71***
(1.87) (4.80) (8.00)
Semi-transparent market lending
fee
0.06 1.56 3.06
(1.56) (3.32) (4.97)
Winner -13.68 -31.61 -22.42
(12.86) (21.36) (25.25)
Loser 26.55*** 70.34*** 84.84***
(9.44) (21.82) (24.98)
Return volatility -1.56 -24.25* -26.95
(5.06) (12.99) (20.33)
Amihud illiquidity 2.09 13.03* 19.07*
(3.48) (7.65) (10.12)
B/M -72.04*** -177.20*** -323.54***
(11.29) (29.87) (50.65)
Capitalization -0.07 0.13 -0.05
(0.06) (0.14) (0.22)
Turnover -2.95 76.63*** 60.77**
(8.01) (19.04) (28.77)
Constant 3.66 70.10** 16.24** 210.50** 20.63* 363.97***
(2.53) (30.97) (7.62) (82.12) (12.44) (134.10)
Number of observations 44,619 25,194 44,835 25,194 44,835 25,194
R2 (average) 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.20
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Table 2.6 : Liquidity provision by stock lending in parallel markets
This table presents weekly fixed-effect panel regression results for the liquidity provision by transparent, semi-transparent and opaque markets. The dependent
variable is Amihud illiquidity. Independent variables include SHRAT (measured in percentage) in the transparent, semi-transparent and opaque markets, three
markets which is a dummy variable that equals one if the stock has positive lending volume in all three markets during the week, and zero otherwise, return,
winner, loser, Return volatility, Amihud illiquidity and turnover in the previous week, and contemporaneous capitalization and IO. Variables are as defined in
Table 2. Our sample contains 323 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai and have been traded in all three SBL markets from January 2010 to
December 2013. All columns in this table include year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Amihudilliquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Amihud
illiquidity
Transparent market SHRATt-1 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Semi-transparent market SHRATt-1 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Opaque market SHRATt-1 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Three marketst-1 -0.18 -0.21 -0.23 -0.26* -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Rt-1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Winnert-1 -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.35
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Losert-1 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
Return volitilityt-1 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Turnovert-1 -1.54*** -1.49*** -1.54*** -1.48*** -1.55*** -1.50*** -1.55*** -1.50***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
IO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
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Table 2.6 (Cont’d)
Capitalization -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Amihud illiquidityt-1 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 8.37*** 8.37*** 8.35*** 8.35*** 8.48*** 8.49*** 8.50*** 8.51***
(1.19) (1.20) (1.18) (1.19) (1.19) (1.20) (1.19) (1.19)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205 44,205
R2 (adjusted) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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Table 2.7 : Robustness tests– return differences on short sale portfolios for
stocks traded in three markets
This table reports the return differences of portfolios sorted based on lending volume. Our sample
contains 323 common stocks that are listed on the TWSE or Gre Tai and have been traded in all
three SBL markets from January 2010 to December 2013. Measures for lending volume include
SHVOL and SHRAT. Performance measures include equally weighted raw return (EWRT) and
equally-weighted abnormal return (EWAR). We report the portfolio performance differences with
both a 5-day holding period and 20-day holding period. Panel A reports the full sample results.
Panels B, C, and D reports sorting results of stocks traded in the transparent, semi-transparent,
and opaque markets, respectively The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are estimated using
Newey-West (1987) adjusted standard errors with 5 or 20 lags for a 5-day or 20-day holding
period.
Panel A: All Markets
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps) EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps)
Portfolios sorted by Lending SHVOL
ptf5-ptf1 -19.30 -22.50 -37.00 -57.20
t-stat (-2.17) (-2.79) (-1.24) (-2.09)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
ptf5-ptf1 -26.05 -24.70 -43.20 -43.40
t-stat (-3.29) (-3.24) (-1.65) (-1.67)
Panel B: Transparent Market
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps) EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps)
Portfolios sorted by Lending SHVOL
ptf5-ptf1 -3.29 -3.34 -40.80 -42.20
t-stat (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.91) (-0.95)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
ptf5-ptf1 0.27 4.74 -40.60 -25.20
t-stat (0.02) (0.33) (-1.11) (-0.68)
Panel C: Semi-transparent Market
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps) EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps)
Portfolios sorted by Lending SHVOL
ptf5-ptf1 -2.79 -5.80 -21.80 -35.00
t-stat (-0.28) (-0.60) (-0.63) (-1.06)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
ptf5-ptf1 -7.10 -4.61 -4.42 0.77
t-stat (-0.67) (-0.45) (-0.15) (0.03)
Panel D: Opaque Market
5 days holding period 20 days holding period
EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps) EWRT (bps) EWAR (bps)
Portfolios sorted by Lending SHVOL
ptf5-ptf1 -36.25 -39.05 -106.80 -123.80
t-stat (-3.27) (-3.80) (-2.54) (-3.18)
Portfolios sorted by SHRAT
ptf5-ptf1 -39.40 -36.90 -106.00 -100.60
t-stat (-4.22) (-4.08) (-3.09) (-3.04)
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Figure 2.1 : The trading process for transparent market transactions
This figure shows the trading process for the transparent market transactions in Taiwan.
Source: the TWSE website
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Figure 2.2 : The trading process for semi-transparent market transactions
This figure shows the trading process for the semi-transparent market transactions in Taiwan.
Source: the TWSE website
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Figure 2.3 : The trading process for opaque market transactions
This figure shows the trading process for the opaque market transactions in Taiwan.
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Figure 2.4 : Market share of parallel markets
This figure plots the market share of each SBL market as a percentage of overall Taiwan SBL
business. Panel A plots the market share of total SBL volume in parallel markets, which is calculated
as total volume of short sales in the market divided by total short sale volume in the Taiwanese SBL
market, for the transparent, semi-transparent and opaque markets during the January 2008 to
December 2010 period. Panel B plots the market share of total SBL value in parallel markets, which
is calculated as the total value of short sales in the market divided by total short sale value in the
Taiwanese SBL market, for the transparent, semi-transparent and opaque markets during the January
2008 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Market share of total SBL volume in parallel markets
Panel B: Market share of total SBL value in parallel markets
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Figure 2.5 : Lending fees in transparent and semi-transparent markets
This figure plots the annualized lending fee measured in basis points in the transparent and semi-
transparent markets during the January 2008 to December 2010 period.
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Chapter 3
Short Selling Before Initial Public Offerings
3.1. Introduction
In this paper we analyze the effect of relaxing short-sale constraints on the market
performance of initial public offerings (IPOs). We show that the presence of short
sellers before an IPO reduces first-day IPO return and improves long-run stock
performance. The average first-day IPO return has been abnormally high in the past
five decades (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 1994), which is often referred as the IPO
underpricing puzzle. IPOs with higher first-day price run-up are associated with
lower return in the long-run (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Theories
predict that short-sale constraints and opinion dispersion could lead to the market
overvaluation of IPOs in the short-term (Miller, 1977; Derrien, 2005; and Ljungqvist,
Nanda, and Singh, 2006). This overpricing would revert back to the fundamental
value in the long-run with the gradual relaxation of short-sale constraints. However,
since the short-sale supply of stocks does not typically exist before the offering date
of an IPO, the effects of short-sale constraints on IPO related issues have not been
directly examined.
In this study, we examine how the relaxation of short-sale constraints before the
IPO offering day affects the IPO first-day return and subsequent long-run
performance. If short-sale constraints reduce the pricing efficiency of IPOs, the
presence of stock lending supply would reduce the initial abnormal returns on the
public offering day. Further, with the gradual relaxation of short-sale constraints,
short sellers could arbitrage away the initial overpricing in the long-run, which leads
to poor long-run performance after IPOs. Therefore, if short-sale supply is available
before the public offering day, IPOs should experience lower initial return and better
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long-run performance. Specifically, we posit that the existence of short-sale supply
before the IPO offering day are likely to (i) reduce the first-day IPO return and (ii)
improve the long-run performance.
To test these conjectures, we obtain a novel sample from the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) on which firms could go public via a two-stage IPO strategy (i.e.,
introduction). An introduction, which has the same regulatory requirements as a
conventional one-stage IPO, allows issuers to separate the listing (i.e., the first-stage
introduction) and equity issuance (i.e., the second-stage offering) into two stages,
while in the first-stage introduction, firms are listed on the LSE without raising new
capital. In the second-stage offering, listed firms raise capital by issuing new shares.
Importantly, existing shares could be borrowed and sold short immediately after the
first-stage introduction. When there exists a stock lending supply after the first-stage
introduction, the second-stage equity issuance becomes short-sale unconstrained.
Short sellers would short existing shares before the second-stage offering day if they
believed stocks are overpriced, which in turn would reduce the upward price
pressure on the second-stage offering day. Consequently, among two-stage IPO
firms, firms with higher security lending supply are expected to have less price run-
up on the second-stage offering day and better performance in the long-run.
We start by examining whether relaxing short-sale constraints before IPOs
reduces the initial return on the public offering day. Consistent with our conjecture,
we find that two-stage IPO firms with higher security lending supply before the
second-stage offering day experience lower initial price run-up. This evidence is also
consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) who show that short-sale constraints
could reduce the adjustment speed of price to negative information.
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In addition, the existing literature suggests that underwriters would intentionally
underprice IPOs, which in turn could generate higher initial return (Rock, 1986;
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). However, we find that the effects of short-sale
constraints on the first-day IPO return could not be explained by the pricing discount
offered by underwriters.
Next, we examine the effects of short-sale constraints on IPO long-run
performance. Consistent with our expectation, we find a positive relation between
the level of lending supply before the second-stage offering and the subsequent long-
run stock performance. This evidence supports Miller (1977), who conjectures that
short-sale constraints on the IPO offering day could contribute to the subsequent
long-run underperformance. Our findings are also in line with Derrien (2005),
Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006), and Dorn (2009) who show that the
overvaluation of IPOs in the short-run could be associated with subsequent
underperformance in the long-run.
Our findings contribute to three different strands of finance literature. First, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines short selling before
IPOs.7 Theoretical studies predict that short-sale constraints and opinion dispersion
on the IPO offering day could be associated with the initial price run-up and
subsequent long-run underperformance (e.g., Miller, 1977). However, in
conventional IPOs, short-sale supply is unobservable since data on stock lending
supply are only available for publicly listed stocks.8 Edwards and Hanley (2010)
7 There are some papers that examine the pre-IPO (i.e., grey) market (e.g., Dorn, 2009; Aussenegg,
Pichler and Stomper, 2006; and Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist, 2006). However, in the grey
market, security lending supply does not exist and retail investors are restricted from selling short
(Dorn, 2009). Therefore, existing studies on grey market still assume that short-sale constraints exist
in the grey market as well as the early IPO aftermarket.
8 Previous studies mainly focus on testing the effects of opinion dispersion on IPO related puzzles and
simply take and support the assumption of short-sale constraints in the IPO aftermarket (Geczy,
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challenge this assumption by looking at the IPO first-day short interest. They find
that short-sale is prevalent on the offering day and is positively correlated with first
day return. However, determined by both short-sale supply and demand, short
interest does not directly measure short-sale constraints. Using a novel sample with
pre-IPO short-sale supply data, we directly test the effects of short-sale constraints
and find supporting evidence.
Second, we show that relaxing short-sale constraints improves pricing efficiency
(e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010; Boehmer and
Wu, 2013) in a new economic setting. Existing short selling literature mainly focuses
on the effects of short-selling bans to examine this relation (e.g., Autore, Billingsley
and Kovacs, 2011; Beber and Pagano, 2013). We provide new evidence to support
this prediction from the IPO market.
Third, we add to the literature on the benefits of the two-stage IPO strategy and
provide a new motivation behind this strategy. Derrien and Kecskés (2007) show
that a two-stage IPO strategy is more effective and efficient than a conventional IPO.
We further show that a two-stage IPO strategy would reduce short-run overpricing
and improve the long-run performance of the newly listed firm, since short-sale
constraints could be relaxed. These benefits would be valuable for practitioners and
market designers.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional
features of the two-stage IPO strategy. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses.
Section 4 describes our sample selection process and summary statistics. Section 5
presents our methods and empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Musto, and Reed , 2002; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; and Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan ,
2001). Their empirical opinion dispersion measures have significant explanatory power for both the
short-term IPO overpricing and subsequent long-term underperformance.
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3.2. Institutional features of a two-stage IPO
At the London Stock Exchange, issuers could choose to go public through a
conventional IPO process or via an introduction. For a conventional IPO, issuers
become listed and raise capital simultaneously. The nominated broker would be
responsible for pricing and promoting the newly issued shares. Meanwhile, for an
introduction, issuers are listed without raising capital in the first-stage introduction.
Current shareholders could trade with investors who wish to buy the existing shares,
but no new shares are issued at this stage. Further, with a first-stage introduction,
issuers could gain access to more institutional investors by increasing their visibility.
After the first-stage introduction, many firms continue with a second-stage
offering to raise new capital. The regulatory requirements for the second-stage
offering are minimal. In particular, issuers only need to file a prospectus containing
updated introduction prospectus, previously disclosed information and terms of the
current offering if the additional offering is sold to a large number of investors.
Therefore, firms with a two-stage IPO strategy could time the market more
effectively than those with a conventional IPO. Following Derrien and Kecskés
(2007), we define firms that get listed through a first-stage introduction and complete
their second-stage offering within five years as two-stage IPO firms.
The two-stage IPO strategy provides an ideal setting to investigate the effect of
short-sale constraints on IPO-related issues. This strategy is highly comparable to a
conventional IPO but substantially different from a seasoned equity offering (SEO).9
Further, for two-stage IPO firms, the market developed for existing shares at the
9 The main difference between the second-stage offering and a SEO is whether the firm has conducted
public issuance before. Further, Derrien and Kecskés (2007) find that the offering time, market
reaction, offering day trading volume, and price run-up before the second-stage offering for two-stage
firms are highly comparable to conventional IPOs, but significantly different from SEOs.
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first-stage introduction also helps to reduce the uncertainty for the second-stage new
issuance (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007).
3.3. Hypotheses development
Our first hypothesis focuses on the effects of short sale constraints on the first-day
IPO return. The positive abnormal return on the first trading day following an IPO
has attracted interests among scholars over the past decades (e.g., Ibbotson, 1975;
Beatty and Ritter, 1986; and Loughran and Ritter, 2004). However, the reason for
“money on the table” remains inconclusive. Among others, Allen and Faulhaber
(1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) predict that due to
information asymmetry, high-quality firms distinguish themselves from low quality
firms by underpricing initial public offerings. In addition, Rock (1986) presents a
model with two groups of investors: informed investors who would only buy new
issuance when shares are underpriced, and uninformed investors who could not
distinguish between underpriced and overpriced new issuance. He shows that
uninformed investors would not purchase new issuance because they would be
allocated with only a portion of the underpriced new issuance, but “win” the entire
overpriced new issuance (i.e., “the winner’s curse”). Therefore, issuers need to
deliberately underprice offerings to attract uninformed investors and ensure full
allocation. Miller (1977) and Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) suggest that
heterogeneous beliefs and short sale constraints could help to explain the large first-
day IPO return, because pessimistic investors could not short sell shares in the early
IPO after-market.
Further, the short selling literature shows that short sale constraints could lead to
pricing inefficiency. For example, Autore, Billingsley and Kovacs (2011), Marsh and
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Payne (2012), and Beber and Pagano (2013) show that the 2008 short selling ban
reduces the stock pricing efficiency. Similarly, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) find that
stocks with limited lending supply experience lower pricing efficiency.
Therefore, if the large IPO initial return is caused by short sale constraints, the
existence of short sale supply before the public offering day should improve the
pricing efficiency and reduce the IPO initial return. In addition, since short sellers
are sophisticated investors with better information (Boehmer, Jones and Zhang,
2008), relaxing short sale constraint enables them to incorporate private information
into the market price of IPOs on the offering day. Bad quality firms could not mimic
good quality firms as short sellers would detect them and heavily short on their
offerings. Issuers therefore have less incentive to underprice IPOs when short sellers
could reduce the information asymmetry. We posit that among two-stage IPO firms,
those without short sale constraints before the second-stage offering would
experience less market overvaluation on the offering day. To summarize, our first
hypothesis states:
H1: The presence of the security lending supply before the second-stage
offering would reduce the initial return on the offering day.
Our second hypothesis examines the effects of short sale constraints on the
subsequent long-run performance of IPOs. If the price run-up on the IPO first trading
day arises from the market overpricing, the stock price should gradually reverse back
to its intrinsic value. Previous studies find that firms with a higher first-day IPO
return are likely to be associated with poorer subsequent long-run performance
(Stern and Bornstein, 1985; Ritter, 1991; and Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Miller
(1977) posits that the gradual relaxation of short sale constraints would allow short
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sellers to arbitrage away the initial overpricing in the long-run. 10 Therefore, among
two-stage IPO firms, those with a security lending supply before the second-stage
offering should have a better long-run performance. To summarize, our second
hypothesis posits:
H2: The presence of the security lending supply before the second-stage
offering would improve IPO long-run performance.
3.4. Data and summary statistics
To test these two hypotheses, we collect data from various sources. In this
section, we describe the data sets and present the summary statistics.
3.4.1. Data sources
We hand collect the introduction information from the LSE new issue data,
which are available from 1994. The LSE data provide the following information:
date of first-stage introduction, company name, industry classification, and the name
of the nominated broker. Since the security lending data are available from January
2002, we consider only introductions that have completed the second-stage offering
between January 2002 and December 2013. For each introduction, we hand collect
press releases from Factiva. We consider the earliest issuance of primary shares as
the second-stage offering, and use the earliest date of news release about this
issuance as the second-stage offering announcement day. Importantly, since we
examine the role of short sale constraints on the IPO performance using only two-
10 There are other explanations for the IPO long-run underperformance, for example, institutional
ownership (Brav and Gompers, 1997), underwriter reputation (Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998)), and
earnings management (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). However, our main focus in this paper is to
examine the effects of short-sale constraints on IPO long-run performance.
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stage IPO firms, our results are not subject to the issue that firms self-select into a
two-stage IPO strategy.
We obtain unadjusted closing, bid, and ask prices, trading volume, and shares
outstanding from Datastream, net income, operating income and sales data from
Datastream and Compustat Global, prospectuses and annual reports from Thomson
One Banker and Worldscope. Further, we use Factiva as a supplementary data source
if prospectuses and annual reports are missing. Following Derrien and Kecskés
(2007), we use the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) index as the market
index and obtain the index daily closing price from Datastream.
We use the method in Derrien and Kecskés (2007) to select our sample. First, we
match introduction firms with Datastream using company name and listing date. We
only keep firms with relevant Datastream information. Next, we eliminate cross-
listing stocks, firms that have been traded somewhere else in the world before the
introduction, investment trusts and funds, and pure introductions (i.e., firms that
were listed at the first-stage introduction but did not complete the second-stage
offering within five years after listing). We end up with a sample of 107
introductions.
We obtain security lending data from Markit, a leading provider of security
borrowing and lending data. The Markit Securities Finance Data are collected from
beneficial owners, lending agents, prime brokers and institutional investors, and are
available at daily frequency. Markit covers security lending data for more than
20,000 institutional funds for over ten years of history, which accounts for
approximately 85% of the global security lending market.
We use the total lendable shares as our proxy for the security lending supply.
Specifically, we define security lending supply as the average total shares available
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for lending over the previous one week ending the second-stage offering day,
divided by total outstanding shares on the second-stage offering day.11 Among the
107 introductions, 22% have positive security lending supply before the second-
stage offering. The average security lending supply before second-stage offering is
12.9% for short-sale unconstrained firms (i.e., firms with positive security lending
supply before second-stage offering).
3.4.2. Summary statistics
Table 3.1 presents the year and industry distributions of the 107 introductions. In
particular, Panel A shows that short sale unconstrained firms begin their first-stage
introduction from 2004. In the empirical analysis, we include year dummy variables
in all specifications to account for the potential year differences. Columns (1) and (2)
show that first-stage introductions are more prevalent during the 2004 - 2008 period,
which is consistent with the increasing number of publicly listing firms before the
financial crisis. In particular, the total number of public listing firms in the U.K. has
more than doubled from 2003 to 2004 and kept increasing until 2008.
As a result of the increased number of first-stage introductions during the 2004 –
2008 period, a wave of the second-stage offerings could be observed between 2005
and 2009, as reported in Panel B of Table 3.1. Further, Panel C reports the industry
distribution of issuers. We define industry groups using the two-digit Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) code. We find that the introduction is more popular
among mining and service firms, while short sale constrained and unconstrained
firms have similar industry distributions.
11 Our results remain similar if we define security lending supply as the average total shares available
for lending over the previous one month ending the second-stage offering day divided by total
outstanding shares on the second-stage offering day.
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Table 3.2 presents the main characteristics of the 107 introductions. We
winsorize variables at the 99th percentiles to mitigate the effects of outliers. We find
that the mean security lending supply is 12.9% for short sale unconstrained
introductions. Further, compared to short sale constrained firms, unconstrained
issuers tend to have larger market capitalization, higher proceeds, and higher
turnover at the first-stage introduction.
3.5. Empirical results
3.5.1. Univariate analyses
To assess the relation between short sale constraints and first-day IPO return, we
first perform univariate tests. Specifically, we compare the initial return and long-run
performance between short sale constrained and unconstrained introductions.
In the first set of tests, we focus on the initial return. We define initial return as
the market closing price on the second-stage offering day over the offering price,
minus one. If short sale constraints before the second-stage offering lead to the
market overpricing, we expect short sale unconstrained introductions to have a lower
initial return.
Table 3.2 presents the test results for the initial return. Consistent with our
expectation, the average initial return of short sale unconstrained introductions
(14.7%) is lower than that of constrained introductions (20.3%). This evidence
suggests that the relaxation short sale constraints could be associated with smaller
initial overpricing. However, the difference is not statistically significant. For
comparison, Table 3.2 also reports the average initial return for the full sample (i.e.,
19.06%), which is higher than the 11.9% reported in Derrien and Kecskés (2007).
Since our sample covers the bubble period before the financial crisis, this difference
in initial returns could be expected.
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One potential explanation for our finding could be that the initial return is
positively related to the pricing discount offered by the underwriter. In the second
test, we examine this alternative explanation. In particular, we define pricing
discount as the market price one day before the announcement day of the second-
stage offering over the offering price, minus one. In Table 3.2, we show that the
average pricing discount is larger for short sale unconstrained introductions.
Therefore, pricing discount does not explain the low initial return of short sale
unconstrained introductions.
In the second set of tests, we examine the effects of short sale constraints on the
long-run performance following the second-stage offering. We measure the long-run
performance using annualized market-adjusted three-year buy-and-hold abnormal
return (Market-adjusted-BHAR), characteristic-adjusted three-year buy-and-hold
abnormal return (Characteristic-adjusted-BHAR), and four-factor alpha.
Specifically, Market-adjusted- (Characteristic-adjusted-) BHAR uses the market
index (size and book-to-market matched firms) as the benchmark while the four-
factor alpha is the intercept of daily regression using the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model. If the long-run underperformance is associated with the initial short sale
constraints, short sale unconstrained introductions should experience less long-run
underperformance.
Consistent with our prediction, we find that short sale unconstrained issuers have
better performance in the long-run by using all the three measures. However, these
outperformance are not statistically different from zero.
Overall, evidence from univariate tests provides some support for our
conjectures. The relaxation of short sale constraints before the second-stage offering
60
could be associated with lower initial return and better long-run performance for
two-stage IPO firms.
3.5.2. Initial returns
In this session, we use multivariate analysis to study whether relaxing short sale
constraints reduces the initial return of two-stage IPO firms. We start with ordinary
least squares (OLS) approach. In particular, we estimate the following reduced-form
regression:
݊ܫ ݅݅ݐܽ ݈݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜ = ߙ௜ +ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌ ݈ݕ௜+ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜ + m௜. (1)
Control variables include several factors that are known to predict IPO initial
returns (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007). Among these factors, Healthy at offering is a
dummy variable that equals to one if a firm has positive sales, operating income, and
net income on the second-stage offering day, and zero otherwise. It proxies for the
quality of issuers. Proceeds is the natural log of proceeds (measured in million
pounds) on the second-stage offering day. Market return at offering is the market
index return over the previous three months ending the day before the second-stage
offering day. It proxies for the market condition. Further, to ensure the robustness of
our results, we use the Market-adjusted initial return as an alternative dependent
variable. We define Market-adjusted initial return as the difference between the raw
initial return and the market return on the second-stage offering day.
Since heterogeneous beliefs could also contribute to the IPO initial price run-up
and long-run underperformance (Miller, 1977), we further employ press coverage
and relative quoted spread as additional control variables. We define press coverage
as the number of press releases in Factiva from the first-stage introduction to the
announcement day of the second-stage offering, divided by the number of years in
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between. If press coverage captures the level of information production (Derrien and
Kecskés, 2007), higher press coverage should be associated with smaller opinion
dispersion at offering. Further, the previous literature shows that heterogeneous
beliefs among investors would create bid-ask spread, which in turn could proxy for
opinion dispersion (Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan, 2001; Handa, Schwartz,
and Tiwari, 2003). We define relative quoted spread as the difference between the
bid and ask prices on the second-stage offering day, divided by the mean of bid and
ask prices.
Finally, we control for firm capitalization at offering and include year dummy
variables to account for the time-variation in initial return. We expect the security
lending supply to be negatively correlated with the initial return.
Table 3.3 presents the OLS estimation results of the relation between security
lending supply and initial return. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) use initial return
as the dependent variable while Columns (3) and (4) use market-adjusted initial
return as the dependent variable. We find that, using both dependent variables,
security lending supply is negatively associated with the initial return. Further, the
coefficients of press coverage are significantly negative in all columns, which
suggests that greater news coverage could reduce opinion dispersion, and further
alleviate the IPO initial price run-up. In economic terms, a one standard deviation
increase in press coverage is associated with a 3.5% decrease in the initial return in
both Columns (2) and (4). Rather, relative quoted spread does not have explanatory
power for the initial return. Collectively, results in Table 3.3 support our first
hypothesis that the existence of the security lending supply before the IPO offering
day could reduce the magnitude of the initial return.
62
The differences in characteristics between short sale constrained and
unconstrained two-stage IPO firms raise the concerns about the endogeneity problem.
For example, shareholders of a large two-stage IPO firm would be more confident
about the second-stage offering, and would in turn be more willing to lend existing
shares out. Further, some firm-specific omitted variables could be correlated with the
security lending supply while they also affect the IPO initial return or long-run
performance.
To account for the potential endogeneity problem, we employ the two-stage
ordinary least square (2SLS) estimation using capitalization at listing and turnover
at listing as instrumental variables for the security lending supply. We define
capitalization at listing as the natural log of firm size (measured in million pounds)
at the first-stage introduction, and turnover at listing as the mean of daily turnover in
the first month following the first-stage introduction. The existing literature suggests
that firm size (e.g., D’Avolio, 2002; Geczy, Musto, and Reed, 2002; Kot, 2007; and
Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2013) and stock liquidity (e.g., Duffie, Gârleanu,
and Pedersen, 2002; D’Avolio, 2002; and Jones and Lamont, 2002) are positively
correlated with the security lending supply, thus satisfying the relevance requirement
of instrumental variables. In addition, since the average duration between the first-
stage introduction and second-stage offering is 1.3 years, these two instrumental
variables are not likely to affect the second-stage initial return and subsequent long-
run performance, satisfying the exclusion condition of instrumental variables. For
robustness, we also report the results of the limited information maximum likelihood
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estimation (i.e., LIML; Anderson and Rubin, 1949; 1950) to examine the finite-
sample bias as we have a relative small sample of 107 firms.12
To provide additional support for our choice of instrumental variables, for all the
2SLS and LIML regressions, we perform the following two tests: (i) a Kleibergen-
Paap (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) relevance test to ensure high correlations between
instrumental variables and security lending supply, and (ii) a Hansen’s J over-
identification test to examine the exogeneity of the instrumental variables. Test
results suggest that both instrumental variables are relevant and exogenous.
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the instrumental variable estimation results.
Columns (1) and (3) use the 2SLS approach, while Columns (2) and (4) implement
LIML approach. We find that turnover at listing is positively associated with the
security lending supply in all columns. In contrast, the positive relation between
capitalization at listing and security lending supply only exist by using the 2SLS
method. These findings suggest that stocks are likely to have larger security lending
supply if they are more liquid at the first-stage introduction. Further, firms are likely
to be short sale unconstrained if they have a larger size at the first-stage introduction.
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the second-stage regression estimates. Consistent
with our expectation, we find that relaxing short sale constraints could significantly
reduce the initial return. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase of
security lending supply is associated with a 22.7% decrease of initial return with the
2SLS approach (Column (1) of Table 3.4). Results remain robust if we use the LIML
approach or use the market-adjusted initial return as the dependent variable.
Further, we find that press coverage is negatively correlated with the initial
return. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in press coverage is
12 According to Stock and Yogo (2005), the LIML approach provides the same asymptotic
distribution as 2SLS but reduces finite-sample bias. The LIML approach is also claimed to be more
resistant to weak instruments problems.
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associated with a 5.3% decrease in the IPO initial return (Column (3)). The
coefficient of relative quote, however, is statistically insignificant in all columns.
Consistent with Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we also find that issuers are more likely
to have higher initial returns if the market return is high or IPO proceeds are low.
3.5.3. Pricing discount
Findings in Section 5.2 indicate that relaxing short sale constraints could be
associated with lower initial return. However, we still need to disentangle the market
overpricing effect from the pricing discount effect (i.e., underwriters intentionally
underprice IPOs during periods of uncertainty and information asymmetry) (Rock,
1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Specifically, Rock (1986) finds that to ensure
uninformed investors would buy the issuance, underwriters would intentionally offer
pricing discounts for IPOs.
Therefore, an alternative interpretation of our previous finding could be that the
low initial return for short sale unconstrained two-stage IPOs simply reflects less
pricing discount from underwriters. Table 3.2 shows that the mean pricing discount
is actually larger for short sale unconstrained introductions. In this section we further
examine this alternative interpretation by employing multivariate tests. If short sale
unconstrained introductions experience less pricing discounts, we would expect the
security lending supply or the dummy variable of short sale unconstrained firms to
be negatively correlated with the pricing discount.
Table 3.5 reports the effects of the short sale constraints on the pricing discount.
In particular, short sale unconstrained firm is a dummy variable that equals one if
the two-stage IPO firm is short sale unconstrained, and zero otherwise. Control
variables include proceeds, market return at announcement, healthy at
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announcement, capitalization at announcement, and prestigious broker. Prestigious
broker is a dummy that equals one if the broker is a global investment bank, and zero
otherwise. The announcement day of the second stage offering is defined as the
earliest date of news release about the second stage offering we find in Factiva.
Consistent with our prediction, we find no significant relation between pricing
discount and short sale constraints. Specifically, pricing discount is positively
correlated with the market level before the announcement day of the second-stage
offering, but negatively correlated with prestigious broker dummy variable. This
finding is consistent with the existing literature which shows that the prestige of a
broker is negatively correlated with the magnitude of IPO underpricing (Chemmanur
and Fulghieri, 1994). In Columns (3) and (4) we examine the effect of security
lending supply on pricing discount. Again we do not find any significant relation
between security lending supply and pricing discount. Therefore, pricing discount
does not explain our results.13
3.5.4. Long-run performance
Our second hypothesis posits that short sale unconstrained introductions would
experience better long-run performance. Following Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998),
we estimate IPO long-run performance using a three-year horizon. Specifically, the
holding period starts from 6 trading days after the second-stage offering day last for
756 days. Since the previous literature shows that IPO long-run performance is
sensitive to methodologies (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997; Brav and Gompers, 1997),
we use different approaches to ensure the robustness of our results.
First, we estimate market-adjusted-BHAR using the HGSC Index. Derrien and
Kecskés (2007) show that HGSC Index is a standard index for small-cap firms in the
13 Our results remain similar if we employ 2SLS and LIML estimation approach.
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U.K. As IPOs are normally small-cap at the offering, the index fits characteristics of
issuers. Next, motivated by Brav and Gompers (1997) who show that the long-run
IPO underperformance could be largely explained by size and book-to-market
effects, we estimate characteristic-adjusted-BHAR using size and book-to-market
matched firms. Matching firms are non-IPO stocks which have at least five years of
listing history but do not have follow-on equity issuance five years before the
matching date.
If the best-matching firm is delisted during our three-year estimation window, we
use the second-best matching firm instead. Specifically, the three-year long-run
performance is calculated as follows:
ܤܪܣܴ௜= ቈቆෑ ൫1 + ݎ௜,௧൯୫ ୧୬[்,௘௡ௗ௢௙௦௔௠ ௣௟௘௣௘௥௜௢ௗ]
௧ୀ௢௙௙௘௥௜௡௚ௗ௔௬ା଺
ቇ
− ቆෑ ൫1 + ݎ௠ ,௧൯୫ ୧୬[்,௘௡ௗ௢௙௦௔௠ ௣௟௘௣௘௥௜௢ௗ]
௧ୀ௢௙௙௘௥௜௡௚ௗ௔௬ା଺
ቇ቉× 100, (2)
where ri,t is the return of stock i on day t; T equals to offering date + 762 trading
days; rm,t is the corresponding benchmark return (i.e., market index or matching firm
return) on day t. Both market-adjusted-BHAR and characteristic-adjusted-BHAR are
annualized after estimation.14 To further ensure the robustness of our results, we use
a third method to measure the long-run performance, i.e., the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model:
ݎ௜,௧− ௙ܴ,௧ = ߙ௜+ ߚଵ൫ܴ ௠ ,௧− ௙ܴ,௧൯+ ߚଶ ܵܯ ܤ௧+ ߚଷܪܯܮ௧+ ߚସܷܯܦ௧+ ߝ௜,௧, (3)
where rf,t is the risk free rate on day t; Rm,t-Rf,t is the excess market portfolio return on
day t; SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt stand for the size, value and momentum factors on
14 Among the 107 introductions, no firm is delisted within three years after the second-stage offering.
Therefore, our results do not have survival bias. However, three firms completed the second-stage
offering later than October 2011 and therefore have a trading history of less than three years. To avoid
selection bias, we keep these stocks and use the last day of our sample, 31st October 2014, as the
ending day of their holding period. Our results remain similar if we exclude these three stocks.
67
day t.15 The daily excess return αi is annualized to simplify the interpretation of
following regression coefficients.
Table 3.6 presents the simple OLS regression results. We find that the security
lending supply has significantly positive influences using all the measurements of
IPO long-run performance. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in
security lending supply is associated with a 10.1% (19.5%) increase in market-
adjusted-BHAR (characteristic-adjusted- BHAR). Further, for the Carhart (1997)
four-factor alpha, a one standard deviation increase in security lending supply is
associated with an abnormal return of 11.3%. These results remain robust after the
inclusion of additional control variables. In terms of opinion dispersion, we find that
the coefficient estimates of press coverage and relative quoted spread are
insignificant in all columns.
Table 3.7 presents the estimation results by using the 2SLS and LIML approaches.
In Panel A, we find that the first-stage regression results are similar to the results in
the initial return analysis. Stocks with larger capitalization and higher turnover at the
first-stage introduction are more likely to have security lending supply. The f-
statistic is 20.5 for all the models. Further, the Hansen-J statistics suggest that none
of our models rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments. Therefore,
our instrumental variables are valid in all long-run performance models.
Panel B of Table 3.7 presents the second-stage regression results. Consistent with
our expectation, we find that security lending supply is positively correlated with
IPO long-run performance by using all the three long-run performance measures.
Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) reports effects of security lending supply on
market-adjusted-BHAR. In economic terms, with the 2SLS approach, a one standard
15 We use the size, value and momentum factors constructed for the U.K. market by Gregory, Tharyan,
and Christidis (2013).
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deviation increase in security lending supply is associated with a 29.6% increase in
market-adjusted-BHAR. Results are similar if we use characteristic-adjusted-BHAR
or the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha as long-run performance measure. Further,
our findings remain robust with the LIML approach, which suggests that our
estimations do not suffer small-sample bias. In terms of opinion dispersion, the
coefficient of relative quoted spread and press coverage are insignificant in all the
eight columns.
Overall, these findings indicate that relaxing short sale constraints improves IPO
long-run performance.
3.5.5. Robustness tests and alternative explanations
In this section, we check the robustness of our results. First, we employ a full
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect model, which
simultaneously estimates a binary choice model and the main model. The binary
choice model is a probit model which regresses short sale unconstrained firm (i.e., a
dummy variable indicating whether the two-stage IPO firm is short sale
unconstrained) on factors that are likely to influence decisions of security lenders
(i.e., turnover at listing and capitalization at listing). The main model provides
unbiased estimates of effects of relaxing short sale constrains on the IPO initial
return and long-run performance.
Panel A of Table 3.8 reports the probit model estimation results. We find that
two-stage IPO firms with larger size and higher turnover at the first-stage listing are
more likely to be short sale unconstrained. We also report the chi-square tests of ρ = 
0 in Panel A, since a violation of the assumption that the correlation between the
error terms of the selection and main models does not equal to zero could lead to
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biased results. In our test, the null hypothesis that the two equations are independent
is rejected for all the MLE models. Therefore, our MLE estimations are appropriate.
Panel B of Table 3.8 presents the results for the jointly estimated treatment
effects models. Columns (1) and (2) report estimation results for the initial return.
The coefficient of short sale unconstrained firm ranges from -29% to -29.1%,
indicating that relaxing short sale constraints alleviates the market overpricing on the
IPO offering day. Columns (3) to (5) report estimation results for the long-term
performance. The coefficients on the short sale unconstrained firm dummy are all
significantly positive, which is consistent with our main results in Table 3.7.
Overall, our test results of H1 and H2 remain robust with the MLE estimation.
One alternative explanation of our main results could be that the security lending
supply provides liquidity to the market on the second-stage offering day and
therefore reduces the illiquidity premium of the new issuance. Amihud (2002) shows
that market illiquidity is positively associated with the stock excess return, and this
effect is stronger in smaller stocks. If this is the case, then we should observe that the
security lending supply promotes the liquidity of introductions on the second-stage
offering day.
Table 3.9 reports our OLS estimation results for this alternative explanation. We
use the bid-ask spread and turnover on the second-stage issuance day as two
measurements of the IPO liquidity. In Columns (1) and (3), we find that there is no
significant difference between the liquidity for short sale constrained and
unconstrained introductions on the second-stage offering day. In Columns (2) and
(4), the coefficients of security lending supply are statistically insignificant,
indicating that short sale constraints do not have significant influence on IPO
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liquidity on the second-stage offering day. Therefore, liquidity premium does not
explain our results.
3.6. Conclusion
This study investigates the effects of relaxing short sale constraints on the first-
day IPO return and subsequent long-run performance by using a set of two-stage
IPOs, named as introductions. In an introduction, public listing and initial share
offering are separated into two stages. This feature enables the security lending
supply to exist before the second-stage offering, leaving us a natural design to
directly examine the effects of relaxing short sale constraints on IPO-related puzzles.
We find that short sale unconstrained IPOs experience less initial price run-up and
better long-run performance.
Our findings provide new evidence in the debate on the theoretical model
developed in Miller (1977) which posits that short sale constraints could lead to the
IPO initial price run-up. In our sample, the short sale unconstrained IPOs have 12.9%
of outstanding shares available for borrowing before the second-stage offering day.
We find that short sale unconstrained two-stage IPOs experience less initial price
run-up and better long-run performance than their counterparts. Our findings support
the assumption that short sale constraints could be associated with the IPO initial
price run-up and subsequent long-run underperformance (Miller 1977; Derrien 2005;
Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh, 2006).
Our findings also demonstrate that short selling could improve pricing efficiency
(Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010; and Boehmer and
Wu, 2013). We find that relaxing short sale constraints improves the IPO pricing
efficiency on the offering day. This evidence contributes to the short selling
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literature, and further supports the positive role of short selling in the financial
market.
Our findings have important implications for market designers and practitioners.
By extending the findings in Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we further show that the
two-stage IPO strategy could be an effective way for firms to go public. Investors
may consider going public with this strategy to enjoy possible benefits from relaxed
short sale constraints.
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Table 3.1 : Firm and industry distributions
This table presents the firm year and industry distributions. Our sample includes 107 U.K.
introductions that completed their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013.
Panel A reports the year distribution for introductions at the first-stage introduction; Panel B reports
the year distribution for introductions at the second-stage offering; and Panel C reports the industry
distribution. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) pertain to the full sample, 107 introductions, Columns
(3) and (4) to the 83 short sale constrained introductions, and Columns (5) and (6) to the 24 short sale
unconstrained introductions. We define short sale unconstrained introductions as those with a positive
security lending supply over the previous one week ending the second-stage offering day.
Panel A: Number and percentage by first-stage listing year
Full sample Short sale constrained Short sale unconstrained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Number % Number % Number %
1999 2 1.9% 2 2.4% 0 0.0%
2000 3 2.8% 3 3.6% 0 0.0%
2001 4 3.7% 4 4.8% 0 0.0%
2002 3 2.8% 3 3.6% 0 0.0%
2003 3 2.8% 3 3.6% 0 0.0%
2004 19 17.8% 15 18.1% 4 16.7%
2005 20 18.7% 18 21.7% 2 8.3%
2006 24 22.4% 20 24.1% 4 16.7%
2007 13 12.2% 9 10.8% 4 16.7%
2008 8 7.5% 3 3.6% 5 20.8%
2009 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
2010 4 3.5% 2 2.4% 2 8.3%
2011 3 2.8% 1 1.2% 2 8.3%
2012 1 0.9% 0 0.0% 1 4.2%
Total 107 83 24
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Table 3.1 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Number and percentage by second-stage offering year
Full sample Short sale constrained Short sale unconstrained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Number % Number % Number %
2002 7 6.5% 7 8.4% 0 0.0%
2003 3 2.8% 3 3.6% 0 0.0%
2004 6 5.6% 6 7.2% 0 0.0%
2005 19 17.8% 16 19.3% 3 12.5%
2006 19 17.8% 19 22.9% 0 0.0%
2007 21 19.6% 16 19.3% 5 20.8%
2008 6 5.6% 3 3.6% 3 12.5%
2009 10 9.4% 6 7.2% 4 16.7%
2010 5 4.7% 3 3.6% 2 8.3%
2011 7 6.5% 2 2.4% 5 20.8%
2012 2 1.9% 1 1.2% 1 4.2%
2013 2 1.9% 1 1.2% 1 4.2%
Total 107 83 24
Panel C: Number and percentage by industry
Full sample Short sale constrained Short sale unconstrained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry Number % Number % Number %
Mining 30 28.0% 25 30.1% 5 20.8%
Construction 1 0.9% 1 1.2% 0 0.0%
Manufacturing 18 16.8% 15 18.1% 3 12.5%
Transportation 8 7.5% 3 3.6% 5 20.8%
Wholesale 1 0.9% 1 1.2% 0 0.0%
Retail 5 4.7% 4 4.8% 1 4.2%
Finance insurance
real estate 18 16.8% 13 15.7% 5 20.8%
Services 26 24.3% 21 25.3% 5 20.8%
Total 107 83 24
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Table 3.2 : Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions that completed
their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. Column (1) pertains to our
full sample, Column (2) to the 83 short sale constrained introductions, and Column (3) to the 24 short
sale unconstrained introductions. We define short sale unconstrained introductions as those with a
positive security lending supply over the previous one week ending the second-stage offering day.
Columns (4) and (5) report the t-statistics for tests of the mean difference and the z-statistics of the
Wilcoxon two-sample test. Security lending supply is the total shares available for lending over total
outstanding shares. We define capitalization at listing as the natural log of firm size (measured in
million pounds) at the first-stage introduction, turnover at listing as the mean of daily turnover in the
first month following the first-stage introduction, proceeds as the natural log of the proceeds
(measured in million pounds) at the second-stage offering, and capitalization at offering as the natural
log of firm size (measured in million pounds) at the second-stage offering. Further, we define press
coverage as the number of press releases in Factiva from the first-stage introduction to the
announcement day of the second-stage offering, divided by the number of years in between, relative
quoted spread as the difference between the bid and ask prices on the second-stage offering day,
divided by the mean of bid and ask prices, pricing discount as the market price one day before the
announcement day of the second-stage offering over the offering price, minus one, initial return as
the market closing price on the second-stage offering day over the offering price, minus one, and
market-adjusted initial return as the difference between the raw initial return and the market return on
the second-stage offering day. Market-adjusted-BHAR is the annualized three year buy-and-hold
abnormal return using the market index as the benchmark. Characteristic-adjusted-BHAR is the
annualized three year buy-and-hold abnormal return using size and book-to-market ratio matched
firms as the benchmark. Four-factor-alpha is the annualized excess return measured as the intercept
of daily return regressions by using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as the benchmark. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Full
sample
Short sale
constrained
introductions
Short sale
unconstrained
introductions
t-statistics for
tests of mean
difference
z-statistics of the
Wilcoxon two-
sample test
Security lending supply (%)
Mean 12.86
Median 7.26
Std. Dev. 16.80
Capitalization at listing (£ millions)
Mean 145.19 65.27 418.26 -2.950***
Median 17.45 12.37 117.49 -5.235***
Std. Dev. 387.45 273.29 567.19
Turnover at listing
Mean 0.47 0.31 0.99 -2.496***
Median 0.18 0.13 0.52 -2.668***
Std. Dev. 0.79 0.46 1.29
Proceeds (£ millions)
Mean 16.99 5.49 56.78 -3.096***
Median 1.81 0.78 25.42 -5.489***
Std. Dev. 46.18 18.42 80.56
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Table 3.2(Cont’d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Full
sample
Short sale
constrained
introductions
Short sale
unconstrained
introductions
t-statistics for
tests of mean
difference
z-statistics of the
Wilcoxon two-
sample test
Capitalization at offering (£ millions)
Mean 210.24 87.17 635.85 -2.786***
Median 16.06 10.13 140.11 -5.463***
Std. Dev. 607.52 400.73 940.63
Press coverage
Mean 82.43 72.40 117.10 -1.102
Median 30.42 23.89 63.48 -2.601***
Std. Dev. 175.22 184.55 135.83
Relative quoted spread (%)
Mean 13.71 16.71 3.35 5.469***
Median 7.79 9.53 1.33 5.344***
Std. Dev. 19.22 20.78 4.29
Pricing discount (%)
Mean 15.69 15.34 17.07 0.851
Median 10.52 12.50 8.75 0.316
Std. Dev. 37.38 41.23 23.64
Initial return (%)
Mean 19.06 20.31 14.73 0.933
Median 14.17 15.00 5.48 0.945
Std. Dev. 37.71 41.60 18.97
Market-adjusted initial return (%)
Mean 18.99 20.27 14.56 0.955
Median 13.77 14.97 4.74 1.031
Std. Dev. 37.61 41.47 18.99
Market-adjusted-BHAR (%)
Mean -10.18 -11.14 -6.84 -0.732
Median -12.88 -12.88 -7.17 -0.545
Std. Dev. 25.28 24.96 26.60
Characteristic-adjusted- BHAR (%)
Mean -11.94 -15.46 0.22
Median -11.91 -11.39 -12.52 -1.341 -0.904
Std. Dev. 50.66 54.37 33.05
Four-factor-alpha (%)
Mean -8.74 -9.04 -7.72 -0.151
Median -4.77 -6.97 6.85 -0.657
Std. Dev. 37.42 38.25 35.13
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Table 3.3 : Initial return for short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions - OLS estimations
This table presents the difference in initial returns between short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions that completed their second-stage offering
between January 2002 and December 2013. We use the OLS regression as our estimation method:
݊ܫ ݅݅ݐܽ ݈݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌݈ ݕ௜+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜ .
Security lending supply is the total shares available for lending over total outstanding shares.
Proceeds is the natural log of the proceeds (measured in million pounds) at the second-stage offering.
Healthy at offering is a dummy variable that equals to one if a firm has positive sales, operating
income, and net income on the second-stage offering day, and zero otherwise. Market return at
offering is the market index return from previous three months until the day before the second-stage
offering day. Press coverage is the number of press releases in Factiva from the first-stage
introduction to the announcement day of the second-stage offering, divided by the number of years in
between. Relative quoted spread is the difference between the bid and ask prices on the second-stage
offering day, divided by the mean of bid and ask prices. Capitalization at offering is the natural log of
firm size (measured in million pounds) at the second-stage offering. Columns (1) and (2) use initial
return as the dependent variable, which is defined as the market closing price on the second-stage
offering day over the offering price, minus one. Columns (3) and (4) use market-adjusted initial
return as dependent variable, which is defined as the difference between the raw initial return and the
market return on the second-stage offering day. All columns include offering year dummy variables.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Initial return Initial return Market-adjustedinitial return
Market-adjusted
initial return
Security lending supply -0.52*** -0.20** -0.52*** -0.20**
(0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
Proceeds -5.78*** -5.74***
(1.05) (1.08)
Healthy at offering -6.06 -6.41
(6.03) (6.10)
Market return at offering 1.49*** 1.49***
(0.18) (0.18)
Press coverage -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Relative quoted spread -0.20 -0.21
(0.13) (0.14)
Capitalization at offering 1.30 1.24
(2.18) (2.25)
Constant 20.02** 40.63*** 20.12** 41.16***
(7.17) (6.69) (7.04) (6.81)
Number of observations 107 107 107 107
R2 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23
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Table 3.4 : Initial return for short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions – IV estimations
This table presents the difference in initial returns between short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions that completed their second-stage offering
between January 2002 and December 2013. We use the 2SLS model to control for endogeneity
problem while also report the LIML estimation results for robustness. Panel A reports the first-stage
regression results from the 2SLS approach and the reduced form estimation results from the LIML
approach. Exogenous instrumental variables are discussed in Section 5. Capitalization at listing is the
natural log of firm size (measured in million pounds) at the first-stage introduction. Turnover at
listing is the mean of daily turnover in the first month following the first-stage introduction. Panel B
reports the second-stage regression results. Specifically, the 2SLS model is as follows:
ܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌ ݈ݕ௜= ߜ௜+ ߨଵܥ ݌ܽ݅ ܽݐ ݈݅ܽݖ ݅ݐ݋݊ ܽݐ݈݅ ݏ݅ݐ݊ ௜݃+ ߨଶܶݑ݊ݎ ݋݁ݒ ݎܽݐ݈݅ ݏ݅ݐ݊ ௜݃+ߨଷܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ ߝ௜,
݊ܫ ݅݅ݐܽ ݈݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑݎଓݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌݈ ݕప෣ + ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜.
Variables are as defined in Table 3. All columns include offering year dummy variables. Standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is security lending supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial return Initial return Market-adjustedinitial return
Market-adjusted
initial return
Variable 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Capitalization at listing 1.96* 1.96 1.96* 1.96
(1.01) (1.18) (1.01) (1.18)
Turnover at listing 2.77*** 2.77*** 2.77*** 2.77***
(0.73) (0.58) (0.73) (0.58)
Number of observations 103 103 103 103
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F
statistic
38.23*** 38.23*** 38.23*** 38.23***
R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
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Table 3.4 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Dependent variable is initial return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial return Initial return Market-adjustedinitial return
Market-adjusted
initial return
Variable 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Security lending supply -1.35** -1.54*** -1.41*** -1.60***
(0.55) (0.64) (0.54) (0.63)
Proceeds -4.96*** -4.78*** -4.90*** -4.73***
(0.70) (0.74) (0.71) (0.74)
Healthy at offering -4.39** -3.88** -4.62** -4.10**
(1.90) (1.80) (1.88) (1.80)
Market return at offering 1.42*** 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.40***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Capitalization at offering 3.79 4.08* 3.88 4.19*
(2.38) (2.46) (2.39) (2.46)
Press coverage -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Relative quoted spread -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 27.85** 26.14** 27.55** 25.80**
(12.16) (13.17) (12.10) (13.08)
Number of observations 103 103 103 103
Hansen’s J over-
identification test
(p-value)
0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
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Table 3.5 : Pricing discount for short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions - OLS estimations
This table presents the difference in pricing discounts between short sale constrained and
unconstrained introductions. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions that completed their second-
stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use the OLS regression as our
estimation method:
ܲ݅ݎ ܿ݅݊݃݀ ݅ܿݏ ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌݈ ݕ௜+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜.
Pricing discount is the market price one day before the announcement day of the second-stage
offering over the offering price, minus one. Short sale unconstrained firm is a dummy variable that
equals one if the two-stage IPO firm is short sale unconstrained, and zero otherwise. Other variables
are as defined in Table 3. All columns include offering year dummy variables. Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Pricing
discount
Pricing
discount
Pricing
discount
Pricing
discount
Short sale unconstrained firm 3.99 18.55
(10.84) (10.69)
Security lending supply -0.24 0.28
(0.20) (0.15)
Prestigious broker -22.48*** -20.06***
(2.49) (1.75)
Proceeds -3.44* -3.29**
(1.75) (1.34)
Healthy at announcement -5.52 -5.62
(9.21) (8.39)
Market return at announcement 1.17** 1.20**
(0.51) (0.49)
Capitalization at announcement 0.83 1.69
(2.68) (2.47)
Constant 20.60** 39.44** 20.60** 30.57**
(5.84) (11.67) (5.84) (10.89)
Number of observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.14
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Table 3.6 : Long-run performance of short sale constrained and unconstrained introductions - OLS estimations
This table presents the difference in the long-run performance between short sale constrained and unconstrained introductions. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions
that completed their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use the OLS regression as our estimation method:
ܮ݋݊ ݃ݎݑ݊ܾܽ݊ ݋݉ݎ ܽ ݈݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌݈ ݕ௜+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜.
Long-run abnormal return is measured as Market-adjusted-BHAR, Characteristic-adjusted-BHAR or Four-factor-alpha. Specifically, market-adjusted-BHAR is the
annualized three year buy-and-hold abnormal return using the market index as the benchmark. Characteristic-adjusted-BHAR is the annualized three year buy-and-hold
abnormal return using size and book-to-market ratio matched firms as the benchmark. Four-factor-alpha is the annualized excess return measured as the intercept of daily
return regressions by using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as the benchmark. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the second-stage offering. Volatility is the standard
deviation of daily stock returns during the year following the second-stage offering, excluding the first trading week. Other variables are as defined in Table 3. All columns
include offering year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Market-adjusted-BHAR
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Characteristic-
adjusted-BHAR
Characteristic-
adjusted-BHAR Four-factor-alpha
Four-factor-
alpha
Security lending supply 0.60*** 0.48** 1.16** 1.38*** 0.67*** 0.79**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.43) (0.38) (0.18) (0.26)
Proceeds -0.09 -2.14 -0.19
(2.56) (2.94) (3.83)
Healthy at offering 14.30 21.75 18.41
(7.99) (15.48) (12.62)
B/M 7.60 4.40 9.31
(7.64) (8.74) (7.06)
Capitalization at offering -2.04 -3.96 -1.79
(3.30) (5.26) (5.35)
Volatility -1.96 -6.22*** 1.31
(1.15) (1.69) (3.04)
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Table 3.6 (Cont’d)
Press coverage 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Relative quoted spread -0.14 0.05 0.34
(0.20) (0.20) (0.38)
Constant -13.79 -10.44 -6.69 26.76 -6.35 -18.64
(13.87) (12.86) (6.79) (18.60) (14.41) (18.64)
Number of observations 107 99 107 99 107 99
R2 0.17 0.33 0.11 0.26 0.08 0.19
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Table 3.7 : Long-run performance of short sale constrained and unconstrained introductions - IV estimations
This table presents the difference in the long-run performance between short sale constrained and unconstrained introductions. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions
that completed their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use the 2SLS model to control for endogeneity problem while also report the
LIML estimation results for robustness. Panel A reports the first-stage regression results from the 2SLS approach and the reduced form estimation results from the LIML
approach. Exogenous instrumental variables are discussed in Section 5. Capitalization at listing is the natural log of firm size (measured in million pounds) at the first-stage
introduction. Turnover at listing is the mean of daily turnover in the first month following the first-stage introduction. Panel B reports the second-stage regression results.
Specifically, the 2SLS model is as follows:
ܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌݈ ݕ௜= ߜ௜+ ߨଵܥ ݌ܽ݅ ܽݐ ݈݅ܽݖ ݅ݐ݋݊ ܽݐ݈݅ ݏ݅ݐ݊ ௜݃+ ߨଶܶݑ݊ݎ ݋݁ݒ ݎܽݐ݈݅ ݏ݅ݐ݊ ௜݃,+ߨଷܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ ߝ௜
ܮ݋݊ ݃ݎݑ݊ܽ ܾ݊ ݋݉ݎ ݈ܽ ݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑݎଓݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌ ݈ݕప෣ + ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜.
Variables are as defined in Tables 3 and 6. All columns include offering year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is security lending supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Characteristic-
adjusted-BHAR
Characteristic-
adjusted-BHAR Four-factor-alpha Four-factor-alpha
Variable 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Capitalization at listing 2.01* 2.01* 2.01* 2.01* 2.01* 2.01*
(1.12) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12)
Turnover at listing 2.85*** 2.85*** 2.85*** 2.85*** 2.85*** 2.85***
(0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81)
Number of observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 20.50*** 20.50*** 20.50*** 20.50*** 20.50*** 20.50***
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
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Table 3.7 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Dependent variable is long-run returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Characteristic-adjusted-
BHAR
Characteristic-adjusted-
BHAR
Four-factor-
alpha
Four-factor-
alpha
Variable 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Security lending supply 1.76*** 1.83*** 5.65*** 5.93*** 2.86** 2.91**
(0.63) (0.67) (1.22) (1.31) (1.18) (1.22)
Proceeds -1.79 -1.87 -7.24* -7.55** -2.70 -2.76
(2.57) (2.58) (3.71) (3.79) (4.25) (4.28)
Healthy at offering 13.19** 12.98** 12.34 11.52 16.72* 16.54
(6.15) (6.20) (16.04) (16.36) (10.07) (10.12)
B/M 8.18 8.23 6.40 6.56 9.72 9.76
(7.30) (7.34) (10.51) (10.68) (7.25) (7.28)
Capitalization at offering -3.36 -3.45 -9.78* -10.13* -4.12 -4.20
(3.24) (3.26) (5.20) (5.30) (4.56) (4.56)
Volatility -1.42 -1.42 -6.11*** -6.12*** 1.98 1.97
(1.08) (1.09) (1.33) (1.33) (2.85) (2.85)
Press coverage 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Relative quoted spread -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 0.42 0.42
(0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.35) (0.35)
Constant -4.10 -3.54 60.91** 63.12** -7.78 -7.30
(19.10) (19.44) (28.47) (29.62) (28.36) (28.60)
Number of observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
Hansen’s J over-identification test
(p-value) 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.63
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Table 3.8 : Robustness tests – MLE estimations
This table presents the difference in the long-run performance between short sale constrained and unconstrained introductions. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions
that completed their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use full maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to control for self-selection
problem:
ℎܵ݋ݎݐܽݏ ݈݁ ݑ݊ ݋ܿ݊ ݏݐܽݎ ݅݊ ݁݀ ݂ ݅݉ݎ ௜= ߜ௜+ ߨଵܥ ݌ܽ݅ ܽݐ ݈݅ܽݖ ݅ݐ݋݊ ܽݐ݈݅ ݏ݅ݐ݊ ௜݃+ ߨଶܶݑ݊ݎ ݋݁ݒ ݎܽݐ݈݅ ݏ݅ݐ݊ ௜݃+ߨଷܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ ߝ௜,
݊ܫ ݅݅ݐܽ ݈݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐܽݏ ݈݁ ݑ݊ ݋ܿ݊ ݏݐܽݎ ݅݊ ݁݀ ݂ ݅݉ݎ ௜+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜,
ܮ݋݊ ݃ݎݑ݊ܾܽ݊ ݋݉ݎ ܽ ݈݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐܽݏ ݈݁ ݑ݊ ݋ܿ݊ ݏݐܽݎ ݅݊ ݁݀ ݂ ݅݉ݎ ௜+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜.
Variables are as defined in Tables 3 and 6. Panel A reports probit regression results from the selection model. Short sale unconstrained firm is a dummy variable that equals
one if the two-stage IPO firm is short sale unconstrained, and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the jointly estimated main model results. All columns include offering year
dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is short sale unconstrained firm dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Initial return Market-adjusted-initialreturn
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Characteristic-adjusted-
BHAR Four-factor-alpha
Capitalization at listing 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.43*** 0.41***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Turnover at listing 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.65***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Number of observations 103 103 95 95 95
ρ 0.48 0.48 -0.85 -0.37 -0.68
chi-square test of ρ = 0 0.03** 0.02** 0.08* 0.00*** 0.00***
(p-value)
85
Table 3.8 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Dependent variable is initial return/long-run returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Initial return Market-adjusted-initialreturn
Market-adjusted-
BHAR
Characteristic-adjusted-
BHAR Four-factor-alpha
Short sale unconstrained firm -28.92** -29.14** 33.60*** 48.73*** 37.49***
(13.48) (13.14) (13.01) (13.51) (11.10)
Proceeds -5.76*** -5.75*** 0.37 -1.98 0.73
(1.19) (1.21) (2.79) (2.88) (3.74)
Healthy at offering -6.59** -6.95** 18.66*** 27.09 24.54**
(3.28) (3.35) (6.91) (16.94) (10.24)
Capitalization at offering 4.34*** 4.38*** -4.55 -7.22 -5.12
(1.44) (1.41) (3.35) (5.31) (4.29)
Press coverage -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.05 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Relative quoted spread -0.08* -0.08 -0.06 0.10 0.45
(0.05) (0.05) (0.21) (0.22) (0.33)
Market return at offering 1.43*** 1.42***
(0.24) (0.23)
B/M 6.03 3.17 7.77
(6.03) (7.87) (6.46)
Volatility -2.15 -6.46*** 0.73
(1.90) (1.60) (3.15)
Constant 38.28*** 38.32*** -16.78* 28.70 -23.50
(6.80) (6.48) (9.65) (18.28) (17.79)
Number of observations 103 103 95 95 95
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Table 3.9 : Stock liquidity of short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions
This table presents the difference in liquidity between short sale constrained and unconstrained
introductions on the second-stage offering day. Our sample includes 107 U.K. introductions that
completed their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use the OLS
regression as our estimation method:
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜= ߙ௜+ ߚଵܵ݁ ܿݑ݅ݎݐݕ݈݁ ݊݀݅݊ ݃ݏݑ݌݌ ݈ݕ௜+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜+ m௜.
Bid-ask spread is the bid-ask spread on the second-stage offering day, measured in percentage.
Turnover is calculated as trading volume divided by shares outstanding on the second-stage offering
day. Short sale unconstrained firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the two-stage IPO firm is
short sale unconstrained, and zero otherwise. Security lending supply is the total shares available for
lending over total outstanding shares. Capitalization at offering is the natural log of firm size
(measured in million pounds) at the second-stage offering. Market return at offering is the market
index return from previous three months until the day before the second-stage offering day. Market
level at offering is the market index level at the second-stage offering day. Proceeds is the natural log
of the proceeds (measured in million pounds) at the second-stage offering. All columns include
offering year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by industry.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Bid-ask spread Bid-ask spread Turnover Turnover
Short sale unconstrained firm -8.19 0.76
(5.64) (0.60)
Security lending supply -0.18 -0.00
(0.17) (0.02)
Capitalization at offering 24.54 -0.15 55.86 -0.06
(70.11) (0.85) (50.31) (0.21)
Market return at offering 0.01* 15.50 0.00 60.26
(0.00) (88.55) (0.00) (50.44)
Market level at offering 0.31 0.00** 0.15 0.00
(0.35) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)
Proceed 0.36 0.30 -0.12 0.18
(1.02) (0.39) (0.20) (0.10)
Constant -3.78 -1.09 -3.13 -3.36
(11.76) (9.51) (3.48) (3.65)
Number of observations 107 107 73 73
R2 0.14 0.12 0.52 0.51
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Chapter 4
Shorting on toxic arbitrage
4.1. Introduction
Arbitrage plays an important role in financial markets. It benefits the market by
enforcing the law of one price and enhancing the pricing efficiency (e.g., Roll,
Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2007; Gromb and Vayanos 2010). Yet limits to
arbitrage make the short trade in an arbitrage strategy harder and more costly than
the long trade (Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011). Therefore, a proper understanding
of the short arbitrage and its impact on the market is crucial. In this paper, we
employ a set of cross-listed stocks to identify arbitrage opportunities and show that
in general, short arbitrageurs provide liquidity. However, they may also impair
liquidity in cases of “toxic arbitrage” opportunities (i.e. arbitrage opportunities that
arise because of asynchronous adjustments to news).
The previous literature examines the effects of arbitrage on market liquidity, and
has mixed predictions: Holden (1995) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2010) predict
that arbitrageurs provide liquidity to the market when they correct the mispricing
based on transient buying pressure. Foucault, Röell, and Sandås,  (2003) conjecture
that when arbitrageurs trade with asymmetric information, they impair market
liquidity as dealers increase spreads to avoid being picked off by stale quotes. In
addition, Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015) posit that arbitrageurs have different
effects on market liquidity depending on the source of arbitrage opportunities.
The literature on short selling finds mixed effects of short sales on market
liquidity. Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) suggest that short sales provide liquidity
to the market. Chakrabarty, Moulton, and Shkilko (2012) extend this argument by
using order data to identify trade initiators, and find that both short sellers and long
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sellers often act as liquidity providers. However, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness
(2012) find that short sellers consume liquidity during intraday downward price
pressures. In addition, Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putniņš (2015) suggest that there 
are two types of short sales: liquidity supplying short sales and liquidity demanding
short sales. They show that liquidity supplying short sales are contrarian, and usually
trade when spreads are wide, while liquidity demanding short sales tend to follow
short-term price drops and usually trade when spreads are narrow.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the heterogeneous effects of short sales on
market liquidity based on arbitrage opportunities among Canadian stocks that are
cross-listed in the U.S. market. A cross-listing arbitrage opportunity arises when
prices in the U.S. and Canadian markets deviate from each other. Arbitrageurs
simultaneously take a short position in the relatively overpriced market and a long
position in the relatively underpriced market. We find that short arbitrageurs provide
liquidity to the cross-listed stocks in general. However, short arbitrageurs could
impair liquidity in cases of toxic relative to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities (i.e.
arbitrage opportunities that arise because of liquidity shocks), and this liquidity
impairment effect is stronger among firms with higher arbitrage costs.
To test the effects of short arbitrage on liquidity in different types of arbitrage
opportunities, we obtain a sample of 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the
U.S. market during the July 2006 and December 2013 period. The market for cross-
listed stocks provides us with a novel setting in which we can clearly categorize
arbitrage opportunities. In particular, this setting has the following advantages: first,
the Canadian and U.S. markets share the same trading hours (i.e., 9:30 a.m. to 4:00
p.m. Eastern Time), which makes it easier to determine arbitrage opportunities.
Second, Canadian stocks are cross-listed in the U.S. market as common stocks rather
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than American depositary receipts (ADRs). These stocks have no conversion fee and
no limits on cross-border ownership, implying that arbitrage is likely to occur
frequently in the market of cross-listed stocks (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). Third,
the U.S market has a large number of Canadian cross-listed firms, and these firms
are relatively mature, which ensures a large and reliable set of arbitrage opportunities
in our sample.
To provide a general assessment of short sellers’ role in the market of cross-
listed stocks, we examine the effect of short sales on Canadian stocks that are cross-
listed in the U.S. market before identifying arbitrage opportunities. Consistent with
the previous literature (Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009; Chakrabarty, Moulton, and
Shkilko, 2012), we find that short sales provide liquidity to cross-listed stocks. In
addition, short sales decrease both the price and return deviations between U.S. and
Canadian markets. This finding supports the view that arbitrageurs enforce the law
of one price and improve market efficiency (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2009).
Next, we focus on cross-listing arbitrage opportunities with a short position in
the U.S. market. We find that short sales provide liquidity where these arbitrage
opportunities occur. Further, we categorize these arbitrage opportunities as toxic and
non-toxic based on whether there is a fundamental change in the stock during the
arbitrage opportunity. We find that short sales impair liquidity in cases of toxic
relative to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities. This finding supports Foucault, Kozhan
and Tham (2015) who conjecture that arbitrageurs provide liquidity in cases of non-
toxic, but impair liquidity in toxic arbitrage opportunities.
Third, we examine toxic arbitrage opportunities among firms with high arbitrage
costs, and find a stronger adverse effect of short sales on liquidity. This finding is
consistent with the short restriction effect proposed by Diamond and Verrecchia
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(1987), which posits that high short sale costs could drive out uninformed short
sellers, which in turn would increase the information content in the short interest.
Our findings contribute to different strands of the asset pricing literature. First,
we add to the limits to arbitrage literature by analyzing short sales in cases of toxic
and non-toxic arbitrage opportunities. Since short arbitrage is harder and more costly
than long arbitrage (Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011), it is worth testing how short
sellers respond to different types of arbitrage opportunities, and how they influence
the market. Using a novel sample of Canadian-U.S. cross-listing stocks, we directly
test the effects of short arbitrage on stock liquidity. We show that short sales impair
liquidity in cases of toxic relative to non-toxic arbitrages, and this impairment effect
is stronger among firms with higher arbitrage costs.
Second, we add to the short selling literature by showing that short sales have
heterogeneous impacts on the market liquidity in different scenarios (Comerton-
Forde, Jones and Putniņš, 2015). We provide new evidence from the short arbitrage 
perspective. Our findings suggest that academics and market participants may
examine short sales in different scenarios separately, as aggregating short sales could
mask important features.
Third, we add to the cross-listing literature on the benefits of short arbitrage.
Previous study that examines the relation between short sales and cross-listed firms
(Gagnon and Witmer, 2014) mainly focuses on the 2008 short selling ban. Our
evidence is more general, as we incorporate different types of arbitrage opportunities
during a longer sample of seven years. We show that short sales enhance the law of
one price and provide liquidity in the market of cross-listed firms.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops hypotheses.
Section 3 describes our sample construction and descriptive statistics. Section 4
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presents empirical results. Section 5 presents the robustness test. Section 6
concludes.
4.2. Hypotheses development
This section develops our hypotheses and presents the related literature. Our
main research question focuses on the effects of short selling on liquidity in different
arbitrage opportunities. Since in our study, we rely on the cross-listing setting to
identify arbitrage opportunities, we conventionally start by analyzing the general
effects of short sales on cross-listed stocks. Our first hypothesis posits that in
general, short sales provide liquidity to cross-listed stocks and reduce the price-parity
deviation between the home (i.e., Canadian) and U.S. markets.
Theory predicts that short sellers are better informed investors who provide
liquidity to the market and help enhance the price discovery (e.g., Miller, 1977;
Diamond, and Verrecchia, 1987; and Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). Empirical
evidence from U.S. local stocks supports this prediction (e.g., Diether, Lee, and
Werner 2009; Chakrabarty, Moulton, and Shkilko, 2012). In addition, by studying
cross-listed stocks during the 2008 short selling ban, Gagnon and Witmer (2014)
find that cross-listed stocks subject to the ban experience an increase in bid-ask
spread in the U.S. market. They show that the ownership for U.S cross-listed
Canadian stocks is tilted heavily towards Canadian investors, while long sellers are
relatively scarcer in the U.S. market.16 Their findings imply that market-makers may
rely heavily on short sales to provide liquidity for cross-listed stocks in the U.S.
market.
16 They show that for cross-listed financial stocks, more than 80% of the shares held by U.S. and
Canadian investors combined are owned by Canadian investors.
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Collectively, we conjecture that the general liquidity provision effect of short
sales also applies to cross-listed stocks. In addition, as short sales enhance the price
discovery, they should enforce the law of one price in both markets of cross-listed
firms. Overall, our first hypothesis states:
H1: Short sales of cross-listed stocks enhance the U.S. market liquidity (H1a)
and reduce price-parity deviations between the home and U.S. markets (H1b).
Previous literature shows that the effects of arbitrageurs on liquidity depend on
the cause of the arbitrage opportunities. On the one hand, theory predicts that short
sales provide liquidity to the market when the arbitrage opportunity arises from
liquidity shocks (e.g., Grossman and Miller, 1988; Campbell, Grossman, and Wang,
1993, and Gromb and Vayanos, 2010). Empirically, Comerton-Forde, Jones and
Putniņš (2015) find that short sales provide liquidity to the market when spreads are 
unusually wide, normally after sharp rises in price. However, they do not consider
arbitrage opportunities.
On the other hand, Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015) predict that if an
arbitrage opportunity arises from information asymmetry, the arbitrage could be
toxic because arbitrageurs may response faster than domestic dealers, increase the
adverse selection costs, and impair liquidity. Empirically, Shkilko, Van Ness, and
Van Ness (2012) find that short sellers consume liquidity during intraday downward
price pressures, but they claim that the price decline is not related to events or
asymmetric information. So far, the liquidity impairment effect of short sales in
cases of toxic arbitrage opportunities has not been empirically tested.
Further, since short sales only represent the sell side of a cross-listing arbitrage
strategy, their impairment effect on liquidity should be stronger in cases of toxic
arbitrage with bad news. To summarize, our second hypothesis posits:
93
H2: Short sales provide liquidity to the U.S. market in cases of cross-listing
arbitrage opportunities (H2a), but impair liquidity in toxic relative to non-toxic
arbitrage opportunities (H2b). This liquidity impairment effect is stronger in cases of
toxic arbitrage opportunities with bad news (H2c).
Previous literature shows that arbitrage costs could deter arbitrage activities
(Gromb and Vayanos, 2010). Empirically, Au, Doukas, and Onayev (2009) and
Duan, Hu, and McLean (2010) find that idiosyncratic risk, as a type of arbitrage
holding costs, deters short selling. They show that short sales in stocks with higher
idiosyncratic risk have stronger predictive power on future stock price decline.
Further, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that increasing arbitrage costs
may have a short restriction effect: high arbitrage costs drive out uninformed short
sellers and increase the information content in short interests. Empirically,
Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock (2013) support this prediction, and show that the
2008 short selling ban increases short selling costs and improves the ratio of
informed to uninformed short sellers in the U.S. market. Based on the short
restriction effect prediction, we expect the proportion of informed short sellers to be
higher in stocks with high arbitrage costs. This would worsen the adverse selection
problem in cases of toxic arbitrage opportunities and further impair liquidity. To
summarize, our third hypothesis posits:
H3: The impairment effect of short sales on liquidity in cases of toxic arbitrage
opportunities (H2b and H2c) is stronger for firms with higher arbitrage costs.
4.3. Sample construction and descriptive statistics
4.3.1. Sample construction
Our sample comprises a set of Canadian stocks which are simultaneously traded
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and one of the main U.S. exchanges (i.e.,
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NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX) between July 2006 and December 2013. We construct
our sample as follows: First, we use information in DataStream to identify all
Canadian ordinary stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. market during the sample
period. Next, to ensure the feasibility of cross-listing arbitrage, we exclude financial
stocks and stocks that are traded over-the-counter. Further, we require stocks to have
(i) home-market counterpart data available in DataStream or Compustat Global and
(ii) U.S. securities lending data in Markit Securities Finance Data. After applying
these filters, we end up with 134 Canadian-U.S. pairs.
We obtain daily stock closing price, trading volume, shares outstanding and
dividend payments for each stock-pair from Compustat Global and DataStream,
S&P500 index, S&P/TSX index and VIX from DataStream, intraday bid and ask
quotes for U.S. stocks from the NYSE Trade and Quote database (TAQ), and
intraday bid and ask quotes for Canadian stocks from Thomson Reuters Tick History
(TRTH). Further, to convert home-market price into U.S. dollars, we also obtain the
intraday quotes of the currency pair CAD/USD from TRTH. We obtain daily
securities lending quantity and value-weighted lending fee for each stock-pair from
Markit Securities Finance Data.
4.3.2. Arbitrage opportunities
A cross-listing arbitrage strategy includes taking a long position in the relatively
undervalued part of the stock-pair and opening a short position in the overvalued part
(De Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk, 2009). In this study, we mainly focus on the
short side of the cross-listing arbitrage strategy. Following Gagnon and Karolyi
(2010), we measure price-parity deviations using the log price difference, i.e., the log
difference between the price in the U.S. market (PUSi,t) and that in the Canadian
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market expressed in USD (PCAi,t ). To identify a cross-listing arbitrage opportunity of
stock-pair i on day t, we first estimate the historical mean (i.e.,݈݊ (ܲ௎ௌ/ܲ஼஺)௜,௧) and
volatility (i.e., σi,t) of i’s log-price difference over one year preceding day t. 17
Motivated by Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2012), we define day t as an
arbitrage day for U.S. short sellers if the log-price difference for stock i exceeds its
historical mean by two or more standard deviations. In this case, arbitrageurs would
take a short position in the U.S. market, since the U.S. price of stock i is overvalued
relative to its Canadian price. We denote this type of arbitrage opportunities as
ShortUS arbitrage. Similarly, if the log-price difference of stock i is two or more
standard deviations below its historical mean, the Canadian price is overvalued
relative to the U.S. stock on day t. Arbitrageurs would take a short position in the
Canadian market. We denote this type of arbitrage opportunities as ShortCA arbitrage.
To further distinguish toxic arbitrage from non-toxic arbitrage opportunities, for
each stock-pair, we calculate the average price of the pair (i.e., PUS and PCA) on a
daily basis for both the pre-arbitrage (i.e., [-5, -1]) and post-arbitrage (i.e., [+1, +5])
windows. We then compare the average prices for this stock-pair between these two
windows using a Wilcoxson rank-sum test. If the arbitrage opportunity arises from a
liquidity shock in one market, then the price in that market would converge back to
its fundamental value when buying pressure subsides (e.g., Grossman and Miller,
1988; Campbell, Grossman, and Wang, 1993). In this case, the post-arbitrage
average stock price should remain similar to the pre-arbitrage average price. In
contrast, if the arbitrage opportunity arises from asynchronous price adjustments to
news, then the average prices in the post-arbitrage window could be significantly
different from the pre-arbitrage average prices, as the new prices reflect a new
17 Our results remain similar if we change this estimation period into half year preceding day t.
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fundamental value. We define an arbitrage opportunity as toxic if the post-arbitrage
average price is statistically different from the pre-arbitrage average. 18 Further,
among toxic arbitrage opportunities, we define those with post-arbitrage average
prices being significantly lower (higher) than pre-arbitrage average prices as
toxicdown (toxicup) arbitrage opportunities.
Table 4.1 provides the characteristics of arbitrage events. Among all ShortUS
arbitrage opportunities, non-toxic arbitrages account for 72%, while toxic arbitrage
accounts for the remaining 28%. The average duration for a typical arbitrage
opportunity is one day, which indicates that arbitrageurs are active in exploiting
price-parity deviations. The average arbitrage profit (|Ln (PUS/PCA)|) is around 2%
per day, much larger than the sum of expected transaction costs and holding costs.19
Therefore, cross-listing arbitrage is feasible in our sample.
The profits for ShortUS toxic and non-toxic arbitrage opportunities are similar
(2.06 percent vs. 2.09 percent, t=0.72). Further, among ShortUS toxic arbitrage
opportunities, toxicdown arbitrages have significantly higher profit (2.23%) than that
of toxicup arbitrages (2.09%, t=4.51). We also report the absolute log return
difference between the U.S. and Canadian market (|Ln (RUS/RCA)|) as an alternative
measure of price-parity deviation. The statistics of the log return difference are
similar to that for absolute log price difference.
4.3.3. Summary statistics
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of our sample. We winsorize variables
at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effects of outliers. We define short
18 We require the Wilcoxson rank-sum test of price differences to be significant at the 1% level.
19 According to trading costs published by Elkins and McSherry, the average transaction cost
including commissions, taxes, fees and market impact costs is 17.64 bps in the U.S. and 25.42 bps in
Canada at the end of 2012. The average daily lending fee of our sample during ShortUS arbitrage
opportunities is 0.63 bps daily.
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interest, the main proxy for short selling, as the daily quantity of shares borrowed,
normalized by total outstanding shares for each firm. Liquidity measures include: (i)
percent quoted spread, which is calculated as the difference between the best bid and
ask prices divided by the midpoint of the two. This variable is estimated at intraday
level and is then time-weighted into daily frequency. (ii) Amihud illiquidity, which is
measured as the absolute daily percentage return divided by the daily dollar trading
volume (Amihud, 2002).
In general, the U.S. market is less liquid, and has lower short interest on days
with arbitrage opportunities. Specifically, among three types of ShortUS arbitrage
opportunities (i.e., toxicup, toxicdown, and non-toxic), toxicdown has the greatest short
interest (3.44 bps) and largest percent quoted spread (58.65 bps). In contrast, toxicup
and non-toxic arbitrage opportunities have similar short interest (2.80 bps vs. 2.92
bps, t=0.35) while toxicup has lower percent quoted spread (46.60 bps vs. 52.21 bps,
t=1.75). Further, Amihud illiquidity is not statistically different among the three types
of ShortUS arbitrage opportunities.
Table 4.3 reports the correlations of the main variables. Consistent with H1a,
short interest in the U.S. market is negatively correlated with the percent quoted
spread and Amihud illiquidity, indicating that short selling enhances liquidity for
cross-listed stocks. Further, short interest is negatively correlated with Canadian-
U.S. price deviation, as well as return difference, which is consistent with H1b.
In addition, both dummy variables, ShortUS and ShortCA, are positively correlated
with U.S. percent quoted spread and Amihud illiquidity. This evidence suggests that
liquidity is lower on days with arbitrage opportunities. These relations are also
consistent with our findings in the summary statistics.
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Moreover, we show that liquidity in the U.S. market decreases with arbitrage
costs. Specifically, we use lending fee and idiosyncratic volatility to measure
arbitrage costs. We define lending fee as the value-weighted lending fee over the
previous seven days for each stock. Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), we
estimate idiosyncratic volatility by regressing the daily Canadian-U.S. return
difference over the previous three months, on leading, contemporaneous, and lagged
daily U.S. market index, Canadian index returns, and foreign exchange changes. We
use the standard deviation of residuals as the proxy for cross-listing arbitrage costs.
We find that both arbitrage cost measures are positively correlated with Canadian-
U.S. absolute price and return differences. This finding is consistent with the notion
that arbitrage costs deter arbitrage activity (Gromb and Vayanos, 2010).
4.4. Empirical results
4.4.1. The effect of short sales on liquidity and price-parity deviation of
cross-listed firms
In this section, we test whether short sales in the U.S. market provide liquidity
to the cross-listed stocks (H1a) and reduce the price-parity deviations (H1b). In
particular, we estimate the following regression to test H1a:
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧ +ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧+ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧ + m௜,௧. (4)
Liquidity measures include percent quoted spread and Amihud illiquidity for the
U.S. market. Control variables include the following factors that are known to
influence stock liquidity: Capitalization is the firm size measured in million pounds.
Dollar volume is the daily dollar trading volume measured in million pounds.
1/Price is the reciprocal of share price. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily
stock returns over the previous month. U.S. index is the index level of S&P500. Ban
is a dummy variable that equals to one during the short selling ban period between
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19 September 2008 and 8 October 2008, and zero otherwise. We also include firm
fixed effects and year dummies.
Panel A of Table 4.4 presents the estimation results. Columns (1) and (2) show
that short interest is negatively associated with percent quoted spread. In economic
terms, a one standard deviation (i.e., 0.08%) increase in short interest in the U.S.
market would reduce the percent quoted spread by 0.9 basis point after controlling
for factors that are known to affect liquidity. Results are similar if we use Amihud
illiquidity as an alternative liquidity measure, as reported in Columns (3) and (4).
Economically, after including all control variables, a one standard deviation increase
in short interest could be associated with a 0.25 percent decrease in Amihud
illiquidity.20 Collectively, these results support our H1a that in general, short sellers
provide liquidity to cross-listed stocks.
Next, to examine whether short sales reduce the cross-listing price-parity
deviation (H1b), we estimate the following regression:
ܲ݅ݎ ܿ݁ ݌ܽ݅ݎݐݕ݀ ݁݅ݒ ܽ݅ݐ݋݊ ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧ +ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧+ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m
௜,௧. (5)
Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), we measure the price-parity deviation
with the absolute log difference of both prices and returns between the U.S. and
Canadian markets.21 we include a set of firm-specific proxies as well as market
condition proxies that are known to explain the price-parity deviation. Firm-specific
proxies are as follows: Volatility, capitalization and dividend yield for each stock in
20 To interpret the coefficients, one should note that the short interest and Amihud illiquidity are
measured in percentage while the quoted spread is measured in basis point in all the regressions.
21 Our results remain similar if we use log difference of prices/returns between the U.S. and Canadian
markets. In unreported tests, we split our sample into two based on the sign of log difference of
prices/returns between the U.S. and Canadian markets. We find that when the sign is positive (i.e.,
when the price is higher in the U.S. relative to that in Canada), the U.S. short interest is significantly
negatively correlated with log price/return difference; when the sign is negative (i.e., when the price is
higher in Canada relative to that in the U.S.), the correlation between the U.S. short interest and log
prices/returns is insignificant.
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the U.S. and Canadian markets. We also include turnover in the U.S. and Canadian
markets as an additional firm-specific proxy, which is defined as the number of
traded shares divided by total shares outstanding for each country.
In addition, market condition proxies include the U.S. (i.e., S&P 500) and
Canadian (i.e., S&P/TSX)) market indexes, index return volatilities over the
previous month for both the U.S. (VIX) and Canada (CA index volatility),
USD/CAD exchange rate volatility over the previous month (FX volatility) and ban.
We also include lagged absolute price and return log differences between the U.S.
and Canadian markets to control for potential autocorrelation in our dependent
variables.
Panel B of Tables 4.4 presents regression estimates for H1b. We find that short
interest in the U.S. market is negatively correlated with both the log absolute price
and log return differences between the U.S. and Canadian markets. In economic
terms, a one standard deviation increase in the short interest is associated with a
decrease of 81 basis points in both the log absolute price and log return differences.
This evidence indicates that short selling in the U.S. market enhances pricing
efficiency by reducing the price-parity deviation among cross-listed stocks. Based on
the above findings, we conjecture that short sellers play a similar role in the cross-
listing market as they do in the conventional market. Therefore, our following
analysis on short arbitrage is less likely to be restricted to any specific feature of the
cross-listing setting.
4.4.2. The effect of short sales on liquidity: toxic versus non-toxic
arbitrage opportunities
In this section, we test whether short sales in the U.S. market enhance market
liquidity in cases of cross-listing arbitrage opportunities (H2a), and impair liquidity
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in toxic relative to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities (H2b). We further examine
whether the liquidity impairment effect of short sales is driven by short sales in cases
of toxicdown arbitrage opportunities (H2c). Since we focus on short sales of cross-
listed stocks in the U.S. market, we mainly examine ShortUS arbitrage opportunities
in the rest of our analyses. We limit our sample to ± 5 days around each ShortUS
event day to mitigate the potential influences on liquidity from non-arbitrage events
and ShortCA arbitrage opportunities. Further, we exclude dividend record days to
avoid the contamination from dividend arbitrage events. For robustness, we also
report the full sample estimation results in the robustness test section.
To test H2, we include a set of dummy variables into Equation (4) to determine
the effects of short sale on liquidity in different types of arbitrage opportunities.
Specifically, the set of dummy variables includes: (i) ShortUS, which equals one if
the short side of an arbitrage is initiated in the U.S., and zero otherwise; (ii) toxic,
which equals one if the arbitrage opportunity arises from asynchronous price
adjustments to fundamental changes, and zero otherwise; (iii) toxicup, which equals
one if the fundamental change of the stock pair is positive, and zero otherwise; and
(iv) toxicdown, which equals one if the fundamental change of the stock pair is
negative, and zero otherwise.
Panel A of Table 4.5 reports estimation results with percent quoted spread as the
dependent variable. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of short
interest on liquidity in ShortUS arbitrage opportunity. The coefficients of short
interest are negative in both columns (i.e., -12.16 and -8.5243, respectively), which
suggests that short sales provide liquidity to the U.S. market during non-arbitrage
days in our sample. Further, we find that liquidity promoting effect of short sales is
stronger in ShortUS arbitrage opportunities. The coefficients of the interaction
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between the short interest and the ShortUS are -21.25 and -16.79, respectively. These
findings are consistent with H2a and show that short sales provide liquidity in cross-
listing arbitrage opportunities.
Columns (3) and (4) present the effects of short sales on liquidity in cases of
toxic ShortUS arbitrage opportunities. The coefficients of the interaction between
short interest and ShortUS are -20.73 and -16.29, respectively. This finding indicates
that short sales provide more liquidity to the market in cases of non-toxic ShortUS
arbitrage opportunities. In cases of toxic ShortUS arbitrage opportunities, short sales
still provide liquidity to the market.22 This is expected since long sellers of cross-
listed Canadian stocks are relatively scarce in the U.S. market. Consequently, the
U.S. market relies heavily on short sellers to provide liquidity to these cross-listed
stocks. However, coefficients of the interaction of short interest, ShortUS, and toxic
are positive in Columns (3) and (4) (i.e., 52.12 and 48.63), which suggests that the
liquidity promoting effect of short sales in cases of toxic arbitrage opportunities is
weaker than that in non-toxic arbitrage opportunities. This evidence supports H2b
and shows that short sales increase the adverse selection cost and relatively impair
liquidity in cases of toxic arbitrage compared to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities.
Further, the coefficients associated with the interaction of ShortUS, short interest,
and toxicdown are positive in Columns (5) and (6) (66.78 and 61.01), which indicates
that the liquidity promoting effect of short sales is weaker in cases of toxicdown
arbitrage opportunities when compared to non-toxic ones. The coefficients of
interaction variable ShortUS, short interest, and toxicup is insignificant in Columns (5)
and (6). This evidence is consistent with H2c and suggests that the liquidity
22 The net effect of short sales on U.S. percent quoted spread in cases of toxic arbitrage opportunities
equals to the sum of coefficients of U.S. short interest (-11.50), ShortUS × U.S. short interest (-20.73),
Toxic × U.S. short interest (-55.98) and Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest (52.12), which equals to
-36.09.
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impairment effect of short sales is mainly driven by short sales in cases of toxic
arbitrage opportunities with bad news.
Our estimation results remain similar when we use Amihud illiquidity as an
alternative liquidity measure, as reported in Panel B of Table 4.5.
4.4.3. The effect of short sales on liquidity: arbitrage costs
In this section, we test whether higher arbitrage costs deteriorate the liquidity
impairing effect of short sales in cases of toxic, and especially toxicdown arbitrage
opportunities (H3). We use lending fee as our main proxy for arbitrage costs. In
particular, high lending fee is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock
belongs to the top lending fee decile on day t, and zero otherwise. For robustness, we
also report results with idiosyncratic volatility as an alternative arbitrage cost
measure. High idiosyncratic volatility is a dummy variable that equals to one if the
stock belongs to the top idiosyncratic volatility decile on day t. We interact these two
dummy variables with factors in the regressions for H2.
Panel A of Table 4.6 presents the estimation results with high lending fee as the
high arbitrage costs indicator. The coefficients associated with the interaction of
ShortUS, short interest, and toxic are positive but insignificant regardless of liquidity
measures. The coefficients of the interaction of high lending fee, ShortUS, short
interest and toxic are significantly positive by using both percent quoted spread and
Amihud illiquidity as the liquidity measures. The results suggest that the liquidity
impairment effect of short sales is stronger for firms with high arbitrage costs in
cases of toxic arbitrage opportunities.
Next, we split toxic arbitrage opportunities into two groups: toxicup and toxicdown.
The variable of interest is the interaction of high lending fee, ShortUS, short interest,
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and toxicdown. We find that the coefficients of the interaction term are significantly
positive for both liquidity measures (i.e., Columns (3) and (4) for percent quoted
spread, and Columns (7) and (8) for Amihud illiquidity). In contrast, all coefficients
of interaction terms associated with toxicup are statistically insignificant. Our results
remain similar when we use high idiosyncratic volatility as the proxy for high
arbitrage costs, as reported in Panel B of Table 4.6. Overall, these findings support
H3, namely that the adverse effect of short sales on liquidity in cases of toxic
arbitrages is stronger for firms with higher arbitrage costs.
4.4.4. Matching portfolios
Thus far, we have found that short selling provides liquidity for stocks that are
cross-listed in the U.S. market. Arbitrage motivated short sales enhance liquidity in
cases of non-toxic arbitrages but impair liquidity in toxic, especially toxicdown
arbitrage opportunities. The liquidity impairment effect of short sales in cases of
toxic arbitrage opportunities is stronger among firms with higher arbitrage costs. In
this section, we provide additional evidence by benchmarking each cross-listed stock
against a matching portfolio. The differences between treatment firms and control
portfolios enable us to examine whether liquidity, short interest and lending fee for
cross-listed firms are abnormal in arbitrage opportunities. According to Davies and
Kim (2009), matching with a control portfolio could be optimal when results are
sensitive to the particular choice of one stock as the control firm. Since short interest,
by nature, could vary significantly among stocks with similar size and price, a
portfolio control would be more reliable in our test.
To form matching portfolios, we first construct size and price deciles
independently with all U.S. ordinary stocks that are traded during our sample period.
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We then create intersections of the size and price deciles. The corresponding
portfolio for each cross-listed stock is used as the control portfolio. We define
abnormal short interest (abnormal percent quoted spread) (abnormal Amihud
illiquidity) (abnormal lending fee) as the short interest (percent quoted spread)
(Amihud illiquidity) (lending fee) of the treatment firm minus the equal-weighted
average short interest (percent quoted spread) (Amihud illiquidity) (lending fee) of
the matching portfolio. Further, we rank cross-listed firms by abnormal lending fee
on each trading day, and use the dummy variable high abnormal lending fee to
identify firms with high abnormal lending fee on a daily basis. Specifically, the
dummy variable equals to one if a firm belongs to the top abnormal lending fee
decile, and zero otherwise.
Panel A of Table 4.7 reports the estimation results when abnormal percent
quoted spread is used as the dependent variable. In Column (1), the coefficient of
abnormal short interest is -82.70. Economically, a one standard deviation (0.13%)
increase in abnormal short interest would reduce the abnormal percent quoted
spread by 10.75 basis points. This finding is consistent with H1a, namely that short
selling enhances liquidity for cross-listed stocks in the U.S. In Column (2), the
coefficient associated with the interaction between ShortUS and abnormal short
interest is negative, indicating that short sales provide more liquidity to the U.S.
market in cases of ShortUS arbitrage opportunities (i.e., H2a). Columns (3) and (4)
show that short sales provide less liquidity in cases of toxic, especially toxicdown
arbitrage than in non-toxic arbitrage opportunities, which suggests that the effects of
short sales on liquidity are heterogeneous. Further, Columns (5) and (6) report
estimation results for H3. Column (5) shows that the coefficient of the interaction of
high abnormal lending fee, ShortUS, toxic, and abnormal short interest is significantly
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positive. This result supports H3 by showing that the liquidity impairment effect of
short sales in cases of toxic arbitrage opportunities is stronger among firms with
higher arbitrage costs. However, in Column (6), the coefficient of the interaction of
high abnormal lending fee, ShortUS, toxicdown, and abnormal short interest is
insignificant.
4.4.5. Robustness tests
4.4.5.1. Endogeneity Concerns
In the previous section, our estimations do not address the potential endogeneity
between the short selling and liquidity measures. For example, short sellers would
trade more actively when the liquidity is high. Further, some omitted variables could
be correlated with short sales while also affect stock liquidity. In this section, we
employ the two-stage ordinary least square (2SLS) estimation, using lagged U.S.
short interest, lagged change in U.S. lending fee, and their interaction terms with our
set of key dummy variables (e.g., ShortUS, Toxic, Toxicup, Toxicdown , and High
abnormal lending fee) as instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity
concern.
The second-stage estimation results of the 2SLS approach are reported in Table
4.8. In Panel A, the liquidity measure is U.S. percent quoted spread. The 2SLS
estimation results are similar as our main results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Specifically,
Column (1) shows that short sellers in the U.S. provide liquidity to the U.S. market
in ShortUS arbitrage opportunities, which is consistent with H2a. Column (2)
supports H2b and shows that short sellers in the U.S. provide less liquidity in toxic
ShortUS arbitrage opportunities relative to non-toxic ones. In addition, Column (3)
supports H2c and shows that short sellers provide less liquidity in toxicdown ShortUS
107
arbitrage opportunities. The result in Column (4) is insignificant. However, in
Column (5), we find that the short sellers provide less liquidity for firms with high
lending fees in cases of toxicdown ShortUS arbitrage opportunities. This finding
suggests that the liquidity impairment effect in cases of toxicdown ShortUS arbitrage
opportunities is stronger for firms with high arbitrage costs, which is consistent with
H3. The Anderson-Rubin Wald statistics and Hansen’s J-statistic suggest that our
instrumental variables are relevant and valid in all of the regressions.
Panel B uses U.S. Amihud illiquidity as liquidity measure. Results are similar to
those in Panel A. Overall, our main results remain consistent after using the
instrumental variable estimation to account for potential endogeneity problem.
4.4.5.2. Full sample estimation
In our main tests for H2 and H3, we limit our sample to ±5 days around each
ShortUS event to avoid contamination from other events. In the robustness test, we
check the sensibility of our results to the choice of sample. We estimate similar
regressions as those in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 with full time-series. Specifically, we add
dummy variable ShortCA and the interaction term between U.S. short interest and
ShortCA to each regression to account for the effect of ShortCA arbitrage opportunities.
Table 4.9 presents the results of full time series estimation. We find that results
remain similar to those reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, regardless of the choice of
liquidity measures. Overall, our main results for H2 and H3 are robust with the full
time series estimation.
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4.5. Conclusion
In this study, we take a fine categorization of cross-listing arbitrage opportunities
and examine the effects of short sales on market liquidity in different scenarios.
Cross-listing arbitrage arises when the U.S. price and home-market price deviate
from each other. It could be toxic if this arbitrage opportunity arises as a result of
asynchronous price adjustments to news, because informed short sellers may
increase adverse selection costs for liquidity providers. Our analysis indicates that
short sales reduce price-parity deviations and provide liquidity to the U.S. market for
cross-listed stocks, especially in cases of arbitrage opportunities. However, they
impair liquidity in cases of toxic relative to non-toxic arbitrage opportunities, and
this liquidity impairment effect is stronger among firms with higher arbitrage costs.
These empirical findings support the view that academics and market participants
should not view short sellers as monolithic (Comerton-Forde, Jones and Putniņš, 
2015). There could be different types of short sales and short sales could have
different effects on market liquidity depending on market conditions and trading
strategies. Therefore, it is worth making categorizations for both short sale
transactions and arbitrage opportunities in the future research.
In addition, we find that the liquidity impairment effect of short sales in cases of
toxic arbitrage opportunities does not negate the general benefits from short selling
activities. In general, short sales provide liquidity to the market. Short sales also help
to enhance the law of one price for cross-listed stocks. Our findings suggest that
short selling is an important component in the cross-listing market to promote
liquidity and pricing efficiency. Regulators may consider short sales as
heterogeneous trading rather than condemn them in blanket fashion.
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Table 4.1 : Arbitrage profits and durations
This table presents the profits and durations for each type of arbitrage opportunities. Our sample
includes 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. between July 2006 and December 2013.
We define |Ln(PUS/PCA)| as the absolute log difference between the price in the U.S. and the price in
Canada expressed in USD. |Ln(RUS/RCA)| is the absolute log difference between the return in the U.S.
and the return in Canada. Duration is the number of days that an arbitrage opportunity persists.
N 25% Median Mean 75% Std. Dev.
ShortUS (Pooled)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| 3,389 1.00 1.82 2.08 3.06 1.18
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| 3,389 0.90 1.64 2.10 2.98 1.53
Duration 3,389 1.00 1.00 1.09 1.00 0.49
ShortUS (Toxic)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| 935 0.97 1.78 2.06 3.01 1.18
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| 935 0.86 1.60 2.04 2.91 1.53
Duration 935 1.00 1.00 1.19 1.00 0.79
ShortUS (Toxicdown)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| 463 1.22 2.01 2.23 3.28 1.17
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| 463 1.04 1.75 2.20 3.08 1.52
Duration 463 1.00 1.00 1.29 1.00 1.06
ShortUS (Toxicup)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| 472 0.89 1.50 1.89 2.67 1.17
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| 472 0.74 1.34 1.89 2.63 1.53
Duration 472 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 0.34
ShortUS (Non-toxic)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| 2,454 1.01 1.84 2.09 3.07 1.18
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| 2,454 0.92 1.66 2.12 3.01 1.53
Duration 2,454 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.00 0.29
ShortCA (Pooled)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| 3,216 0.99 1.60 1.94 2.72 1.14
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| 3,216 0.85 1.51 2.00 2.78 1.50
Duration 3,216 1.00 1.00 1.48 1.00 2.76
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Table 4.2 : Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample as well as each type of arbitrage
opportunities. Our sample includes 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. between July
2006 and December 2013. Short interest is the daily quantity of shares borrowed, normalized by total
outstanding shares for each firm Percent quoted spread is the difference between the best bid and best
ask divided by the midpoint of them, aggregated into daily frequency. Amihud illiquidity is the
absolute daily percentage return divided by the daily dollar trading volume. Idiosyncratic volatility is
the standard deviation of the residual of the daily Canadian-U.S. return differences over the previous
three months regressed the on leading, contemporaneous, and lagged daily U.S. market index,
Canadian index returns, and foreign exchange rate changes. Capitalization is the firm size measured
in million pounds. Dollar volume is the daily dollar trading volume measured in million pounds.
1/Price is the inverse of share price. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the
previous month. U.S. index is the S&P500 index level. CA index is the level of the S&P/TSX index.
VIX is the U.S. market volatility index. CA index volatility is the S&P/TSX index volatility over the
previous month for Canada. FX volatility is the USD/CAD exchange rate volatility over the previous
month.
N 25% Median Mean 75% Std. Dev.
Full Sample
U.S. short interest (bps) 130,155 0.00 0.33 3.22 2.31 8.10
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 130,155 7.91 18.47 35.95 45.18 47.45
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 129,975 0.05 0.31 5.91 2.59 19.18
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 130,155 0.46 0.77 1.03 1.27 0.88
U.S. lending fee (bps) 113,822 10.00 16.17 137.35 94.47 333.92
U.S. dollar volume ($ Millions) 130,155 0.64 4.13 20.37 19.64 40.44
Capitalization ($ Millions) 130,155 5.89 7.12 7.28 8.75 1.75
U.S. index level 130,155 1,197.30 1,342.84 1,332.26 1,461.89 221.24
CA index level 130,155 1,504.10 1,570.10 1,573.15 1,678.77 148.97
VIX 130,155 15.02 18.47 21.17 24.29 9.45
CA index volatility 130,155 15.96 22.65 25.33 31.45 13.19
U.S. 1/Price 130,155 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.19
U.S. volatility 130,155 0.21 0.43 0.65 0.85 0.64
CA volatility 129,345 0.20 0.41 0.61 0.80 0.60
ShortUS (Pooled)
U.S. short interest (bps) 3,389 0.00 0.25 2.97 2.05 7.55
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 3,389 10.06 27.40 52.31 67.79 65.13
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 3,379 0.07 0.56 9.81 5.08 26.06
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 3,389 0.54 1.01 1.25 1.59 0.98
U.S. lending fee (bps) 2,887 11.05 21.25 160.64 122.00 355.00
ShortUS (Toxic)
U.S. short interest (bps) 935 0.00 0.23 3.12 2.14 7.90
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 935 10.39 27.91 52.56 68.71 65.13
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 930 0.09 0.65 9.03 4.89 24.12
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 935 0.55 1.00 1.27 1.62 1.03
U.S. lending fee (bps) 795 11.37 18.00 142.49 116.01 323.58
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Table 4.2 (Cont’d)
N 25% Median Mean 75% Std. Dev.
ShortUS (Toxicdown)
U.S. short interest (bps) 463 0.00 0.23 3.44 1.83 8.99
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 463 15.70 34.22 58.65 76.6 66.16
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 458 0.09 0.94 8.79 5.03 22.84
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 463 0.69 1.11 1.36 1.74 1.04
U.S. lending fee (bps) 383 13.54 34.41 167.73 175.00 345.26
ShortUS (Toxicup)
U.S. short interest (bps) 472 0.00 0.23 2.80 2.31 6.65
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 472 8.19 20.76 46.60 57.31 63.60
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 472 0.08 0.45 9.26 4.77 25.32
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 472 0.48 0.88 1.18 1.50 1.01
U.S. lending fee (bps) 412 10.09 15.05 119.02 71.54 300.56
ShortUS (Non-toxic)
U.S. short interest (bps) 2,454 0.00 0.26 2.92 2.03 7.41
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 2,454 9.89 27.15 52.21 67.62 65.15
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 2,449 0.07 0.52 10.10 5.24 26.76
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 2,454 0.49 0.91 1.24 1.54 1.12
U.S. lending fee (bps) 2,092 11.00 22.30 167.54 125.78 366.07
ShortCA (Pooled)
U.S. short interest (bps) 3,216 0.00 0.38 3.47 2.55 8.38
U.S. percent quoted spread (bps) 3,216 9.64 25.00 46.29 58.24 60.02
U.S. Amihud illiquidity 3,209 0.07 0.50 9.98 4.52 27.50
Idiosyncratic volatility (%) 3,216 0.50 0.90 1.21 1.53 1.05
U.S. lending fee (bps) 2,826 11.95 18.14 137.25 106.14 313.81
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Table 4.3 : Correlations
This table presents unconditional correlations between our main variables. Our sample includes 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. between July 2006 and
December 2013. ShortUS is a dummy that equals one if the U.S. price of the stock-pair is overvalued relative to the Canadian price in the arbitrage opportunity, and zero
otherwise. ShortCA is a dummy that equals one if the Canadian price of the stock-pair is overvalued relative to the U.S. price in the arbitrage opportunity, and zero otherwise.
Other variables are as defined in previous tables. P values are reported in parentheses.
U.S. short
interest
U.S. percent
quoted spread
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity |Ln(PUS/PCA)| |Ln(RUS/RCA)| ShortUS ShortCA
U.S. lending
fee
Idiosyncratic
volatility Capitalization
U.S. short interest 1.00
U.S. percent quoted spread -0.10 1.00
(0.00)
U.S. Amihud illiquidity -0.01 0.66 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| -0.05 0.47 0.10 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| -0.06 0.44 0.14 0.57 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ShortUS -0.00 0.06 0.00 0.29 0.22 1.00
(0.08) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
ShortCA -0.00 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.20 -0.02 1.00
(0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
U.S. lending fee 0.04 0.28 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.63)
Idiosyncratic volatility -0.10 0.65 0.09 0.40 0.43 0.03 0.03 0.25 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capitalization 0.02 -0.35 -0.02 -0.16 -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.34 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 4.4 : The effect of short sales on liquidity and price parity deviation of
cross-listed firms
This table presents the effect of short sales on the liquidity and price parity deviation of cross-listed
firms. Our sample includes 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. between July 2006
and December 2013. Panel A reports the results from estimating the following equation:
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧+ ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧.
Columns (1) and (2) use percent quoted spread as the liquidity measure. Columns (3) and (4) use
Amihud illiquidity as the liquidity measure. Ban is a dummy variable that equals to one during the
short selling ban period between 19 September 2008 and 8 October 2008, and zero otherwise. Other
variables are as defined in previous tables.
Panel B reports the results from estimating the following equation:
ܲ݅ݎ ܿ݁ ݌ܽ ݅ݎݐݕ݀ ݁݅ݒ ܽ݅ݐ݋݊ ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧+ ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧.
Columns (1) and (2) use |Ln(PUS/PCA)| as the price-parity deviation measure. Columns (3) and (4) use
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| as the price-parity deviation measure. Variables are as defined in previous tables. All
columns in this table include year dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: The effect of short sales on the liquidity of cross-listed firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable U.S. percentquoted spread
U.S. percent
quoted spread
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. short interest -16.06*** -11.13*** -4.29*** -3.04*
(4.20) (4.09) (1.41) (1.56)
Capitalization -12.68** -3.41
(5.41) (2.09)
Ban 9.20*** 0.96
(2.75) (1.08)
VIX 0.29*** 0.06*
(0.08) (0.04)
U.S. volatility -0.53 -0.55
(1.12) (0.49)
U.S. 1/price 103.98*** 24.51***
(19.63) (8.97)
U.S. dollar volume 0.07*** 0.03***
(0.02) (0.01)
Constant 44.29*** 109.76*** 7.42*** 25.99
(2.95) (41.55) (1.16) (15.89)
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 130,155 130154 129975 129975
R2 (within) 0.07 0.35 0.02 0.08
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Panel B: The effect of short sales on the price parity deviation of cross-listed firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable |Ln(PUS/PCA)| |Ln(PUS/PCA)| |Ln(RUS/RCA)| |Ln(RUS/RCA)|
U.S. short interest -0.12*** -0.10** -0.12** -0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capitalization -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.02) (0.03)
Dividend yield 0.01* 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
U.S. turnover 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
CA turnover 0.01** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
U.S. volatility 0.02 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02)
CA volatility -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
VIX 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
CA index volatility 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
FX volatility 0.02*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Ban 0.14*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.05)
|Ln(PUS/PCA)| (lag) 0.13***
(0.02)
|Ln(RUS/RCA)| (lag) 0.35***
(0.01)
Constant 0.48*** 1.57*** 0.69*** 1.61***
(0.02) (0.17) (0.03) (0.18)
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 130,155 129,207 130,149 129,195
R2 (within) 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.23
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Table 4.5 : The effect of short sales on liquidity: toxic versus non-toxic arbitrage
opportunities
This table presents the effect of short sales on the liquidity in cross-listing arbitrage opportunities. Our
sample includes 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. for the ± 5 days around each
Short_US event between July 2006 and December 2013. This table reports the results from estimating
the following three equations:
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜+ ߚଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଷ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧× ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ+ ߚଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧+ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧× ൫ߚଵ + ߚଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଷܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧+ ߚସ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧൯+ ߚହ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚ଺ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧+ ߚ଻ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧+ ଼ߚ ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧+ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧× ൫ߚଵ + ߚଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଷܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚସܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ + ߚହ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣+ ߚ଺ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡൯+ ߚ଻ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ଼ߚ ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚଽܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡+ ߚଵ଴ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚଵଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ + ߚଵଶܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧
Panel A uses percent quoted spread as the liquidity measure. Panel B uses Amihud illiquidity as the
liquidity measure. Variables are as defined in previous tables. All columns in this table include year
dummy variables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is U.S. percent quoted spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
U.S. short interest -12.16** -8.52** -11.50** -7.98** -11.49** -7.98**
(4.89) (3.93) (4.83) (3.84) (4.83) (3.84)
ShortUS 6.19*** 4.70*** 6.27*** 4.57*** 6.27*** 4.57***
(1.04) (0.86) (1.18) (1.01) (1.18) (1.01)
ShortUS × U.S. short interest -21.25*** -16.79** -20.73** -16.29* -20.74** -16.30*
(7.91) (7.69) (9.84) (9.71) (9.84) (9.71)
Toxic 5.74*** -0.53
(1.78) (1.38)
Toxic × U.S. short interest -55.98** -52.21***
(22.10) (19.76)
Toxic × ShortUS -5.71* 0.93
(3.40) (2.57)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 52.12* 48.63*
(28.36) (25.32)
Toxicdown 5.17** -1.42
(2.20) (2.13)
Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -62.63** -58.44**
(26.32) (23.50)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -5.90 0.70
(3.71) (2.81)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short
interest
66.78** 61.01**
(31.47) (28.79)
Toxicup 7.10 1.58
(4.84) (3.69)
Toxicup × U.S. short interest -34.18 -30.67
(30.86) (25.70)
Toxicup × ShortUS -6.20 -0.02
(5.68) (4.70)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 16.06 17.17
(37.89) (33.28)
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U.S. dollar volume 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ban 5.34* 5.39* 5.48*
(3.18) (3.21) (3.24)
VIX 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
U.S. volatility -3.46** -3.45** -3.44**
(1.65) (1.65) (1.64)
Capitalization -11.91* -11.93* -11.93*
(6.19) (6.18) (6.18)
U.S. 1/price 106.28*** 106.21*** 106.21***
(22.29) (22.28) (22.28)
Constant 50.28*** 106.58** 50.23*** 106.74** 50.22*** 106.69**
(3.75) (47.54) (3.76) (47.51) (3.76) (47.54)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,768
R2 (within) 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.37
Panel B: Dependent variable is U.S. Amihud illiquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
U.S. short interest -2.31 -1.36 -2.10 -1.17 -2.08 -1.16
(2.11) (2.19) (2.09) (2.19) (2.09) (2.18)
ShortUS 1.32** 0.95** 1.75*** 1.36** 1.75*** 1.36**
(0.54) (0.47) (0.60) (0.54) (0.60) (0.54)
ShortUS × U.S. short interest -5.44* -4.47 -7.00* -5.90 -7.00* -5.90
(2.88) (2.91) (3.89) (3.97) (3.89) (3.97)
Toxic 2.17** 0.75
(0.98) (0.97)
Toxic × U.S. short interest -16.95* -15.80*
(8.96) (8.72)
Toxic × ShortUS -3.61** -2.19
(1.74) (1.57)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 21.76* 20.24*
(12.56) (12.09)
Toxicdown 3.29*** 1.85*
(1.12) (1.02)
Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -25.46** -24.25**
(10.15) (9.76)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -6.43*** -5.09**
(2.22) (2.07)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short
interest
35.94** 34.20**
(14.11) (13.81)
Toxicup -0.52 -1.90
(2.47) (2.30)
Toxicup × U.S. short interest 4.97 6.02
(15.92) (16.07)
Toxicup × ShortUS 0.77 2.23
(2.83) (2.59)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -8.14 -9.06
(18.24) (18.12)
U.S. dollar volume 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ban 1.03 1.06 1.11
(1.13) (1.16) (1.16)
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VIX 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
U.S. volatility -1.74** -1.75** -1.76**
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69)
Capitalization -2.80 -2.80 -2.79
(2.52) (2.52) (2.52)
U.S. 1/price 24.53** 24.53** 24.53**
(9.51) (9.50) (9.51)
Constant 9.99*** 23.79 9.99*** 23.75 9.98*** 23.72
(1.15) (19.15) (1.15) (19.12) (1.15) (19.16)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 27,739 27,739 27,739 27,739 27,739 27,739
R2 (within) 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08
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Table 4.6 : The effect of short sales on liquidity: arbitrage costs
This table presents the effect of short sales on the liquidity in cross-listing arbitrage opportunities. Our sample includes 134 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S.
for the ± 5 days around each Short_US event between July 2006 and December 2013. This table reports the results from estimating the following two equations:
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧+ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜.௧× ൫ߚଵ + ߚଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଷܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧+ ߚସܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚହ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ+ ߚ଺ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚ଻ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧× ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ଼ߚ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧× ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧൯+ ߚଽ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଵ଴ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧+ ߚଵଵܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧+ ߚଵଷ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵସܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧× ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵହ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧× ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵ଺ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧
݅ܮ ݍݑ݅݀ ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ = ߙ௜,௧+ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ௜,௧× ൫ߚଵ + ߚଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଷܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚସܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ + ߚହܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚ଺ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚ଻ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡+ ଼ߚ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଽܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵ଴ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵଵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣× ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧൯+ ߚଵଷ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ + ߚଵସܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚଵହܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡+ ߚଵ଺ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଵ଻ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ + ߚଵ଼ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ + ߚଵଽ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶ଴ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶଵܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶଶ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ × ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧௨௣ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶଷ ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௜,௧௎ௌ× ܶ݋݅ݔ ௜ܿ,௧ௗ௢௪௡ × ܪ݅݃ ℎܽ ܾݎ ݅ݐܽݎ ݃ ݁ܿ݋ݏݐ௜,௧+ ߚଶସܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௜,௧+ m௜,௧
Panel A uses U.S. lending fee as the arbitrage cost measure. Panel B uses idiosyncratic volatility as the arbitrage cost measure. High lending fee is a dummy that equals to one
if the stock belongs to the top lending fee decile on day t, and zero otherwise. High idiosyncratic volatility is a dummy that equals to one if the stock belongs to the top
idiosyncratic volatility decile on day t, and zero otherwise. Other variables are as defined in previous tables. Columns (1) to (4) in both Panel A and B use percent quoted
spread as the liquidity measure. Columns (5) to (8) use Amihud illiquidity as the liquidity measure. All columns in this table include year dummy variables. Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: Arbitrage cost measure is U.S. lending fee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable
U.S. percent
quoted
spread
U.S. percent
quoted
spread
U.S. percent
quoted
spread
U.S. percent
quoted
spread
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. short interest -7.25* -6.28 -7.24* -6.30 -1.59 -1.29 -1.59 -1.30
(4.05) (5.36) (4.05) (5.35) (1.57) (2.27) (1.57) (2.26)
ShortUS 3.44*** 1.73** 3.44*** 1.73** 0.54 0.15 0.54 0.15
(0.95) (0.74) (0.95) (0.74) (0.41) (0.36) (0.41) (0.36)
ShortUS × U.S. short interest -7.77 -5.66 -7.78 -5.68 -2.85 -2.43 -2.87 -2.46
(8.60) (9.21) (8.60) (9.21) (2.71) (2.80) (2.72) (2.80)
Toxic 3.61** -2.69* 1.18 -0.24
(1.67) (1.38) (1.18) (1.16)
Toxic × U.S. short interest -23.50* -19.42 -5.28 -3.94
(12.04) (12.13) (7.55) (8.04)
Toxic × ShortUS -1.06 5.88*** -1.08 0.39
(2.90) (2.19) (1.78) (1.60)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 5.28 1.42 5.04 3.45
(18.48) (16.48) (9.83) (9.78)
High lending fee 8.12** 4.98* 8.11** 4.96* 1.93 1.14 1.90 1.11
(3.54) (2.53) (3.54) (2.54) (1.37) (1.25) (1.37) (1.24)
High lending fee × U.S. short interest -13.77 -5.73 -13.79 -5.73 -1.63 0.33 -1.61 0.36
(12.23) (10.13) (12.24) (10.12) (5.09) (5.03) (5.08) (5.03)
High lending fee × ShortUS 10.03*** 10.35*** 10.03*** 10.36*** 4.42*** 4.47*** 4.42*** 4.48***
(3.05) (2.61) (3.05) (2.61) (1.54) (1.49) (1.54) (1.49)
High lending fee × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -35.59* -28.48 -35.60* -28.49 -10.83 -8.75 -10.83 -8.73
(19.85) (18.48) (19.85) (18.48) (10.97) (11.30) (10.97) (11.30)
High lending fee × Toxic 7.36 7.79 3.77 3.84
(7.20) (5.57) (2.98) (2.87)
High lending fee × Toxic × U.S. short interest -106.81*** -110.87*** -37.89** -39.44**
(35.49) (30.95) (17.44) (16.85)
High lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS -15.71 -17.53* -9.44* -9.79**
(10.61) (8.87) (4.92) (4.67)
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High lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 146.58*** 154.34*** 50.38* 52.44**
(46.36) (44.45) (27.13) (26.04)
Toxicdown 3.25* -4.08** 1.27 -0.34
(1.66) (1.59) (1.05) (1.02)
Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -26.43** -18.69 -7.19 -5.07
(13.25) (13.79) (6.14) (7.21)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -1.74 6.65** -2.08 -0.33
(3.71) (3.12) (1.68) (1.54)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 14.95 -0.66 10.19 6.24
(20.50) (21.94) (8.13) (9.06)
High lending fee × Toxicdown 6.77 10.61 9.23** 10.05**
(10.37) (8.13) (4.02) (3.90)
High lending fee × Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -112.33*** -127.49*** -55.06*** -59.10***
(39.23) (27.54) (15.37) (13.95)
High lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS -13.96 -21.82** -17.48*** -19.22***
(12.57) (10.21) (6.60) (6.46)
High lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 152.19*** 191.88*** 73.55*** 82.90***
(48.44) (40.70) (26.22) (25.07)
Toxicup 4.62 1.05 0.95 -0.00
(4.13) (2.91) (3.07) (2.84)
Toxicup × U.S. short interest -14.19 -17.74 -0.07 -0.38
(26.89) (23.58) (20.42) (20.32)
Toxicup × ShortUS -1.07 2.65 -0.02 0.89
(4.45) (3.14) (3.60) (3.29)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -14.04 3.12 -4.36 -1.65
(29.90) (25.51) (23.06) (22.57)
High lending fee × Toxicup 7.68 1.37 -5.32 -6.67
(14.37) (11.44) (4.57) (4.22)
High lending fee × Toxicup × U.S. short interest -84.57 -61.37 8.01 12.68
(75.55) (74.18) (25.71) (24.32)
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High lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS -17.11 -8.87 3.18 5.06
(18.07) (15.79) (5.30) (4.69)
High lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 112.21 49.43 -4.09 -18.42
(87.11) (89.31) (30.58) (31.03)
U.S. dollar volume 0.06** 0.06** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Ban 5.34* 5.48* 1.04 1.14
(3.14) (3.14) (1.13) (1.14)
VIX 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.07 0.07
(0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
U.S. volatility -3.29** -3.28** -1.70** -1.70**
(1.58) (1.57) (0.66) (0.66)
Capitalization -11.45* -11.45* -2.67 -2.66
(6.14) (6.14) (2.54) (2.54)
U.S. 1/price 106.75*** 106.79*** 24.67** 24.75**
(22.16) (22.16) (9.47) (9.48)
Constant 45.94*** 100.50** 45.95*** 100.47** 8.92*** 22.16 8.91*** 22.07
(3.80) (47.16) (3.81) (47.17) (1.07) (19.40) (1.07) (19.42)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,739 27,739 27,739 27,739
R2 (within) 0.10 0.37 0.10 0.37 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08
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Panel B: Arbitrage cost measure is idiosyncratic volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable
U.S.
percent
quoted
spread
U.S. percent
quoted
spread
U.S.
percent
quoted
spread
U.S. percent
quoted
spread
U.S.
Amihud
illiquidity
U.S.
Amihud
illiquidity
U.S.
Amihud
illiquidity
U.S.
Amihud
illiquidity
U.S. short interest -6.02 -3.39 -6.03 -3.40 0.94 1.62 0.97 1.65
(5.00) (4.14) (5.00) (4.14) (2.03) (2.20) (2.03) (2.20)
ShortUS 4.25*** 2.75*** 4.24*** 2.74*** 0.78 0.43 0.78 0.43
(0.88) (0.74) (0.88) (0.74) (0.47) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45)
ShortUS × U.S. short interest -10.65 -8.78 -10.66 -8.82 -1.94 -1.41 -1.94 -1.43
(7.71) (8.09) (7.70) (8.09) (4.28) (4.31) (4.29) (4.31)
Toxic 4.44*** -2.51* 0.91 -0.64
(1.59) (1.40) (0.80) (0.81)
Toxic × U.S. short interest -28.94** -27.06** -5.48 -4.87
(13.18) (12.42) (5.72) (6.16)
Toxic × ShortUS -4.17 2.89 -1.11 0.42
(2.69) (2.12) (1.29) (1.20)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 21.07 21.18 3.11 2.39
(17.63) (16.26) (8.54) (8.68)
High idiosyncratic volatility 20.66*** 8.36** 20.65*** 8.35** 6.62*** 3.82** 6.62*** 3.81**
(4.56) (3.95) (4.55) (3.95) (1.91) (1.62) (1.91) (1.62)
High idiosyncratic volatility × U.S. short interest -46.79*** -43.80*** -46.87*** -43.86*** -27.31*** -26.46*** -27.30*** -26.43***
(16.90) (15.14) (16.95) (15.18) (8.50) (8.07) (8.50) (8.07)
High idiosyncratic volatility × ShortUS 13.44*** 12.76*** 13.44*** 12.76*** 6.89** 6.74** 6.89** 6.74**
(3.91) (3.73) (3.91) (3.73) (2.64) (2.60) (2.64) (2.60)
High idiosyncratic volatility × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -135.97** -129.10** -136.15** -129.30** -99.24*** -97.97*** -99.08*** -97.81***
(57.21) (57.78) (57.30) (57.84) (29.02) (29.95) (29.02) (29.94)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxic 5.34 12.35 8.19* 9.72**
(9.70) (8.59) (4.32) (4.34)
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High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxic × U.S. short interest -99.11*** -106.73*** -35.01** -36.95**
(25.98) (28.28) (14.14) (14.51)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxic × ShortUS -5.89 -11.46 -16.85** -18.27***
(16.11) (13.45) (6.84) (6.57)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 171.34* 160.18** 141.99*** 140.37***
(90.11) (77.88) (40.02) (39.12)
Toxicdown 4.71** -3.19* 1.50 -0.23
(1.90) (1.72) (0.92) (0.88)
Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -34.32** -31.84** -9.27 -8.59
(16.07) (14.57) (6.15) (6.59)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -6.19* 1.15 -2.77* -1.22
(3.16) (2.44) (1.50) (1.40)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 36.94* 35.77* 10.08 9.35
(19.65) (19.39) (8.80) (9.15)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicdown -0.63 12.64 15.43** 18.34***
(11.94) (11.49) (6.86) (6.84)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -77.03** -88.86*** -48.18*** -50.94***
(31.17) (31.34) (15.99) (15.66)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicdown × ShortUS 4.53 -5.73 -27.85*** -30.43***
(13.94) (12.39) (10.64) (10.57)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 137.40* 126.60* 182.88*** 180.93***
(77.88) (73.53) (48.07) (46.68)
Toxicup 3.77 -0.72 -0.58 -1.72
(3.49) (2.45) (1.87) (1.71)
Toxicup × U.S. short interest -16.57 -15.11 2.91 3.57
(21.78) (20.05) (13.72) (14.18)
Toxicup × ShortUS -1.76 3.41 1.39 2.63
(3.89) (2.87) (2.23) (2.03)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -8.08 -4.85 -9.33 -9.87
(25.49) (23.19) (15.80) (16.21)
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High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicup 15.83 15.55 -1.75 -1.71
(19.94) (17.81) (4.92) (5.28)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicup × U.S. short interest -491.30 -856.86** 133.77 47.24
(488.66) (431.16) (168.63) (177.30)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicup × ShortUS -21.69 -21.85 -1.21 -1.38
(27.11) (24.16) (6.68) (6.40)
High idiosyncratic volatility × Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 567.75 926.69* -129.59 -42.18
(562.81) (509.22) (181.79) (185.65)
U.S. dollar volume 0.07** 0.07** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Ban 5.39* 5.51* 1.03 1.09
(3.16) (3.15) (1.12) (1.13)
VIX 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.08* 0.08*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
U.S. volatility -3.50** -3.50** -1.77** -1.77**
(1.62) (1.62) (0.68) (0.68)
Capitalization -12.06* -12.06* -2.85 -2.83
(6.14) (6.14) (2.51) (2.52)
U.S. 1/price 100.75*** 100.78*** 22.21** 22.28**
(22.41) (22.41) (9.11) (9.13)
Constant 45.92*** 106.80** 45.92*** 106.73** 8.65*** 23.72 8.64*** 23.59
(3.63) (47.08) (3.63) (47.11) (0.97) (19.11) (0.98) (19.17)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,768 27,739 27,739 27,739 27,739
R2 (within) 0.10 0.37 0.10 0.37 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08
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Table 4.7 : Matching portfolios
This table presents the effect of short sales on the liquidity in cross-listing arbitrage opportunities based on abnormal measurements. Our sample includes 134 Canadian
stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. for the ± 5 days around each ShortUS event between July 2006 and December 2013. Abnormal short interest is the short interest of the
treatment firm minus the average short interest of the associated size and price matched portfolio. Abnormal percent quoted spread is the percent quoted spread of the
treatment firm minus the average percent quoted spread of the associated size and price matched portfolio. Abnormal Amihud illiquidity is the Amihud illiquidity of the
treatment firm minus the average Amihud illiquidity of the associated size and price matched portfolio. High abnormal lending fee is a dummy that equals to one if the
difference between the lending fee of the treatment firm and that of the associated size and price matched portfolio belongs to the top abnormal lending fee decile on day t,
and zero otherwise. The estimation equations are similar to that in Table 4, 5 and 6. Panel A uses abnormal percent quoted spread as the liquidity measure. Panel B uses
abnormal Amihud illiquidity as the liquidity measure. Variables are as defined in previous tables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is U.S. abnormal percent quoted spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
U.S. abnormal short interest -82.70*** -80.45*** -79.51*** -79.53*** -75.60*** -75.63***
(14.10) (13.99) (13.92) (13.91) (15.42) (15.40)
ShortUS -6.17*** -5.64*** -5.63*** -7.76*** -7.76***
(1.67) (1.76) (1.76) (2.12) (2.12)
ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest -19.81*** -19.74*** -19.74*** -22.29** -22.28**
(6.44) (7.41) (7.41) (9.37) (9.38)
Toxic -8.16* 2.97
(4.74) (4.07)
Toxic × U.S. abnormal short interest -51.57** -14.35
(20.02) (17.29)
Toxic × ShortUS 5.76 -1.06
(6.82) (6.72)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 47.84* 22.19
(25.39) (26.66)
High abnormal lending fee 2.60 2.60
(5.26) (5.26)
High abnormal lending fee × U.S. abnormal short interest -19.08 -19.10
(21.68) (21.66)
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High abnormal lending fee × ShortUS 6.31 6.32
(4.86) (4.86)
High abnormal lending fee × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest -5.20 -5.09
(24.66) (24.68)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic -44.67***
(11.95)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic × U.S. abnormal short interest -174.56***
(43.19)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS 31.30*
(16.34)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 150.77**
(58.86)
Toxicdown -11.64** 3.24
(5.39) (4.36)
Toxicdown × U.S. abnormal short interest -71.40*** -29.28
(21.62) (17.80)
Toxicdown × ShortUS 9.02 4.00
(8.32) (8.20)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 63.91** 47.67
(31.96) (35.12)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown -57.90***
(16.36)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown × U.S. abnormal short interest -156.90***
(58.79)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS 27.09
(24.54)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 92.30
(86.24)
Toxicup 1.25 4.48
(10.85) (10.11)
Toxicup × U.S. abnormal short interest 12.99 53.07
(71.61) (79.42)
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Toxicup × ShortUS -3.31 -8.24
(11.45) (11.14)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest -12.27 -59.83
(73.33) (79.39)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup -17.87
(25.34)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup × U.S. abnormal short interest -201.92
(141.88)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS 25.26
(27.85)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 229.54
(148.70)
U.S. dollar volume -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ban -23.73*** -23.72*** -23.89*** -24.00*** -23.74*** -24.12***
(6.70) (6.69) (6.70) (6.77) (6.73) (6.80)
VIX -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.42***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
U.S. volatility 1.27 1.27 1.21 1.20 1.30 1.27
(2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01)
Capitalization 13.86* 13.81* 13.82* 13.82* 14.45* 14.47*
(7.60) (7.59) (7.59) (7.59) (7.56) (7.55)
U.S. 1/price -129.68*** -129.60*** -129.63*** -129.65*** -127.70*** -127.68***
(30.10) (30.09) (30.09) (30.08) (30.25) (30.21)
Constant -108.22* -107.26* -107.14* -107.15* -112.69* -112.90*
(58.67) (58.58) (58.56) (58.54) (58.50) (58.42)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 27,740 27,740 27,740 27,740 27,740 27,740
R2 (within) 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
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Panel B: Dependent variable is U.S. abnormal Amihud illiquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
U.S. abnormal short interest -134.44*** -127.27*** -124.21*** -124.21*** -103.06*** -103.12***
(28.54) (28.03) (27.93) (27.94) (27.22) (27.25)
ShortUS -11.96*** -11.38** -11.38** -7.23 -7.24
(4.55) (4.91) (4.91) (4.73) (4.73)
ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest -61.41*** -60.62*** -60.63*** -51.18** -51.15**
(17.86) (21.53) (21.53) (20.70) (20.71)
Toxic -25.23* 14.71
(14.69) (14.03)
Toxic × U.S. abnormal short interest -168.24*** -35.51
(56.73) (45.08)
Toxic × ShortUS 21.79 -18.09
(18.58) (16.14)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 154.76** 37.29
(66.16) (54.13)
High abnormal lending fee -8.72 -8.80
(11.82) (11.80)
High abnormal lending fee × U.S. abnormal short interest -92.47* -92.57*
(51.35) (51.34)
High abnormal lending fee × ShortUS -10.25 -10.23
(13.06) (13.07)
High abnormal lending fee × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest -23.33 -23.22
(53.70) (53.72)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic -132.54***
(39.69)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic × U.S. abnormal short interest -474.28***
(119.38)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS 130.42**
(51.40)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 417.83***
(156.59)
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Toxicdown -27.58 25.65
(18.51) (18.84)
Toxicdown × U.S. abnormal short interest -173.05** -17.13
(67.52) (57.08)
Toxicdown × ShortUS 14.49 -23.30
(24.56) (18.58)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 132.46* 29.74
(76.33) (57.20)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown -169.19***
(41.72)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown × U.S. abnormal short interest -426.42**
(168.37)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS 116.31*
(65.55)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 275.15
(202.03)
Toxicup -20.04 -8.46
(25.12) (20.92)
Toxicup × U.S. abnormal short interest -157.99 -52.54
(96.77) (81.95)
Toxicup × ShortUS 27.46 -0.82
(27.63) (25.19)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 180.10 39.87
(108.86) (95.91)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup -49.66
(86.01)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup × U.S. abnormal short interest -477.25
(351.29)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS 108.61
(86.77)
High abnormal lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. abnormal short interest 540.16
(360.45)
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U.S. dollar volume -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Ban -55.95*** -55.85*** -56.62*** -56.35*** -49.03*** -49.41***
(19.18) (19.15) (19.19) (19.30) (18.60) (18.65)
VIX -1.41*** -1.41*** -1.41*** -1.41*** -1.21*** -1.20***
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.45) (0.45)
U.S. volatility 5.35 5.31 5.16 5.17 3.16 3.12
(5.25) (5.25) (5.24) (5.24) (4.82) (4.82)
Capitalization 3.17 3.15 3.20 3.23 4.65 4.78
(16.94) (16.93) (16.93) (16.92) (16.95) (16.92)
U.S. 1/price -686.28*** -686.03*** -686.06*** -685.93*** -663.06*** -662.58***
(97.66) (97.65) (97.67) (97.68) (98.22) (98.16)
Constant 45.73 47.19 47.39 47.11 33.31 32.25
(135.79) (135.69) (135.68) (135.60) (136.78) (136.45)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 27,711 27,711 27,711 27,711 27,198 27,198
R2 (within) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26
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Table 4.8: Robustness tests –instrumental variables
This table presents the effect of short sales on the liquidity in cross-listing arbitrage opportunities based on 2SLS instrumental variable estimation. Our sample includes 134
Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S. for the ± 5 days around each ShortUS event between July 2006 and December 2013. Panel A uses percent quoted spread as
the liquidity measure. Panel B uses Amihud illiquidity as the liquidity measure. The instrumental variables include lagged U.S. short interest, lagged one day change in U.S.
lending fee, and their interaction terms with the set of key dummy variables (e.g., ShortUS, Toxic, Toxicup, Toxicdown, and High abnormal lending fee). Explanatory variables
with hat are predicted by our set of instrumental variables in the first-stage regressions. Variables are as defined in previous tables. Anderson-Rubin Wald F statistic and
Anderson-Rubin Wald Chi-sq statistic are results of the weak instrument robust inference. Hansen’s J-test value is the result of over-identification test. Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is U.S. percent quoted spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -95.66*** -94.03*** -94.01*** -110.03*** -110.01***
(19.85) (19.60) (19.60) (19.27) (19.27)
ShortUS 5.70*** 5.54*** 5.53*** 3.55*** 3.55***
(1.44) (1.48) (1.48) (1.22) (1.22)
ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -56.55** -72.89** -72.88** -50.88* -50.95*
(25.15) (30.07) (30.07) (29.17) (29.20)
Toxic 3.27 0.93
(3.41) (2.53)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -158.67* -98.01
(88.21) (65.76)
Toxic × ShortUS -2.39 1.94
(4.35) (3.82)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 205.93* 115.77
(108.12) (89.53)
High lending fee 5.61 5.60
(6.34) (6.33)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 38.12 38.11
(37.93) (37.93)
High lending fee× ShortUS 12.21*** 12.20***
(4.41) (4.40)
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ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -98.95 -98.80
(62.62) (62.59)
High lending fee× Toxic -34.45
(23.28)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -790.34
(640.59)
High lending fee× Toxic × ShortUS 23.62
(24.20)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 915.29
(634.95)
Toxicdown 4.46 1.18
(4.44) (3.07)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -201.76** -140.63*
(100.20) (73.34)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -6.36 1.28
(6.37) (5.08)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 284.00** 160.24*
(124.18) (95.19)
High lending fee× Toxicdown -33.78*
(19.33)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ܷ . .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -817.80
(642.38)
High lending fee× Toxicdown × ShortUS 9.96
(20.46)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 1025.35*
(626.71)
Toxicup 1.83 1.67
(4.55) (4.16)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -87.09 -15.43
(98.33) (57.29)
Toxicup × ShortUS 1.71 1.59
(4.91) (4.45)
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ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 88.09 30.08
(116.31) (83.06)
High lending fee× Toxicup -25.50*
(15.48)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 381.10
(334.70)
High lending fee× Toxicup × ShortUS 27.69
(20.61)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -373.71
(377.56)
U.S. dollar volume 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ban 1.26 1.20 1.27 1.74 1.74
(2.61) (2.65) (2.66) (2.59) (2.61)
VIX 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
U.S. volatility 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.19
(1.54) (1.54) (1.54) (1.50) (1.50)
Capitalization -12.79*** -12.81*** -12.81*** -12.45*** -12.45***
(2.23) (2.24) (2.24) (2.03) (2.03)
U.S. 1/price 63.93*** 63.90*** 63.96*** 61.83*** 61.90***
(13.19) (13.22) (13.21) (13.60) (13.57)
Constant 111.03*** 111.03*** 111.01*** 107.13*** 107.07***
(17.92) (17.98) (17.98) (16.32) (16.27)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 23,460 23,460 23,460 23,460 23,460
R2 (within) 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Anderson-Rubin Wald F statistic 6.34*** 3.74*** 2.95*** 2.73*** 2.23***
Anderson-Rubin Wald Chi-sq statistic 25.57*** 30.14*** 35.72*** 44.11*** 54.13***
Hansen’s J over-identification test 3.75 5.16 6.04 6.82 8.75
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Panel B: Dependent variable is U.S. Amihud illiquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -38.08*** -37.47*** -37.46*** -45.56*** -45.56***
(10.29) (10.24) (10.24) (11.87) (11.87)
ShortUS 1.23** 1.38** 1.38** 1.03* 1.03*
(0.60) (0.66) (0.66) (0.56) (0.56)
ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -21.73** -28.09** -28.08** -25.04* -25.05*
(9.52) (12.05) (12.05) (13.37) (13.38)
Toxic 2.22 0.87
(1.74) (1.68)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -57.90 -31.75
(35.59) (28.29)
Toxic × ShortUS -2.61 -1.02
(2.18) (2.30)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 76.38* 54.54
(40.33) (35.58)
High lending fee -0.97 -0.98
(2.61) (2.61)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 25.88 25.88
(19.24) (19.24)
High lending fee× ShortUS 2.46 2.46
(2.13) (2.13)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -18.10 -18.06
(21.50) (21.50)
High lending fee × Toxic -14.73
(9.54)
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ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -459.33*
(279.25)
High lending fee× Toxic × ShortUS 12.47
(10.01)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁× ܶ݋ݔଓܿ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 451.68
(278.60)
Toxicdown 2.98 1.38
(2.21) (1.83)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -78.27* -50.65
(43.45) (33.96)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -5.03* -2.28
(2.80) (2.53)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 106.02** 74.25*
(47.78) (41.21)
High lending fee× Toxicdown -9.92**
(4.94)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ܷ . .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -331.16**
(146.98)
High lending fee× Toxicdown × ShortUS 1.91
(5.18)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௗ௢௪௡ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 356.83**
(143.48)
Toxicup 1.04 0.14
(2.93) (3.28)
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ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -25.27 3.94
(42.82) (31.31)
Toxicup × ShortUS 0.06 0.48
(3.25) (3.90)
ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 33.10 14.67
(48.38) (40.33)
High lending fee× Toxicup -3.19
(6.88)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ 98.79
(147.83)
High lending fee× Toxicup × ShortUS 6.71
(9.50)
ܪଓ݃ ℎ ݈݁ ݊݀ଓ݊ ݃ ݂݁ ݁ × ܶ݋ݔଓܿ ௨௣ × ℎܵ݋ݎݐ௎ௌ × ܷ. .ܵ ℎܵ݋ݎݐଓ݊ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐ෣ -145.75
(163.73)
U.S. dollar volume 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ban -0.33 -0.38 -0.32 -0.18 -0.18
(1.24) (1.26) (1.25) (1.25) (1.24)
VIX 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 0.10*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
U.S. volatility -0.94 -0.93 -0.93 -0.92 -0.92
(0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.79) (0.79)
Capitalization -3.35*** -3.36*** -3.36*** -3.36*** -3.37***
(0.88) (0.88) (0.88) (0.90) (0.90)
U.S. 1/price 5.44 5.41 5.44 5.49 5.49
(5.23) (5.22) (5.22) (5.11) (5.11)
Constant 27.35*** 27.38*** 27.37*** 27.45*** 27.46***
(7.24) (7.25) (7.25) (7.53) (7.54)
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Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 23,453 23,453 23,453 23,453 23,453
R2 (within) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13
Anderson-Rubin Wald F statistic 4.82*** 3.37*** 2.41*** 2.10*** 2.41***
Anderson-Rubin Wald Chi-sq statistic 19.45*** 27.19*** 29.16*** 33.92*** 58.49***
Hansen’s J over-identification test 1.91 3.54 5.83 6.94 14.25
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Table 4.9: Robustness tests– full time-series estimation
This table presents the effect of short sales on the liquidity in cross-listing arbitrage opportunities with full time-series estimation. Our sample includes 134 Canadian stocks
that are cross-listed in the U.S. between July 2006 and December 2013. The estimation equations are similar to that in Table 4, 5 and 6. Panel A uses percent quoted spread
as the liquidity measure. Panel B uses Amihud illiquidity as the liquidity measure. Variables are as defined in previous tables. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable is U.S. percent quoted spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
U.S. short interest -10.51** -10.51** -10.51** -6.28 -6.29
(4.15) (4.15) (4.15) (4.06) (4.06)
ShortUS 6.25*** 6.01*** 6.01*** 1.44 1.44
(1.24) (1.39) (1.38) (1.03) (1.03)
ShortUS × U.S. short interest -26.90*** -25.88** -25.89** -13.48 -13.50
(9.05) (10.59) (10.60) (9.29) (9.29)
Toxic 2.06 0.13
(2.70) (2.36)
Toxic × U.S. short interest -26.34 -16.80
(16.31) (15.30)
Toxic × ShortUS -1.16 3.65
(3.15) (2.63)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 22.79 -2.10
(20.38) (17.92)
High lending fee 2.38* 2.37*
(1.35) (1.35)
High lending fee× U.S. short interest -15.87 -15.86
(12.14) (12.13)
High lending fee× ShortUS 17.01*** 17.01***
(4.21) (4.21)
High lending fee× ShortUS × U.S. short interest -28.77 -28.77
(18.47) (18.47)
High lending fee× Toxic 8.08***
(3.00)
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High lending fee× Toxic × U.S. short interest -44.04**
(18.31)
High lending fee× Toxic × ShortUS -18.05***
(6.22)
High lending fee× Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 91.96***
(33.48)
Toxicdown 2.87 -0.41
(3.80) (3.28)
Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -47.07** -30.91
(22.28) (20.50)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -2.88 3.72
(4.21) (4.00)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 51.40* 11.62
(27.63) (25.74)
High lending fee× Toxicdown 13.96***
(4.03)
High lending fee× Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -49.86**
(19.78)
High lending fee× Toxicdown × ShortUS -26.19***
(6.88)
High lending fee× Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 121.83***
(36.18)
Toxicup 0.77 1.55
(1.82) (1.80)
Toxicup × U.S. short interest 0.21 -3.54
(15.00) (15.72)
Toxicup × ShortUS 1.13 2.61
(3.20) (2.49)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -17.59 -13.97
(21.96) (20.96)
High lending fee× Toxicup -3.08
(5.20)
140
Table 4.9 (Cont’d)
High lending fee× Toxicup × U.S. short interest 5.96
(56.25)
High lending fee× Toxicup × ShortUS -3.63
(10.15)
High lending fee× Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -21.85
(63.18)
ShortCA 1.67** 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.05
(0.80) (1.01) (1.01) (1.02) (1.02)
ShortCA × U.S. short interest -8.82 -1.01 -1.00 -1.85 -1.86
(7.02) (8.89) (8.89) (9.01) (9.01)
U.S. dollar volume 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ban 9.11*** 9.03*** 9.04*** 9.02*** 9.13***
(2.73) (2.73) (2.73) (2.68) (2.67)
VIX 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
U.S. volatility -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.49 -0.49
(1.13) (1.13) (1.13) (1.10) (1.10)
Capitalization -12.73** -12.73** -12.73** -12.55** -12.55**
(5.42) (5.42) (5.42) (5.42) (5.42)
U.S. 1/price 103.55*** 103.54*** 103.53*** 103.25*** 103.26***
(19.61) (19.60) (19.60) (19.54) (19.54)
Constant 110.19*** 110.18*** 110.22*** 107.68** 107.67**
(41.58) (41.57) (41.57) (41.68) (41.66)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 129,163 129,163 129,163 129,163 129,163
R2 (within) 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
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Panel B: Dependent variable is U.S. Amihud illiquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
U.S. short interest -2.64 -2.64 -2.63 -0.99 -1.00
(1.61) (1.61) (1.60) (1.59) (1.59)
ShortUS 1.71*** 2.01*** 2.01*** 0.19 0.20
(0.60) (0.71) (0.71) (0.48) (0.48)
ShortUS × U.S. short interest -9.36*** -10.56** -10.56** -6.67** -6.67**
(3.53) (4.72) (4.72) (3.06) (3.06)
Toxic 1.24 0.04
(1.36) (1.11)
Toxic × U.S. short interest -3.86 2.71
(8.09) (7.46)
Toxic × ShortUS -2.33 0.44
(1.58) (1.34)
Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 8.08 -3.40
(9.83) (8.30)
High lending fee 0.63 0.62
(0.69) (0.69)
High lending fee × U.S. short interest -6.20 -6.20
(4.76) (4.75)
High lending fee × ShortUS 6.83*** 6.83***
(2.13) (2.13)
High lending fee × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -8.05 -8.04
(13.38) (13.38)
High lending fee × Toxic 5.08**
(2.16)
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High lending fee × Toxic × U.S. short interest -32.46***
(11.92)
High lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS -10.85***
(3.93)
High lending fee × Toxic × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 45.36**
(22.25)
Toxicdown 2.79 0.69
(1.88) (1.53)
Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -13.57 -1.43
(11.79) (11.20)
Toxicdown × ShortUS -5.43** -0.91
(2.18) (1.68)
Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 23.35* 2.71
(12.41) (11.63)
High lending fee × Toxicdown 8.98***
(2.46)
High lending fee × Toxicdown × U.S. short interest -42.36***
(13.28)
High lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS -17.88***
(4.67)
High lending fee × Toxicdown × ShortUS × U.S. short interest 65.51***
(22.97)
Toxicup -1.72* -1.22
(1.01) (1.32)
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Toxicup × U.S. short interest 10.14 8.15
(6.97) (7.76)
Toxicup × ShortUS 2.16 2.32
(1.67) (2.14)
Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -13.99 -11.17
(11.62) (12.10)
High lending fee × Toxicup -1.96
(2.89)
High lending fee × Toxicup × U.S. short interest 2.47
(17.82)
High lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS 0.38
(4.91)
High lending fee × Toxicup × ShortUS × U.S. short interest -7.88
(32.62)
ShortCA 2.23*** 1.84*** 1.85*** 1.84*** 1.85***
(0.76) (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) (0.67)
ShortCA × U.S. short interest -10.15*** -8.95** -8.95** -9.28** -9.28**
(3.86) (4.39) (4.39) (4.42) (4.42)
U.S. dollar volume 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ban 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.89
(1.09) (1.11) (1.12) (1.08) (1.09)
VIX 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
U.S. volatility -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.55 -0.55
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)
Capitalization -3.42 -3.42 -3.42 -3.37 -3.37
(2.09) (2.09) (2.09) (2.11) (2.11)
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U.S. 1/price 24.36*** 24.36*** 24.35*** 24.24*** 24.26***
(8.97) (8.97) (8.97) (8.93) (8.94)
Constant 26.10 26.08 26.11 25.42 25.40
(15.92) (15.91) (15.92) (16.12) (16.13)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 128,984 128,984 128,984 128,984 128,984
R2 (within) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
145
Bibliography
Allen, Franklin, and Faulhaber, Gerald R., 1989, Signaling by Underpricing in the
IPO Market, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 303-323.
Amihud, Yakov, 2002, Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time-series
effects, Journal of Financial Markets 5, 31-56.
Anderson, T. W., and Herman Rubin, 1949, Estimation of the parameters of a single
equation in a complete system of stochastic equations, The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics 20, 46-63.
Anderson, T. W., and Herman Rubin, 1950, The asymptotic properties of estimates
of the parameters of a single equation in a complete system of stochastic
equations, The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 21, 570-582.
Au, Andrea S., John A. Doukas, and Zhan Onayev, 2009, Daily short interest,
idiosyncratic risk, and stock returns, Journal of Financial Markets 12, 290-
316.
Aussenegg, Wolfgang, Pegaret Pichler, and Alex Stomper, 2006, Ipo pricing with
bookbuilding and a when-issued market, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 41, 829-862.
Autore, Don M., Randall S. Billingsley, and Tunde Kovacs, 2011, The 2008 short
sale ban: Liquidity, dispersion of opinion, and the cross-section of returns of
us financial stocks, Journal of Banking and Finance 35, 2252-2266.
Barber, Brad M., and John D. Lyon, 1997, Detecting long-run abnormal stock
returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics, Journal of
Financial Economics 43, 341-372.
146
Beatty, Randolph P., and Jay R. Ritter, 1986, Investment banking, reputation, and
the underpricing of initial public offerings, Journal of Financial Economics
15, 213-232.
Beber, Alessandro, and Marco Pagano, 2013, Short‐selling bans around the world:
Evidence from the 2007–09 crisis, Journal of Finance 68, 343-381.
Benveniste, Lawrence M., and Paul A. Spindt, 1989, How investment bankers
determine the offer price and allocation of new issues, Journal of Financial
Economics 24, 343-361.
Biais, Bruno, 1993, Price formation and equilibrium liquidity in fragmented and
centralized markets, Journal of Finance 48, 157-185.
Bloomfield, Robert, and Maureen O'Hara, 1999, Market transparency: Who wins
and who loses? Review of Financial Studies 12, 5-35.
Bloomfield, Robert, and Maureen O'Hara, 2000, Can transparent markets survive?
Journal of Financial Economics 55, 425-459.
Bloomfield, Robert, Maureen O'Hara, and Gideon Saar, 2015, Hidden liquidity:
Some new light on dark trading, Journal of Finance 70, 2227-2274.
Bodie, Z, A Kane, and AJ Marcus, 2009, Investments. 8th eds, (McGraw-Hill:
Singapore).
Boehmer, Ekkehart, Charles M. Jones, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2008, Which shorts are
informed? Journal of Finance 63, 491-527.
Boehmer, Ekkehart, Charles M. Jones, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2013, Shackling short
sellers: The 2008 shorting ban, Review of Financial Studies 26, 1363-1400.
Boehmer, Ekkehart, Gideon Saar, and L. E. I. Yu, 2005, Lifting the veil: An analysis
of pre-trade transparency at the nyse, Journal of Finance 60, 783-815.
147
Boehmer, Ekkehart, and Juan Wu, 2013, Short selling and the price discovery
process, Review of Financial Studies 26, 287-322.
Brav, Alon, and Paul A. Gompers, 1997, Myth or reality? The long-run
underperformance of initial public offerings: Evidence from venture and
nonventure capital-backed companies, Journal of Finance 52, 1791-1821.
Brunnermeier, Markus K., and Martin Oehmke, 2013, Predatory short selling,
Review of Finanec18, 2153-2195.
Campbell, John Y., Sanford J. Grossman, and Jiang Wang, 1993, Trading volume
and serial correlation in stock returns, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108,
905-939.
Carhart, Mark M., 1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of
Finance 52, 57-82.
Carter, Richard B., Frederick H. Dark, and Ajai K. Singh, 1998, Underwriter
reputation, initial returns, and the long-run performance of ipo stocks,
Journal of Finance 53, 285-311.
Chakrabarty, Bidisha, Pamela C. Moulton, and Andriy Shkilko, 2012, Short sales,
long sales, and the lee–ready trade classification algorithm revisited, Journal
of Financial Markets 15, 467-491.
Chan, Louis K. C., Narasimhan Jegadeesh, and Josef Lakonishok, 1996, Momentum
strategies, Journal of Finance 51, 1681-1713.
Chemmanur, Thomas J., and Paolo Fulghieri, 1994, Investment bank reputation,
information production, and financial intermediation, Journal of Finance 49,
57-79.
Chowdhry, Bhagwan, and Vikram Nanda, 1991, Multimarket trading and market
liquidity, Review of Financial Studies 4, 483-511.
148
Comerton-Forde, Carole, Charles M Jones, and Tālis J Putniņš, 2015, Shorting at 
close range: A tale of two types, Journal of Financial Economics
forthcoming.
Cornelli, Francesca, David Goldreich, and Alexander Ljungqvist, 2006, Investor
sentiment and pre-ipo markets, Journal of Finance 61, 1187-1216.
D’Avolio, Gene, 2002, The market for borrowing stock, Journal of Financial
Economics 66, 271-306.
Davies, Ryan J., and Sang Soo Kim, 2009, Using matched samples to test for
differences in trade execution costs, Journal of Financial Markets 12, 173-
202.
De Jong, Abe, Leonard Rosenthal, and Mathijs A. Van Dijk, 2009, The risk and
return of arbitrage in dual-listed companies, Review of Finance 13, 495-520.
Dechow, Patricia M., Amy P. Hutton, Lisa Meulbroek, and Richard G. Sloan, 2001,
Short-sellers, fundamental analysis, and stock returns, Journal of Financial
Economics 61, 77-106.
Derrien, François, 2005, Ipo pricing in “hot” market conditions: Who leaves money
on the table? Journal of Finance 60, 487-521.
Derrien, François, and Ambrus Kecskés, 2007, The initial public offerings of listed
firms, Journal of Finance 62, 447-479.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Robert E. Verrecchia, 1987, Constraints on short-selling
and asset price adjustment to private information, Journal of Financial
Economics 18, 277-311.
Diether, Karl B., Kuan-Hui Lee, and Ingrid M. Werner, 2009, Short-sale strategies
and return predictability, Review of Financial Studies 22, 575-607.
149
Dorn, Daniel, 2009, Does sentiment drive the retail demand for ipos? Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 85-108.
Duan, Ying, Gang Hu, and R. David McLean, 2010, Costly arbitrage and
idiosyncratic risk: Evidence from short sellers, Journal of Financial
Intermediation 19, 564-579.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Gârleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2002, Securities lending,
shorting, and pricing, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 307-339.
Duong, Truong X., Zsuzsa R. Huszár, and Takeshi Yamada, 2015, The costs and
benefits of short sale disclosure, Journal of Banking and Finance 53, 124-
139.
Edwards, Amy K., and Kathleen Weiss Hanley, 2010, Short selling in initial public
offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 98, 21-39.
Engelberg, Joseph, 2008, Costly information processing: Evidence from earnings
announcements, Unpublished working paper.
Engelberg, Joseph E., Adam V. Reed, and Matthew C. Ringgenberg, 2012, How are
shorts informed?: Short sellers, news, and information processing, Journal of
Financial Economics 105, 260-278.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993, Common risk factors in the returns
on stocks and bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
Foucault, Thierry, Roman Kozhan, and Wing Wah Tham, 2015, Toxic arbitrage,
Unpublished working paper.
Foucault, Thierry, Marco Pagano, and Ailsa Röell, 2013. Market liquidity: Theory,
evidence, and policy (Oxford University Press).
150
Foucault, Thierry, Ailsa Röell, and Patrik Sandås, 2003, Market making with costly
monitoring: An analysis of the soes controversy, Review of Financial Studies
16, 345-384.
Gagnon, Louis, and G. Andrew Karolyi, 2010, Multi-market trading and arbitrage,
Journal of Financial Economics 97, 53-80.
Gagnon, Louis, and Jonathan Witmer, 2014, Distribution of ownership, short sale
constraints, and market efficiency: Evidence from cross-listed stocks,
Financial Management 43, 631-670.
Geczy, Christopher C., David K. Musto, and Adam V. Reed, 2002, Stocks are
special too: An analysis of the equity lending market, Journal of Financial
Economics 66, 241-269.
Goldstein, Itay, and Alexander Guembel, 2008, Manipulation and the allocational
role of prices, The Review of Economic Studies 75, 133-164.
Gozluklu, Arie Eskenazi, 2014, Pre-trade transparency and informed trading:
Experimental evidence on undisclosed orders, Unpublished working paper.
Gregory, Alan, Rajesh Tharyan, and Angela Christidis, 2013, Constructing and
testing alternative versions of the fama–french and carhart models in the uk,
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 40, 172-214.
Grinblatt, M. and Hwang, C.Y., 1989, Signalling and the pricing of new issues, The
Journal of Finance 44, 393-420.
Gromb, Denis, and Dimitri Vayanos, 2002, Equilibrium and welfare in markets with
financially constrained arbitrageurs, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 361-
407.
Gromb, Denis, and Dimitri Vayanos, 2010, Limits of arbitrage, Annual Review of
Financial Economics 2, 251-275.
151
Grossman, Sanford J., and Merton H. Miller, 1988, Liquidity and market structure,
Journal of Finance 43, 617-633.
Handa, P., Schwartz, R. and Tiwari, A., 2003, Quote setting and price formation in
an order driven market, Journal of financial Markets, 6, 461-489.
Hansch, Oliver, Narayan Y. Naik, and S. Viswanathan, 1998, Do inventories matter
in dealership markets? Evidence from the london stock exchange, Journal of
Finance 53, 1623-1656.
Harris, Lawrence, Ethan Namvar, and Blake Phillips, 2013, Price inflation and
wealth transfer during the 2008 SEC short-sale ban, The Journal of
Investment Management, Second Quarter.
Hirshleifer, David, Siew Hong Teoh, and Jeff Jiewei Yu, 2011, Short arbitrage,
return asymmetry, and the accrual anomaly, Review of Financial Studies 24,
2429-2461.
Holden, Craig W., 1995, Index arbitrage as cross-sectional market making, Journal
of Futures Markets 15, 423-455.
Houge, Todd, Tim Loughran, Gerry Suchanek, and Xuemin Yan, 2001, Divergence
of opinion, uncertainty, and the quality of initial public offerings, Financial
Management 30, 5-23.
Huszár, Zsuzsa R, Ruth SK Tan, and Weina Zhang, 2015, Is transparency in the
equity lending market good news? Unpublishend working paper.
Ibbotson, Roger G., 1975, Price performance of common stock new issues, Journal
of Financial Economics 2, 235-272.
Ibbotson, Roger G., Jody L. Sindelar, and Jay R. Ritter, 1994, The market's problems
with the pricing of initial public offerings, Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance 7, 66-74.
152
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman, 1993, Returns to buying winners and
selling losers: Implications for stock market efficiency, Journal of Finance
48, 65-91.
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman, 2011, Momentum, Annual Review of
Financial Economics 3, 493-509.
Jones, Charles M, Adam V Reed, and William Waller, 2014, Revealing shorts: An
examination of large short position disclosures, Unpublished working paper.
Jones, Charles M., and Owen A. Lamont, 2002, Short-sale constraints and stock
returns, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 207-239.
Kaplan, Steven N., Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Berk A. Sensoy, 2013, The effects of
stock lending on security prices: An experiment, Journal of Finance 68,
1891-1936.
Kleibergen, Frank, and Richard Paap, 2006, Generalized reduced rank tests using the
singular value decomposition, Journal of Econometrics 133, 97-126.
Kolasinski, Adam C., Adam V. Reed, and Jacob R. Thornock, 2013, Can short
restrictions actually increase informed short selling? Financial Management
42, 155-181.
Kolasinski, Adam C., Adam V. Reed, and Matthew C. Ringgenberg, 2013, A
multiple lender approach to understanding supply and search in the equity
lending market, Journal of Finance 68, 559-595.
Konukoglu, Emre, 2010, Uninformed momentum traders, Unpublished working
paper
Kot, Hung Wan, 2007, What determines the level of short-selling activity? Financial
Management 36, 123-141.
153
Ljungqvist Alexander , Vikram Nanda, and Rajdeep Singh, 2006, Hot markets,
investor sentiment, and ipo pricing, Journal of Business 79, 1667-1702.
Loughran, Tim, and Jay R. Ritter, 1995, The new issues puzzle, Journal of Finance
50, 23-51.
Loughran, Tim, and Jay R Ritter, 2004, Why has ipo underpricing changed over time?
Financial Management 33, 5-37.
Lyons, Richard K., 1996, Optimal transparency in a dealer market with an
application to foreign exchange, Journal of Financial Intermediation 5, 225-
254.
Madhavan, Ananth, 1995, Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of
trading information, Review of Financial Studies 8, 579-603.
Madhavan, Ananth, 2000, Market microstructure: A survey, Journal of Financial
Markets 3, 205-258.
Madhavan, Ananth, David Porter, and Daniel Weaver, 2005, Should securities
markets be transparent? Journal of Financial Markets 8, 265-287.
Marsh, Ian W., and Richard Payne, 2012, Banning short sales and market quality:
The uk’s experience, Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 1975-1986.
Miller, Edward M., 1977, Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion, Journal of
Finance 32, 1151-1168.
Newey, Whitney K, and Kenneth D West, 1987, A simple, positive semi-definite,
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix,
Econometrica (1986-1998) 55, 703.
Ofek, Eli, and Matthew Richardson, 2003, Dotcom mania: The rise and fall of
internet stock prices, Journal of Finance 58, 1113-1138.
154
Pagano, Marco, and Ailsa Röell, 1996, Transparency and liquidity: A comparison of
auction and dealer markets with informed trading, Journal of Finance 51,
579-611.
Porter, David C., and Daniel G. Weaver, 1996, Estimating bid-ask spread
components: Specialist versus multiple market maker systems, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 6, 167-180.
Prado, Melissa Porras, 2015, Future lending income and security value, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis forthcoming.
Rindi, Barbara, 2008, Informed traders as liquidity providers: Anonymity, liquidity
and price formation, Review of Finance 12, 497-532.
Ritter, Jay R., 1991, The long-run performance of initial public offerings, Journal of
Finance 46, 3-27.
Rock, Kevin, 1986, Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Financial
Economics 15, 187-212.
Roll, Richard, Eduardo Schwartz, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2007, Liquidity
and the law of one price: The case of the futures-cash basis, Journal of
Finance 62, 2201-2234.
Saffi, Pedro A. C., and Kari Sigurdsson, 2010, Price efficiency and short selling,
Review of Financial Studies 24, 821-852.
Scheinkman, José A., and Xiong Wei , 2003, Overconfidence and speculative
bubbles, Journal of Political Economy 111, 1183-1220.
Shkilko, Andriy, Bonnie Van Ness, and Robert Van Ness, 2012, Short selling and
intraday price pressures, Financial Management 41, 345-370.
Stern, Richard L, and Paul Bornstein, 1985, Why new issues are lousy investments,
Forbes 136, 152-190.
155
Stock, James, and Motohiro Yogo, 2005. Asymptotic distributions of instrumental
variables statistics with many instruments (Chapter).
Teoh, Siew Hong, Ivo Welch, and T. J. Wong, 1998, Earnings management and the
long-run market performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance
53, 1935-1974.
Vega, Clara, 2006, Stock price reaction to public and private information, Journal of
Financial Economics 82, 103-133.
Welch, I., 1989, Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial
public offerings, The Journal of Finance 44, 421-449.
Yin, Xiangkang, 2005, A comparison of centralized and fragmented markets with
costly search, Journal of Finance 60, 1567-1590.
